MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before this Court are matters of confidentiality remanded to it by the Three-Judge District Court, 1 McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-582 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2003) (order remanding to a single-judge district court matters of confidentiality and the proposed Press Intervenors’ motion to make public the full record), relating to the consolidated action challenging as unconstitutional the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (“BCRA”). After considering both party and non-party objections, the Three-Judge District Court’s Agreed Protective Order, McConnell v. FEC, 02-582 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2002) (order to permit the parties to file certain designated documents as “Confidential” or “Counsel Only”), the Three-Judge District Court’s oral order regarding the unsealing of protected documents, see Tr. at 387-96 (McConnell v. FEC, 02-582 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2002) [hereinafter “Oral Order”] (oral order to consider unsealing documents filed pursuant to the Agreed Protective Order)), and the applicable law, the Court shall unseal and make public the opinions of the Three-Judge District Court and the vast amount of information contained therein supporting the Court’s conclusions. However, the Court will not unseal any part of the record originally filed under seal that is not contained in the opinions.
The Order accompanying this memorandum opinion will articulate the specific obligations of the parties. Essentially, the opinions of the Three-Judge District Court will be disclosed in their entirety, save for several narrow exceptions.
2
In
This Court has determined that in certain narrow instances, non-parties to this proceeding are entitled to remain confidential under
United States v. Hubbard,
I. BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed BCRA into law, the first major overhaul of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) since the 1974 Amendments and their revision following
Buckley v. Valeo,
In an effort to “expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition” of this consolidated action, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a)(4) (note); BCRA § 403(a)(4), on August 13, 2002, the Three-Judge District Court signed an Agreed to Protective Order. McConnell v. FEC, 02-582 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter “Agreed Protective Order”] (order). The Order permitted the parties to exchange documents during discovery and file certain designated documents with the Court as “Confidential” or “Counsel Only,” Agreed Protective Order ¶¶ 2-7, thereby avoiding prolonged wrangling over discovery requests. The Three-Judge District Court, however, retained discretion to review and modify the Agreed Protective Order. Id. ¶ 11 (“All Confidential Information that is filed with the Court ... shall be filed under seal and kept under seal until further order of the Court.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 12 (“This Order shall not preclude any party from seeking a ruling from the Court regarding the validity or propriety of any claim of confidentiality asserted by the producing entity.”); id. ¶ 13 (“Nothing in this Order shall prevent or in any way limit or impair the right of cоunsel for the parties to file a motion to unseal portions of the record for purposes of this litigation.”); id. ¶ 25 (“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary that may be set forth herein, the parties understand that the Court shall retain the authority to modify this Order upon good cause shown.”).
On December 5, 2002, the Three-Judge District Court orally notified the parties at the oral argument of its intention to unseal the entire record,
see
Tr. at 387-96, unless specific written objections were filed with the Court delineating the “legal basis” in support of keeping designated portions of the record sealed.
Id.
at 396 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Such objections were expected to be consistent with the “stringent” presumption of disclosure.
Id.
at 396 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Counsel for the litigants were directed to notify third parties of the Three-Judge District Court’s intention to unseal the record as the parties would be better able to identify them than the Court; particularly given the vo
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
The D.C. Circuit gave form to the common law right to access in
United States v. Hubbard,
(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent to which the public had access to the documents prior to the sealing order; (3) the fact that a party has objected to disclosure and the identity of that party; (4) the strength of the property and privacy interests involved; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced.
Johnson,
III. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to the Three-Judge District Court’s December 5, 2002, Oral Order, the parties and non-parties to the cоnsolidated action were put on notice that all documents subject to the Agreed Protective Order would be unsealed, unless specific objections were raised.
See
Tr. at 387-96. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the level of specificity in the objec
A. The Agreed Protective Order
As noted above, the Court retained considerable discretion to modify and unseal the record under the Agreed Protective Order. The Order, by its clear and plain terms, puts both parties and non-parties, alike, on notice: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary that may be set forth herein, the parties understand that the Court shall retain the authority to modify this Order upon good cause shown.” Agreed Protective Order ¶ 25.
Despite the patent terms of the Order, many of the parties contend that the Court should not compel the disclosure of documents filed under seal.
See, e.g.,
Mot. of NRTWC to Maintain Docs. Under Seal at 4-5 (contending that NRTWC’s reliance on the Agreed Protective Order precludes disclоsure of certain documents). With regard to Plaintiffs, the Court finds this argument, by itself, without merit. Plaintiffs willfully challenged the constitutionality of BCRA and placed evidence before this Court to adjudicate their claims. Moreover, as litigants in this case, they should have been well-aware of the terms of the Agreed Protective Order. While the terms of the Agreed Protective Order, alone, do not compel the disclosure of sealed documents, its terms are certainly not a barrier to disclosure. At the same time, the binding law of this circuit, handed down,
inter alia,
in
Hubbard,
requires the Court to consider the nature of each document, mindful of “this country’s strong tradition of access to judicial proceedings.”
Hubbard,
Indeed, in
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
This Court is left to conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims of reliance on the Agreed Protective Order are without merit. Under their logic, each litigant would be free to decide for the Court what information is or is not confidential. Such a conclusion would defy the principles laid down in Nixon v. Warner and is contrary to the Court’s prerogative explicitly stated in the Agreed Protective Order.
