This is an action for divorce and alimony instituted by Eiphie McConnell against Hugh McConnell. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Missouri on August 12, 1906, and soon afterwards came to defendant’s home at Paragould, Arkansas, and lived there until their separation on April 9, 1908. At the time of their marriage, plaintiff was 23, and defendant was 50 years old. Defendant was a man of considerable property, and plaintiff had nоthing. When they separated, they executed a written agreement whereby plaintiff was to receive $500 in lieu of all her claims or interest of any kind whatever in her husband’s property. When they seрarated, plaintiff went to her mother, and has not lived in the State of Arkansas since that time. She alleged in her complaint that her husband drove her from his home, and refused to live with her for .more than one year before she instituted the action. She also alleged matters which if true amounted to such indignities as to render her condition in life intolerable. The suit was commenced in the fall of 1909.
The defendant denied the allegations of the complaint! During the pendency of the suit, the court allowed plaintiff temporary alimony and also an attorney’s fee in the sum of $100. On final heаring, the chancellor found that plaintiff was not entitled to a divorce; but that she was entitled to alimony. A decree was entered dismissing her complaint for divorce for want of equity, and allowing her permanent alimony in the sum of $50 per month, and setting aside the agreement of the parties in regard to the rights and interest of the wife in her husband’s .property -made at the time of their separation. The court also refused to allow any additional attorney’s fee. The case is here on appeal.
On the whole case, we think the decision of the chancellor was сorrect. In cases of this sort, we do not think ariy useful purpose can be served by setting out in detail the evidence or making extended comments on it.
We deem it sufficient to say that a carеful consideration of the testimon}' leads us to the 'conclusion that there is no sufficient reason why the parties to this suit should not keep the vows made by them at the marriage altar and live togеther as husband and wife. No charge of immoral conduct is made by either. Neither appears to have any settled hatred or antipathy for the other. It appears that they had no mаrital troubles until in October, 1907, when a sister of the defendant came to live with them. She had an equal share in her brother’s residence, and they owned other property in common. She seems to hаve had a desire to take charge of the household, and the plaintiff naturally resented her actions in this regard. The defendant became involved in the trouble and jealousy thus engendered, and participated in the quarrels. The quarrels between plaintiff and defendant grew more frequent and more violent, and finally culminated in their separation, which, as above stated, occurred on April 9, 1908. Shortly after their separation, plaintiff brought suit against Mollie McConnell, the sister of the defendant, alleging that she had alienated her husband’s affections from her. Plaintiff dismissed this suit, and subsequеntly the sister of defendant died. It appears that the parties to the suit, during its pendency, have at different times sought a reconciliation; but it seems that they have never been of that mind at the sаme time, and it is difficult for us to determine whether such efforts have been made in good faith, or for the purpose of obtaining some benefit in the trial of this case. We are inclined to the lattеr opinion. However, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff failed to establish her grounds for 'divorce, and that the decision of the chancellor in dismissing her complaint for divorce wаs correct. But it does not follow, as contended by counsel for defendant, that he erred either in setting aside their separation agreement or in allowing her permanent alimony payable in monthly installments. The facts in this case are not like those in either the case of Prior v. Prior,
While, as above stated, the evidence was not sufficient to justify the chancellоr in entering a decree of divorce for the plaintiff, we think it does show that the defendant was more to blame for the separation than the plaintiff. It was his duty to cleave to his wife in preference to his sister. It is also the duty of the husband to support his wife, and, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the allowance of alimony made by the chancellor -in the final decree should not now be disturbed. Shirey v. Shirey,
We now come to the question of attorney’s fees. It is shown that the plaintiff made an agreement with her attorney that he should receive a portion of whatever property, real or personal, should be awarded her out of her husband’s estate. An agreement by a wife to pay her attorney in a suit for divorce and alimony against her husband a certain per cent, of such sums as the court should award her for alimony is void as against public policy. 2 Nelson on Divorce and Separation, § 88; 14 Cyc. 763; Van Vleck v. Van Vleck, 47 N. Y. Sup. 470; Jоrdan v. Westerman,
Now, it is contended by counsel fоr defendant that, although such contract is void, there is no presumption that the wife will not fulfil it; and that where her attorney has faithfully and satisfactorily acted for her in pursuance of an agreеment for a contingent interest in the result of the litigation, there is. no necessity entitling her -to an allowance for attorney’s fees; and -contend that the court erred -in allowing the suni of $100 for her сounsel fees. They rely upon the cases of White v. White,
The decree will be affirmed.