192 Iowa 357 | Iowa | 1921
I. Plaintiff alleges that, as sheriff of Page County from January 1, 1904, to January 1, 1911, he was in charge of the county jail, and waited on the prisoners confined
Defendant county admits that plaintiff did not make quarterly itemized reports for compensation claimed by him, as required by Section 508; denies that it refused to furnish plaintiff blanks for making such claims; and denies that it has waived the requirements of Section 508, and that it is estopped thereby to say that such reports were not filed as required by statute.
Defendant alleges that, at frequent intervals, plaintiff made claims against it for washing for prisoners, as provided in Paragraph 17 of Section 511 of the Supplement to the Code, 191.3, and that these claims were all paid and settled in full by defendant ; that plaintiff accepted such payment; and that, by his acceptance of the amount so allowed, his whole claim against
Defendant further alleges that plaintiff made itemized reports, as required by Section 508, for all claims he had against the county, except for waiting on prisoners; that such reports and claims were approved by the board of supervisors, and that settlement was made with plaintiff, as required by Section 508; that, during the entire time of plaintiff’s terms as sheriff, and up to January 20, 1915, he made no claim whatever for waiting on and washing for prisoners, and that no claim was' presented to the board, so that the same could be acted upon, except that, during all of the time plaintiff was an incumbent of the office, he made claims at stated intervals for washing, for prisoners, as provided in Paragraph 17 of Section 511, and that full settlement was made with him on such claims for washing for prisoners, and he was paid in full for such services; that plaintiff did not make the claim in suit until July 20, 1915, which was more than 4% years after his last term of office had expired, and more than 11 years after his right to compensation for such services for the first quarter of his first term had accrued; and that, because of the lapse of so many years after such services were rendered, and by reason of the laches, of plaintiff in presenting his claim, by reason of his long acquiescence in the settlements made with him, and by reason of plaintiff’s negligence in failing to make claims against defendant for such services, as provided by law, plaintiff waived all claim against the defendant for services, and plaintiff is estopped from claiming and recovering anything for such services.
Replying, plaintiff admits that he made claims against the county at various times for washing for prisoners, which claims were paid, but denies that the payment thereof constituted in any way a settlement of the claims now urged for waiting on
Plaintiff further says that he could bring no action on his account until claim therefor was filed with the defendant county and payment refused, and that five years have not elapsed since the filing of said claim and refusal to pay the same; that the claim he is now urging against the defendant county is a running account, and constitutes but one sole cause of action, and that five years have not elapsed from the last item of the account to the time of the bringing of this action; that waiver is of a contractual nature, and would be against public policy; and. that the waiver and estoppel claimed by defendant are not of matters which could be waived.
A jury was waived, and the case tried to the court. The court dismissed plaintiff’s action, and rendered judgment against him for costs.
There is no dispute as to material facts.
Plaintiff served as sheriff of Page County from January 1, 1904, to January 1, 1911. During this time, he had charge of the jail of Page County, and was custodian of the prisoners committed during that time. He washed the prisoners’ personal clothing and bedclothing, scrubbed and cleaned the jail, and performed the usual and ordinary services necessary in waiting on and caring for the prisoners. Plaintiff kept a book entitled “Prisoners’ Expense Account. ” This book was ruled in columns, giving the names, ages, and sex of the prisoners, the date when received, the charge made for boarding each prisoner, charges for washing for each prisoner, fees for receiving and releasing each prisoner, a column for the total expense account for each prisoner, and the date of discharge. This book also had a column for miscellaneous charges. In the column “washing” appears a charge after the name of every prisoner, commencing’ with the first entry, dated January 2, 1904, and ending Decem
Plaintiff offered testimony that reasonable compensation for his services in waiting on prisoners was from 15 to 35 cents per prisoner per day. Plaintiff himself testified that such service was worth 20 cents, and 20 cents per day per prisoner is the compensation he demands.
Defendant demurred to plaintiff’s petition as amended, based on the statute of limitations, and the demurrer was overruled. Defendant then answered, setting up, among other defenses, that plaintiff’s action was barred. Plaintiff moved to strike defendant’s amended and substituted answer, which motion was by the court overruled.
The decided weight of authority is to the effect that the statute of limitations may be pleaded, unless waived by agreement, express or clearly to be implied, that this will not be done. McKay v. McCarthy, 146 Iowa 546; Howe v. Sioux County, 180 Iowa 580.
The plaintiff pleads that he did not render the quarterly itemized reports for the matters covered by his claim, as provided in Section 508, and gives as his principal reasons that he was not furnished blanks for so doing, and that the board did not fix a stated amount per person per day for waiting on prisoners. He pleads these reasons as estoppel against the defendant to say that his reports were not filed as required by statute, and says the defendant waived such requirement. The court found, as a matter of law, that the facts proved by plaintiff in reference to these matters, did not constitute an estoppel against the county to plead the statute of limitations. The statute does not require the board to fix the compensation per day per prisoner for washing for and waiting on prisoners, in advance of the sheriff’s filing claim for such services. Paragraph 17 of Section 511 of the Code is as follows:
“For waiting on and washing for prisoners, the sheriff shall have su'ch reasonable compensation as shall be allowed .by the board of supervisors.”
IV. This case was before this court once before, and is reported in 179 Iowa 1032.
“We are of opinion that claims for ‘waiting on and washing for prisoners’ must have been presented to the board of supervisors by plaintiff at the end of every three months during his several terms of office; and if for any reason he did not do so, he should so state, and if he did, he should state how- much was allowed, to the end that only precisely what he then claimed, the amount allowed, and the balance, if any, remaining unpaid, shall be litigated; or, if his claim is for an additional amount, the basis thereof may be ascertained.”
We think the court was correct in holding that the excuses offered by the plaintiff for not filing his claims quarterly, as provided by statute, were not sufficient, and did not stay the running of the statute of limitations; and that the claims in this case are barred, except for the last two quarters of the year 1910. Code Section 508; McCord v. Page County, 179 Iowa 1032.
VI. We come now to consider whether plaintiff is entitled to recover on his claim for the last two quarters.
Harding v. County of Montgomery, 55 Iowa 41, is cited in support of the holding. Accordingly, the court held that he could not determine, under the evidence, how much of plaintiff’s present claims are for such washing, and how much for the other items mentioned in his petition, and therefore the court
The majority accept the view of the trial court, and hold that appellant is precluded from recovery also for services claimed for waiting on prisoners during the last two quarters of the year 1910.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.- — Affirmed.