On the other hand, the Court is sensitive to the unique concerns of non-parties to this litigation. Although the terms of the Agreed Protective Order are no less plain when read by a non-party, these individuals or entities were brought into this proceeding by the parties to provide evidence — acquired, it appears, based on assurances of confidentiality — and clearly have a greater privacy interest than those here by their own volition. The status of non-parties, alone, does not shield their objections from review by the Court under the principles laid down in Hubbard; however, the Court is cognizant of their unique interests and rights.
B. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(12)(A) Objections
Various parties — namely the AFL-CIO Plaintiffs,
7
Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs,
8
several McConnell Plaintiffs,
9
and the FEC Defendant — object to the disclosure of certain documents, purported to fall under the auspices of 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(12)(A). Joint Statement Regarding Confidentiality of 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(12)(A) Materials by Pis. AFL-CIO, Chamber of Commerce and Other Pis. and Def. FEC at 4 [hereinafter “Joint Statement”]. According to these parties, certain contested documents “constitute part of the non-public administrative record in a closed FEC enforcement proceeding, Matters Under Review (‘MURs’) 4291,
et. al,
and are subject to the decision in
AFL-CIO v. FEC,
The plain language of Section 437g(a)(12)(A) prohibits the FEC from disclosing information from its investigative
Any notification оr investigation made under this section shall not be made public by the Commission or by any person without the written consent of the person receiving such notification or the person with respect to whom such investigation is made.
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(12)(A). Section 437g(a)(12)(A) is implemented by 11 C.F.R. § 111.21(a), which provides that:
Except as provided in 11 CFR 111.20, no complaint filed with the Commission, nor any notification sent by the Commission, nor any investigation conducted by the Commission, nor any findings made by the Commission shall be made public by the Commission or by any person or entity without the written consent of the respondent with respect to whom the complaint was filed, the notification sent, the investigation conducted, or the finding made.
11 C.F.R. § 111.21(a). In
In re Sealed Case,
the D.C. Circuit held that “both 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(12)(A) and 11 C.F.R. § 111.21(a) plainly prohibit the FEC from disclosing information concerning
ongoing
investigations under any circumstances without the written consent of the subject of the investigation.”
In re Sealed Case,
The facts of this proceeding, however, are readily distinguishable from both In re Sealed Case and AFL-CIO. Plaintiffs’ purported Section 437g(a)(12)(A) documents can be divided into two categories: (1) documents filed with the Court by AFL-CIO Plaintiffs, Joint Statement at 3, and (2) documents filed with the Court by Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and Associated Builders and Contractors Plaintiffs (collectively, “Coalition Plaintiffs”), id. at 4-5. Both sets of documents filed with the Court were also filed with the FEC during an administrative enforcement action. With regard to the first category of documents, “the AFL-CIO agreed to identify documents in the record of MURs 4291, et al., ... that were resрonsive to defendants’ discovery requests ... and provide them to the defendants under ... the Agreed Protective Order.” Id. at 3. In the Joint Statement, AFL-CIO Plaintiffs state that these documents were produced from AFL-CIO files and “recopied and provided to the FEC” for this litigation. Id. at 3^4. The second set of documents, involving Coalition Plaintiffs, were produced in a slightly different fashion. Rather than recopy documents from their own files, Coalition Plaintiffs “stipulated to a procedure that allowed counsel for defendants to review and use documents in the FEC’s files” for this litigation. Id. at 5. According to the discovery stipulation, Coalition Plaintiffs “agree[d] to make [documents in the FEC’s files] available to the Commission for use in [this] litigation as if they had been produced by the Client [Coalition Plaintiffs] in response to [discovery] Requests.” Praecipe Filing Discovery Stipulation at 2 [hereinafter “Discovery Stipulation”] (emphasis added). Under the process agreed to by the parties, FEC Defendant first produced the documents from its investigative files, then these documents were delivered to Coalition Plaintiffs for review, and finally, the documents were copied for use in this litigation and tendered to the FEC in response to its discovery requests. See id. at 2-3.
As noted above, the documents provided by AFL-CIO Plaintiffs had already been tendered to the FEC during an investigative proceeding. In the course of this litigation, however, AFL-CIO Plaintiffs reproduced these documents from their own files and turned them over to FEC Defendant аnew, in response to discovery requests. As a result, the documents produced for this proceeding did not come directly from an FEC investigative file, but rather from AFL-CIO Plaintiffs’ files. As for the second set of documents, while these documents originally came from a FEC investigative file, they were returned to Coalition Plaintiffs — consistent with the statute — where they were reviewed, copied, and returned to FEC Defendant “as if they had been produced by the [Coalition Plaintiffs] in response to [discovery] Requests.” Discovery Stipulation at 2. By reviewing and returning the documents as if disclosing documents from their own files, Coalition Plaintiffs’ Section 437g(a)(12)(A) claims were vitiated.
Coalition Plaintiffs were, of course, entitled to review the portions of the FEC’s files that they originally supplied as the result of an administrative enforcement proceeding. By reviewing and copying those documents, however, and then returning them to FEC Defendant in response to a discovery request in this litigation, the documents no longer fall under the protections afforded by Section 437g(a)(12)(A). Defendant FEC did not seek the returned-documents as the result of a FECA enforcement proceeding, rather these documents were requested during discovery in a civil trial initiated by Coalition Plaintiffs.
