192 Iowa 746 | Iowa | 1921
This is an action for the rescission of a written contract for the sale and exchange of real properties, for the cancellation of a deed executed as part performance thereunder, and for other specific and general equitable re--1- ° relief. *
The facts disclosed by the record are substantially as fol
It is claimed by plaintiffs that A. Y. Mclntire, while on the premises, pointed out a schoolhouse on the tract, and stated that it was located on the farm; also stated and represented that there were three wells, one near the house, another hear the barn, and a third in the held or pasture, that never went dry, and that they furnished a never failing supply of water. Robert Mclntire testified that he heard no such statement, and denied that his father represented him in any sense as agent, but asserted that he went with them because they had not seen each other for some time, to visit. J. L. McCormick and Deming, however, both testified that A. V. Mclntire in fact said that the wells never went dry, and that there was always an abundance of water in them. A. Y. Mclntire denied making any of the statements attributed to him, testifying that he said that the water in the wells was as good as any in that vicinity, and that he offered to measure the water in them, and offered them a drink, to prove his statement. It is also contended by counsel for appellants that A. V. Mclntire was either in fact the owner of the land, personally interested therein, or represented Robert. This is denied’ by the defendants, and is not sustained by the evidence.
There is no doubt that A. Y. Mclntire, when he lived upon the farm, occasionally hauled water, in dry seasons, with which
Plaintiffs promptly furnished an abstract of title to the residence property, and delivered it to Deming for the use of the defendant, after the contract was signed. This abstract was examined by an attorney in Des Moines, who made a few requirements as to minor matters, and returned it to the defendant. Although frequently requested and urged to furnish an abstract to the farm, the defendant delayed doing so until some time in September. He offered, however, to deposit $1,000 in a bank, to guarantee the title. This abstract, when examined by appel-' lants’ attorney, revealed many defects in the record title to the farm. These defects, however, were not of a serious character, and some were obviated by the statute; while others required only affidavits, to cover them. The examiner also complained of the form of the abstract, and requested that it be put in better shape for examination, and that, when the requirements were met, it be returned to him for further examination. According to the testimony of the defendants, the abstract, with the requirements of plaintiffs’ attorney, was turned over to an abstracter, with directions to secure affidavits and to do whatever was necessary to perfect the title. This, of course, necessitated some delay. The defendants did not return the abstract to plaintiffs or to their attorney; but shortly before the trial commenced in the court below, they tendered a new abstract, which, it is claimed, shows a good, merchantable title to the farm. Plaintiffs refused to accept the new abstract, and the trial proceeded. The new abstract is not before us, nor has counsel for appellant
“Where an action is commenced against a vendor by his vendee, based upon an alleged defect in or failure of title> it will be sufficient to defeat the action if it be made to appear that before trial the title has been perfected. Stevenson v. Polk, 71 Iowa 288.”
Assuming that the new abstract met the requirements of the contract, it was sufficient upon this point.
Plaintiffs further contend that the deed conveying the Highland Park property was delivered to Deming with instructions to hold it until the defendants furnished an abstract to the farm. Deming denies that anything was said about the abstract, or that he was instructed to hold it until a deed was received from Mclntire. He testified that he did not deliver it until he received the Mclntire deed, but that, on account of a defect in the first deed, a second one was executed on July 25th. Deming’s version of the transaction is corroborated to some extent by the
We need not consider the effect of the failure of plaintiffs to comply with the court’s decree granting them only 10 days within which to examine the new abstract and furnish defendant with a statement of the objections and requirements of their attorney thereto, except to say that this requirement and provision of the decree in the court below shall not be held to in any wise prejudice appellants’ right to demand and receive a merchantable title to the Davis County land, together with an abstract showing same; and to this extent the decree is set aside and modified. We are convinced that the decree dismissing plaintiffs’ petition should be sustained. The proof of the alleged fraudulent representations is not sustained by a preponderance of the evidence, and no sufficient reason is shown for rescinding the contract or for the cancellation of the deed conveying the residence property to Robert Mclntire.