105 Wash. 659 | Wash. | 1919
The respondent, Gordon Construction Company, at Seattle, on November 3, 1909, wrote to the appellant at Denver, Colorado, a letter offering to construct for him a building substantially a reproduction of one then situated at the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, in Seattle. This letter contained the following:
“We will furnish drawings and specifications by Harry Weatherwax . . . and furnish all material and labor and construct for you the ‘Monitor and Merrimac’ building, as per Weatherwax’s plans . . . We will build in a substantial and workmanlike manner the ‘Monitor and Merrimac’ building, which will be a substantial reproduction of the ‘Monitor and Merrimac’ building on the ‘Pay Streak’, AY.-P. Exposition, with some additions and changes, as follows: ... ”
The offer contained in this letter was accepted by the appellant, and the respondent construction company proceeded with the construction of the building, having furnished a bond guaranteeing’ the faithful performance of the contract with the respondent insurance company as surety. The construction company completed the building and turned the same over to the appellant. Ten days later the building suddenly collapsed. The appellant reconstructed the building, and instituted this action to recover the cost of such reconstruction, and the damages resulting from the collapse.
The appellant’s complaint was based upon his allegation that the construction company had improperly
The appellant’s testimony was taken by depositions, and several months were consumed in preparing the case for trial, and during this time and while the appellant’s testimony was being produced before the jury, the respondent construction company gave no intimation that any other issue than that especially raised by the pleadings was to be presented. The construction company, however, was allowed, when presenting its defense, to introduce evidence that the plans were inherently defective in that the trusses were insufficient, as designed, to carry the weight which, of necessity, they must bear. This testimony was introduced over the objection of the appellant that the construction company, having furnished the plans, was liable for any defects therein, and would be responsible for the collapse of the building if it were
The testimony introduced respecting the adequacy of the plans should have been excluded for two reasons; the first being that the contract between the parties having called for the furnishing of the plans by the respondent construction company, thereby that company vouched for the adequacy of the plans and cannot now raise any question thereto. Where either party to a building contract agrees to furnish, and does furnish, the plans for a building, he thereby guarantees their sufficiency for the purpose. Huetter v. Warehouse & Realty Co., 81 Wash. 331, 142 Pac. 675, L. R. A. 19150 671. The respondent offered the testimony upon the theory — which the trial court adopted—that the word “furnish,” as used in the contract, was so indefinite or ambiguous as to allow the production of parol testimony to explain it, and under this ruling the respondent construction company was allowed to show that the appellant was familiar with the plans at the time the contract was entered into; and that, as a matter of fact, instead of the respond
The second reason why this testimony was inadmissible is that assigned by the appellant in his objection' to it. The case had been at issue under the pleadings as framed by the parties for many months, both parties had attended "and taken depositions, and the trial had proceeded to the point where the respondents were about to introduce their testimony before the appellant was apprised of the fact that any defense other than that suggested in the affirmative defense was to be relied upon. If the defense of inadequacy of the plans had been otherwise admissible, it was of the same nature as the defense that the collapse of the building was occasioned by the additional weight imposed by reason of the appellant’s changes of construction. If these were matters which could not properly be raised by general denial, then each of them should have been pleaded as an affirmative defense. If, however, they were both issues presentable under the general denial, as is claimed by the respondents, then the fact that one of them was specially plead, and the presentation of the other was neither specially made in the pleadings nor in any
The appellant has further objected to the verdict against him for the reason that there was no competent evidence of the value of the extra work for which the jury found him liable. This presents a question of fact, and from an examination of the record, we are satisfied the jury was in possession of sufficient facts to justify a return of the verdict.
The judgment as it stands carries interest from the date of the collapse of the building. This is erroneous, as interest should only be allowed from the date of the judgment. Wright v. Tacoma, 87 Wash. 334, 151 Pac. 837.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the lower court will be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Chadwick, C. J., Tolman, Mitchell, and Main, JJ., concur.