In fact, the FEC was explicitly prohibited from opening its investigative files in response to discovery requests by parties not related to the particular information requested. See McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-582 at 4-5 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2002) [hereinafter “August 13, 2002, Order”] (order denying the FEC a protective order that would allow it to disclose to certain parties the entire investigative files of approximately 61 pending or closed FEC administrative enforcement proceedings). The Three-Judge District Court recognized the “sensitive nature of the documents” and observed that “less intrusive alternatives to disclosing the files” existed rather than permitting the diverse interests to this case to “rummage” through these files. Id. at 10. In a footnote, the Three-Judge District Court noted that the Plaintiffs, in fact, had suggested one such alternative:
Insofar as any plaintiff happens to be an investigated party in one of the FEC’s ongoing or closed investigations, that plaintiff and the Commission have equal access to the documents provided in the investigation by that party, and either can seek to reach an accommodation with the other about the use of any such document here. Or, the FEC can, through discovery requests or third party subpoenas — appropriately tailored under Rule 26 or Rule 45 to the issues in the case at bar — obtain the documents anew, with the parties so targeted for discovery cognizant of the effort and able to protect their legal interests.
The fact that Coalition Plaintiffs stipulated that the disclosure of this information did not constitute a “waiver of any protection afforded under § 437g of FECA” is inapposite. Discovery Stipulation at 3. As the Court has demonstrated, the documents proffered by Coalition Plaintiffs and returned to the FEC are entitled to no protection under Section 437g(a)(12)(A). The waiver provision means that by tendering these documents to the FEC as the result of a discovery request, Coalition Plaintiffs’ actions did not constitute a waiver of their statutory protections afforded under Section 437g(a)(12)(A) for release in other contexts. Accordingly, the FEC is still precluded from releasing these and other documents directly from its investigative files or using these documents, tendered during discovery, for purposes other than this litigation.
Under the logic expounded in the Joint Statement, the protections accorded by Section 437g(a)(12)(A) would extend beyond the clear language of the statute. According to the parties, once a document became part of an FEC investigative file, the original document, still in the possession of the party being investigated, would be forever shielded from disclosure, even where that document was responsive to a discovery request and obtained anew in a separate judicial proceeding.
11
This argument is unpersuasive. Section
The Plaintiffs in this action chose to litigate with the understanding that they could be required to produce documents in response to discovery requests, and that such documents could potentially become a part of the judicial record, where there is a “strong tradition of [public] access.”
Hubbard,
C. The Common Law Right of Access to Judicial Proceedings
Many of the parties and non-parties to this litigation object to the disclosure of certain documents filed with the Court under seal. While this country has a “strong tradition of access to judicial proceedings,”
id.,
the right of access is far from absolute,
Nixon,
The Court is therefore vested with considerable discretion,
see, e.g., Nixon,
D. Application of the Hubbard Test
(1) Party Objections or Waivers
Hubbard
requires the Court to consider the identity of each party that raises an objection.
Hubbard,
(a) McConnell Plaintiffs 15
Of the twenty-one individuals and organizations that comprise the McConnell
The objections filed by these seven McConnell Plaintiffs can be divided into two categories: (1) Section 437g(a)(12)(A) and (2) general Hubbard objections. The Court has already indicated, however, that it finds Plaintiffs ABC and ABC PAC’s Section 437g(a)(12)(A) arguments unpersuasive. See supra Discussion at 927-30. As a result, the Court will consider ABC and ABC PAC’s Section 437g(a)(12)(A) objections under Hubbard. 16
NRLC, NRL Education Trust Fund, NRL-PAC and CFG Plaintiffs (collectively, “NRLC and CFG Plaintiffs”) object to the disclosure of all but eight documents filed with the Court. See Objections to Unsealing Confidential Docs, by Pis.’ NRLC and CFG at 2-3. In addition, NRLC and CFG Plaintiffs continue to object to the disclosure of the confidential portions of NRLC Executive Director Dr. David O’Steen and CFG Executive Director David Keating’s depositions. See id. at 2.
The Three-Judge District Court does not cite to any documents contested by NRLC Plaintiffs. The only contested material relied upon by the Three-Judge District Court in its opinions consists of a portion of Keating’s deposition, see Keat-ing Dep. at 59 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.6.3; Leon’s Op. at Findings ¶ 308), which appears in the form of a quotation in Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Findings of Fact, and a citation to minutes of The Club for Growth’s Board Meeting (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.5.1). The contested portion of the deposition clearly does not satisfy the stringent test under Hubbard. The quoted portion of Keating’s deposition does not allude to sensitive political information or disclose any political “trade secrets,” and this material has been deemed probative to the disposition of the Three-Judge District Court’s adjudication. Accordingly, this Court will order the disclosure of this quotation as it appears in my Findings of Fact. As for the minutes of the Board Meeting, since I do not quote from this document and only provide a citation to the document in the record, I will keep the document under seal. Applying Hubbard, I conclude that since the Board’s minutes are not widely disseminated and since CFG expressed a strong privacy interest in the document, the minutes shall remain under seal. In this ease, the private interests in keeping the Board’s minutes confidential outweighs the clear, probative value of the information contained therein.
(b)NRA Plaintiffs 17
NRA Plaintiffs only object to the disclosure of “sensitive financial information.” Objections of the NRA and PVF to Lifting the Confidentiality Designations with Respect to Sensitive Financial Information at 1. As a result, NRA Plaintiffs have waived their objections to the disclosure of all documents filed with the Court, save the objected to financial information. See id.
Undoubtedly, litigation regarding the regulation of our campaign finance system will involve money. In many instances, the parties filed documents with the Court that contained sensitive third-party financial information, including bank account and credit card numbers. Because there is no public interest in the release of such information, and given the real and substantial harm that would result from the disclosure of this information, all parties, including NRA Plaintiffs, will be permitted to redact sensitive financial information, including, but not necessarily limited to, credit card and bank account numbers. This, of course, does not include, inter alia, budget figures, account balances, or contribution amounts cited or quoted by the Three-Judge District Court in their opinions. In such instances, the Three-Judge District Court has determined that this information, contained in its decision, is probative evidence.
(c) Echols Plaintiffs 18
Echols Plaintiffs did not file any objections to the Three-Judge District Court’s Oral Order and have thereby waived any objection to this Court’s order to unseal portions of the record.
(d) Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs 19
Plaintiffs Chamber of Commerce (“COC”) and National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”) joined in filing the Joint Statement, which voiced their objection to the disclosure of alleged Section 437g(a)(12)(A) materials. Joint Statement at 1. Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs, however, did not file any independent objections with the Court. Consequently, aside from the objections raised in the Joint Statement, Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs have waived any objection to the Court’s order to unseal portions of the record. Of the remaining Section 437g(a)(12)(A) documents, which failed to implicate the protections afforded by that
After a careful review of the documents contested by Plaintiffs COC, NAM, ABC, and ABC PAC (collectively, “Coalition Plaintiffs”) and relied upon by the Three-Judge District Court, this Court is not persuaded that these materials should remain sealed in light of “this country’s strong tradition of access to judicial proceedings,”
Hubbard,
(e) National Association of Broadcasters Plaintiff
The National Association of Broadcasters did not file any objections to the Three-Judge District Court’s Oral Order and have thereby waived any objection to this Court’s order to unseal portions of the record.
(f) AFL-CIO Plaintiffs 22
AFL-CIO Plaintiffs joined in filing the Joint Statement, which objects to the disclosure of alleged Section 437g(a)(12)(A) materials. Joint Statement at 1. In addition, AFL-CIO Plaintiffs filed independent
The Three-Judge District Court did not cite or quote from any of the non-Section 437g(a)(12)(A) material to which AFL-CIO Plaintiffs object. Since this Court will only order the disclosure of material relied on by the Three-Judge District Court, this Court will not order the disclosure of any of this contested, non-Section 437g(a)(12)(A) material.
Of the purported Section 437g(a)(12)(A) documents, the Three-Judge District Court only cites or quotes from four such documents.
23
As the Court has observed above, AFL-CIO Plaintiffs, as litigants in this case, affirmatively presented these documents to the Court in an effort to challenge the constitutionality of BCRA. Although none of these documents were available to the public prior to this litigation, one of the them, AFL-CIO 001614-16 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.1.1), contains the script/description of an advertisement run by AFL-CIO Plaintiffs during the 1996 election cycle. The information in these documents was already made available to the public when AFL-CIO Plaintiffs ran these advertisements almost seven years ago, and as a result, these documents are entitled to less protection under
Hubbard. Hubbard,
(g) Paul Plaintiffs 24
Paul Plaintiffs only object to the disclosure of the identities of two factual wit
Because the Three-Judge District Court did not rely on the testimony of these witnesses, Paul Plaintiffs may keep their identities confidential. The Three-Judge District Court did not rely on the anonymous witnesses’ assertions in formulating its opinions, and as a result, the disclosure of their identities is not necessary for the public to evaluate the substance of the Three-Judge District Court’s opinions.
(h) Republican National Committee (“RNC”) Plaintiffs 25
RNC Plaintiffs object to the disclosure of certain documents filed with the Court. See generally RNC Pis.’ and CRP’s Objections to the Unsealing of Certain Docs [hereinafter “RNC Pis.’ Objections”]. Specifically, RNC Plaintiffs urge the Court to “consider lifting confidentiality only for those documents that are actually relied upon in reaching its decision and in the parties’ pleadings,” id. at 5, but also object to the disclosure of five documents relied upon by the parties in their pleadings, see id., App. A. In addition, RNC Plaintiffs object to the disclosure of documents containing sensitive political strategies, see id., App. B, and ask the Court to redact documents containing personal and financial information, see id., App. C, D.
As indicated above, the Court will only order the disclosure of documents relied upon by the Three-Judge District Court, either as disclosed through quotation or, where necessary, through a copy of the actual document. It follows then that this Court is only entertaining the disclosure of highly probative information. As RNC Plaintiffs acknowledge, RNC Pis.’ Objections at 4 (citing
National Children’s Center),
the D.C. Circuit held: “A court’s decrees, its judgments, its orders, are the quintessential business of the public’s institutions,”
Nat’l Children’s Center,
The Three-Judge District Court only cites to one document contested by RNC Plaintiffs, RNC 0275390-96 (Quoted, Kol-lar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Finding ¶ 2.7.10.1), and cites to a third document, RNC NM 0406326-33 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.26.4.1), which purportedly contains sensitive personal information that should be redacted. 26 This Court concludes that these documents are not protected under Hubbard, and therefore, must be disclosed to the extent indicated in the accompanying order. However, because the personal information contained in RNC NM 0406326-33 — namely, a certified public accountant’s name and contact information — will not serve to advance the public’s understanding of that document, RNC Plaintiffs may redact this information before releasing it to the public. In addition, RNC Plaintiffs may redact e-mail addresses included in RNC 0221404-05. 27
(i) California Democratic Party Plaintiffs 28
Of the nine individuals and entities that comprise the California Democratic Party Plaintiffs, only two filed objections with the Court: the California Democratic Party (“CDP Plaintiff’) and the California Republican Party (“CRP Plaintiff’). CRP Plaintiff, however, filed its objections with the RNC Plaintiffs. 29 See swpra Discussion at 936-37. Therefore, the Court only entertains the objections of CDP Plaintiff here.
CDP Plaintiff “has no objection to the vast majority of its documents being unsealed subject to certain information being redacted, but does object to unsealing certain confidential documents relating to donor information and the coordinated campaign.” Objections of CDP to the Unsealing of Certain Docs, at 1-2. CDP requests that “bank account or other personal or sensitive information be redacted.” Id. at 2. Moreover, “CDP continues to have an objection to lifting confidentiality with respect to three sets of documents,” id., allegedly protected under Hubbard, id. at 3. The second and third sets of documents, according to CDP Plaintiffs, “include sensitive fundraising and coordinated campaign planning documents,” id., and the first set of documents, a “fundraising ‘call’ list,” id. at 4, contains “potentially sensitive personal and political information,” id. At a minimum, CDP Plaintiffs argue that the “names and organizations of the[se] potential donors” should be redacted. Id.
The Three-Judge District Court has not cited or quoted from the second or third set of documents, but has quoted from the first set of documents, the “fundraising
(j) Adams Plaintiffs 30
Adams Plaintiffs have waived their objections to the unsealing of all the documents that they filed with the Court. Adams Pis.’ Supp. Submission Regarding the Status of Docs. Filed Under Seal at 3 (“Therefore, all materials that the Adams plaintiffs filed under seal should be unsealed as of the date specified in the stipulation.”) (emphasis in original).
(k) Thompson Plaintiffs 31
Thompson Plaintiffs did not file any objections to the Three-Judge District Court’s Oral Order and have thereby waived any objection to this Court’s order to unseal portions of the record.
(1) Defendant Intervenors 32
Defendant Intervenors filed a memorandum, arguing that “the Court can and should- — with a very few exceptions — open the record in this case to public view.” Memorandum in Resp. to the Opp’ns to the Unsealing of the Record at 1. Defendant Intervenors did not object to the disclosure of testimony or documents that they supplied to the Court. See generally id. As a result, Defendant Intervenors have waived any objection to the Court’s order to unseal portions of the record provided by Defendant Intervenors.
(2) Non-Party Objections
As observed above, under the
Hubbard
test, the Court must take into consideration the identity of the party raising the objection.
Hubbard,
In some cases, however, the Court has determined that the rights of certain non-parties to this proceeding warrant additional protection, consistent with the factors expounded in Hubbard. In these narrow instances, this Court has left the entire quote in the Three-Judge District Court’s opinion intact, but characterized the non-party in such a way as to protect its confidentiality. Subsequently, the citations accompanying these quotations— which would indicate to the public the identity of these non-parties — have been redacted. 33 In addition, Judge Henderson has cited to portions of Government Defendants’ Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Defendant Intervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact. These documents will be disclosed to the public, but portions of these documents have been redacted because they implicate the same type of non-party privacy interests. 34
(a) Government Defendants 35
In mounting their defense of the constitutionality of BCRA, Government Defendants relied extensively upon the testimony of third party witnesses, including campaign finance scholars and experts, political consultants, former candidates for public office, former members of Congress, and representatives from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (“DSCC”), the National Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”).
36
As the Government Defendants observe; “This challenge to the constitutionality of
In
Hubbard,
the D.C. Circuit noted the apocalyptic warnings of James Madison: “A popular Government without proper information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both.... A people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”
Hubbard,
Government Defendants put forth two basic arguments: (1) “[u]nsealing the testimony or otherwise making it publicly available could have adverse effects on the witnesses professionally,” Gov’t Defs.’ Objections at 10, and (2) the disclosure of this voluntary testimony “could seriously prejudice the government’s ability to obtain volunteer testimony on sensitive ... matters ... in the future,”
id.
at 10-11.
38
In addition, the Court notes that, as third parties, these witnesses are afforded greater protections under
Hubbard. See Hubbard,
While the testimony of third-party witnesses is accorded greater protection un
The Court also finds Defendants’ second argument — that the Government will have difficulty obtaining third-party witnesses in the future based on this Court’s decision — unpersuasive in this particular instance. First, the plain language of the Agreed Protective Order made it clear that the Court retained the power to review documents submitted to it under seal.
See, e.g.,
Agreed Protective Order ¶ 25 (“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary that may be set forth herein, the parties understand that the Court shall retain the authority to modify this Order upon good cause shown.”). Second, by narrowly tailoring this disclosure order to only the most probative information, the Court carefully fashioned this order to protect “both the public interest in access and the private interest in non-disclosure.”
Hubbard,
(b) American Financial Group
Non-party American Financial Group (“AFG”) objects to “unsealing confidential documents insofar as they pertain to docu
(c) AT & T
Non-party AT & T filed a letter with the Court, preserving its objections to the disclosure of all documents and testimony that it filed with the Court. See AT & T Letter at 1 (dated Dec. 17, 2002). Of the documents and testimony filed with the Court, however, I cite to only one AT & T document in my Findings of Fact, ATT 000018 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.77.4). This Court concludes that this document is not protected under Hubbard, and it will be disclosed consistent with the accompanying order.
The cited document, ATT 000018, does not represent the internal communications or business strategies of AT & T executives, rather it is an invitation to attend the 1999 Republican House-Senate Dinner. The fact that an AT & T executive received this invitation is not a characterization of AT & T or a reflection of its political activities. The citation merely seeks to demonstrate that corporate executives receive invitations to such events at the behest of the major political parties. Because this document does not involve the internal strategies or “trade secrets” of AT & T, and because this document is reflective of the major parties’, and not AT & T’s, activities, the Court believes the disclosure of this document is consistent with the factors expounded in Hubbard.
(d) Brennan Center for Justice
Non-parties Brennan Center for Justice and Professor Kenneth M. Goldstein (collectively, “Non-parties Brennan Center”) submitted limited objections to the Three-Judge District Court’s Oral Order to unseal the record in this case. Objection of Brennan Center and Prof. Kenneth M. Goldstein to Lifting Confidentiality at 1. Specifically, Non-parties Brennan Center object to the disclosure of a CD-ROM database supplied to the Court. Id. This Court observes that the actual database was not relied upon by the Three-Judge District Court and, therefore, will not be released to the public. Subsequently, and consistent with the accompanying order, this information will not be disclosed to the public.
(e)National Media, Inc., and Citizens for Better Medicare
Non-parties National Media, Inc. (“NMI”) and Citizens for Better Medicare (“CBM”) “object[ ] to the unsealing of documents and testimony.” CBM Objections to the Unsealing of Docs, and Testimony at 5 [hereinafter “CBM Objections”]; NMI Objections to the Unsealing of Dоcs, and Testimony at 5 [hereafter “NMI Objections”]. According to these non-parties, the documents and testimony that NMI and CBM contest “go to the heart of both CBM’s and NMI’s strategies and tactics for creating and implementing CBM’s political and communicatiou/advertising campaigns.” NMI Objections at 2. In addition, this material discloses “CBM’s strategies and tactics for creating, implementing and funding issue advocacy and grassroots lobbying campaigns on the important issue of meaningful market-based reforms of the nation’s Medicare system.” CBM Objections at 2.
The Three-Judge District Court’s opinions, however, do not disclose information related to “strategies or tactics.” For example, the portions of Timothy C. Ryan’s deposition quoted or cited in the opinions
41
(f) National Republican Senatorial Committee 44
Non-party National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”) requests that the Court “maintain the confidentiality of all documents that the NRSC voluntarily submitted to the government.” Objections of Non-Party NRSC to Lifting the Confi
The Three-Judge District Court only cites to one NRSC document in its opinions, NRSC 066-000009 (Cited, Kollar-Ko-telly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.53; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 222), and although NRSC objects to the disclosure of all of its documents, the Court notes that this particular document was not listed among the documents that NRSC explicitly contested.
See id.,
App. A. This document, a draft letter, invites members of the “High Technology industry” to attend the 1998 Republican House-Senate Dinner. NRSC 066-000009. Beyond the fact that it is a draft letter, it does not represent the internal correspondence of NRSC, nor does it contain “sensitive political strategies.” The letter is a solicitation to attend a fundraising dinner, and as such, it is sent out to individuals and entities that may do with it what they choose. While these sorts of letters are not sent out to the general public, they are sent out to third parties to request their attendance at a particular event. Non-party NRSC can only claim a reduced privacy interest in this document. Considering that this information was deemed probative by the Three-Judge District Court and “this country’s strong tradition of access to judicial proceedings,”
Hubbard,
(g) PhRMA 45
Non-party PhRMA “objects to the unsealing of any document produced by PhRMA in connection with this [proceeding].” PhRMA Objections to the Unsealing of Docs, at 1. PhRMA notes that “[m]any of the documents produced ... are politically sensitive and could result in ... fallout or injury.” Id. at 2. PhRMA also contends that it was not provided with formal notice by the Three-Judge District Court of its Oral Order to consider unsealing the record in these proceedings. Id. Nonetheless, PhRMA was obviously aware of the Three-Judge District Court’s order and filed this objection.
In four separate instances, 46 I quoted testimony or a document provided by PhRMA in my Findings of Fact. This material does not fall under the limited disclosure protections accorded by Hubbard, and therefore, this material will be disclosed consistent with the terms of the accompanying order.
The document quoted in my Findings of Fact merely confirms that PhRMA contributed money to Citizens for Better Medicare. This information is no secret and merely validates the Three-Judge District Court’s proposition that PhRMA sponsors Citizens for Better Medicare. Moreover, because the Three-Judge District Court quoted directly from the source, the Court will not require the disclosure of a physical copy of this docu
(h) Progressive Strategies, LLC
Non-party Progressive Strategies, LLC, “objects to the lifting of confidentiality under, or other rescission or abrogation, by the Court, of the Agreed Protective Order.” Objections of Non-Party Progressive Strategies, LLC to Lifting of Confidentiality Under Agreed Protective Order at 1. The materials filed under the Agreed Protective Order include “the transcript of the Deposition of Michael Scott Lux taken by RNC on August 26, 2002[,] and certain exhibits thereto, consisting of documents” provided by Progressive Strategies. Id.
The Three-Judge District Court only cites to one of the documents provided as an exhibit to Lux’s deposition.
47
In addition, the opinions reference two portions of Lux’s testimony.
48
None of this cited material relates to Progressive Strategies’s “agenda, goals and objectives, [or] to ... communications with and conferences held with its clients.”
Id.
Indeed, the document cited by the Three-Judge District Court in its opinions consists of a copy of Progressive Strategies’s Internet site, which is already available to and accessible by the public. Moreover, Lux’s testimony was merely cited to substantiate his qualifications, Lux Dep. Ex. 2 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.88),
id.
at 5,16 (Cited, Henderson’s Opinion at note 118), which is also available on Progressive Strategies’s Internet site in the form of biographical information, or because it made general observations about the campaign finance system,
see
Lux Dep. at 50-52 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Finding ¶ 1.88 and Henderson’s Findings of Fact at Finding ¶ 79.d.(l)). This material does not warrant confidentiality contrary to “this country’s strong tradition of access to judicial proceedings.”
Hubbard,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and consistent with the Court’s broad discretion, the Court will make the Three-Judge District Court’s opinions available to the public, with the exception of a few narrow instances where the Court has redacted the source of the cited material to protect the confidentiality of a non-party to these proceedings. All documents quoted in the Three-Judge District Court’s opinions will be made available to the public as they appear, quoted in the opinions. All other documents cited in the opinions shall be disclosed, based on the level of specificity
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, and consistent with the broad discretion granted to this Court, it is, this 2nd of May, 2008, hereby,
ORDERED that the parties responsible for filing the evidentiary record, inclusive of documents and testimony, shall re-file, as part of the public record, an unredacted version of the previously sealed portions of the record, provided that:
1. The Three-Judge District Court relies on the source to support a proposition cited in its Opinions or Findings of Fact,
2. The Court has not otherwise indicated, by sealing the citation, that the supporting document should remain under seal, and
3. The Court has not quoted directly from the source, relieving the party in question of its obligation to disclose a physical copy of the cited material; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties responsible for re-filing portions of the evidentiary record, inclusive of documents and testimony, relied upon by the Three-Judge District Court need only disclose the precise portion of the source indicated in the citation; and it is further
ORDERED that personal information, including telephone and fax numbers, bank account and credit card information, and email and general mailing addresses, may be redacted from the disclosed documents; and it is further
ORDERED that, in regard to Judge Henderson’s Opinion, where she cites to portions of Defendants’ Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Defendant In-tervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Defendant and Defendant Intervenors shall redact the following portions of the cited material:
Defendants’ Amended Proposed Findings of Fact:
• ¶ 95
• ¶100
• ¶ 123, lines 5, 6, and line 7 through the identification of the sealed document.
• If 142
• ¶ 164
• ¶ 676
Defendant Intervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact:
• ¶ 27, line 11, beginning with the identification of the document, and continuing until the end of the finding;
and it is further
ORDERED that the following Findings in Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Findings of Fact contain documents that have been sealed and shall not be disclosed by the parties, as indicated in the Findings:
• ¶ 171.3
• ¶ 1.74.3
• II 1.78.1
• ¶ 2.6.5.1
and it is further
ORDERED that the following Findings in Judge Leon’s Findings of Fact contain documents that have been sealed and shall not be disclosed by the parties as indicated in the Findings:
• ¶ 34
• ¶ 238
• ¶ 240
and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall re-file with the Court on the public record unre-dacted briefs disclosing only what has been cited in the Opinions of the Three-Judge District Court and not sealed consistent with the rest of this Order. If not cited to by the Three-Judge District Court in its Opinions, the evidentiary references in the briefs shall remain under seal; and it is further
ORDERED that, where the parties filed unsealed exhibits and evidentiary records with the Court in conjunction with sealed material, the parties shall segregate those portions that were not filed under seal and refile them with the Court as part of the public record; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties responsible for re-filing documents and the evidentiary record relied upon by the Three-Judge District Court, including any briefings, evi-dentiary records, or findings of fact originally filed with the Court under seal, shall comply with this Order no later than ten (10) days after the Three-Judge District Court has released its decision.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Three-Judge District Court was originally convened pursuant to the statutory grants of authority found in Section 403(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) ("BCRA”) and 28 U.S.C. § 2284. See NRA v. FEC, No. 02-581 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2002) (order granting NRA Plaintiffs' application for a three-judge district court).
. In certain instances, this Court has determined that the rights of non-parties to this proceeding prohibit the disclosure of the sourсe of certain limited information cited or quoted in my Findings of Fact and in Judge Leon’s Findings of Fact. The quotations from
In addition, Judge Henderson's opinion cites to Government Defendants’ Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Defendant In-tervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact. These documents will be disclosed, but in certain limited situations, portions of the findings of facts have been redacted because they impli-
cate the same type of privacy rights discussed in this footnote.
. In other words, where the citation indicates a range of page numbers, the information within that range of pages must be disclosed; however, where the citation indicates particular paragraph or line numbers, only the information cited within those paragraph or line numbers need be disclosed by the parties. Where the Court quotes evidence directly, the supporting document need not be disclosed at all, as the pertinent information is already available to the public in the form of a quotation.
. The parties also filed several exhibits under seal that contain both sealed and unsealed material. See, e.g., DEV 130 (containing both confidential and non-confidential material). The parties must segregate those portions that were not filed under seal and refile them with the Court as part of the public record.
. The NRA Plaintiffs include the National Rifle Association and the National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund.
. For example, the ACLU Plaintiffs did not file any objections with the Court; the Adams Plaintiffs filed a submission with the Court waiving their objections, see Adams Pis.’ Supp. Submission Regarding the Status of Docs. Filed Under Seal at 1; the NRA Plaintiffs only objected to the disclosure of personal information, like bank account and credit card numbers, see NRA Pis.’ Objections to Lifting Confidentiality Designations with Respect to Sensitive Financial Information at 1-2; and the RNC Plaintiffs carefully inventoried each document that they requested to remain under seal along with the general legal arguments supporting each claim, see generally RNC Pis.' Objections to the Unsealing of Certain Docs. On the other hand, Government Defendants "oppose[d] the wholesale unsealing of the record.” Mot. of DOJ and FEC to Maintain Certain Portions of the Record Under Seal at 1. Moreover, several Plaintiffs requested that the vast majority of the documents they filed with the Court remain under seal. See Mot. of NRTWC to Maintain Docs. Under Seal at 1; Objections to Unsealing Confidential Docs, by Pis. NRLC and CFG at 2-3.
. The AFL-CIO Plaintiffs include the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education Political Contributions Committee.
. The Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs include: the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the U.S. Chamber Political Action Committee, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors.
. The McConnell Plaintiffs that jоined in filing the Joint Statement include: Associated Builders and Contractors and Associated Builder and Contractors Political Action Committee.
. In order for Plaintiffs and Defendant to prevail on this argument, they must demonstrate that the disclosure of documents in this case would violate Section 437g(a)(12)(A).
. Judge Kessler rejected this line of reasoning in
AFL-CIO.
In that case, the defendant FEC argued "that if § 437g(a)(12)(A) remains in effect after an investigation ends, any district court action pertaining thereto would have to remain sealed, leading to a body of secret case law.”
AFL-CIO,
With respect to the FEC's enforcement proceedings under § 437g(a)(6), the district court does not review the investigative file or the certified administrative record; in fact, there is no requirement that the administrative record even be filed with the district court. A § 437g(a)(6) lawsuit is a separate and independent proceeding that seeks to establish that a former respondent in an FEC administrative proceeding has violated FECA. It involves no review of either the underlying FEC investigation or the FEC's administrative enforcement decision, but instead requires fresh discovery and a determination of the facts de novo. Therefore, § 437g(a)(12)(A) has no effect on the ability of the FEC to prosecute these cases and no bearing on whether any decision would have to be sealed.
Id. (emphasis added). Although a Section 437g(a)(6) lawsuit would likely involve many of the same documents contained within the FEC’s investigative files, Judge Kessler rejects the notion that Section 437g(a)(12)(A) eternally shields these documents from disclosure where they are obtained anew and used in a separatе judicial proceeding.
. When the FEC initiates an administrative enforcement proceeding, the individual or entity that is being investigated has no say in the matter. No doubt, most, if not all, parties investigated by the FEC have been forced to produce documents against their will. Section 437g(a)(12)(A) precludes the FEC from releasing these documents to the public or using them for any other purpose, without the express consent of the party that provided them. However, when an individual or entity, which also happens to have been investigated by the FEC, initiates a lawsuit, that party has made the voluntary decision to file a suit in a court of law. Any documents that the party must produce during the course of that litigation stem directly from the volitional act of filing a lawsuit, provided that the documents were introduced as the result of discovery and not obtained in violation of Section 437g(a)(12)(A).
. As noted above, some of the documents produced in this action were also implicated in AFL-CIO v. FEC, 111 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C.2001). That case is currently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Case No. 02-5069 (D.C.Cir.). Only six of the documents at issue in AFL-CIO were actually quoted or cited by the Three-Judge District Court in this proceeding, and only the quoted or cited portions are being made available to the public by this Court. As a result, this Court's decision to unseal documents in this litigation will not affect the status of the vast number of documents subject to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in AFL-CIO. Moreover, three of the six documents recount or describe advertisements that AFL-CIO Plaintiffs broadcasted on the public airwaves during the 1996 election cycle, and therefore, do not involve politically sensitive materials. Of the remaining three documents, one contаins information about a survey conducted in 1996, the second concerns "issue” advocacy and recommends various political consultants (only the quoted portion of this document is being disclosed), and the third suggests that the AFL-CIO should run “issue” advocacy in a particularly close election race. See infra Discussion at-.
. The Three-Judge District Court quotes extensively from the record in its various findings of facts and opinions. As a result, where the Three-Judge District Court quotes directly from the record, that portion of the record will be available to the public as it appears in the opinion, in the form of a quotation. However, where the Three-Judge District Court cites to the record to support a proposition, but does not quote the record directly, a physical copy of the cited portion of the record will be made available to the public. It should also be noted, however, that in several instances, where this Court deemed a third party’s interests particularly compelling, the source of that information has been redacted from the opinion to protect the confidentiality of the non-party. If not cited in the opinions, and if not sealed in the opinions or the Order accompanying this Memorandum Opinion, then the rest of the record originally filed under seal remains sealed.
. The McConnell Plaintiffs include: Senator Mitch McConnell, Representative Bob Barr, Representative Mike Pence, Alabama Attorney General William H. Pryor, the Libertarian National Committee, Inc., the American Civil Liberties Union, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., Associated Builders and Contractors Political Action Committee, the Center for Individual Freedom, Club for Growth, Inc., Indiana Family Institute, Inc., the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund, Nation
. Because these contested documents were also objected to by Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs, the Court will entertain ABC and ABC PAC's objections with Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs. See infra Discussion at 933-34.
. See supra note 5.
. The Echols Plaintiffs are Emily Echols, Hannah McDow, Isaac McDow, Jessica Mitchell, Daniel Solid and Zachary C. White.
.See supra note 8.
.Specifically, the Three-Judge District Court only cites twelve such documents: (1) TC 00698 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.Ó.2.2; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 300), (2) AV 0024-40 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 300), (3) AV 0046-47 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶2.6.2.2), (4) AV 0060-64 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2), (5) AV 0106-18 (Cited, Kollar-Ko-telly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2), (6) AV 0139-41 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 300), (7) TC 00513-37 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 300), (8) NAW 0002, 0005 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 300), (9) TC 00662-63 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2), (10) NAM 0206-27 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2; Leon's Opinion at Findings ¶ 300), (11) TC 0610-13 (Cited, Kol-lar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2), and (12) TC 00802-04 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.7.5).
. Although Judge Gasch observed that "it is terribly difficult to establish, on an principled basis, temporal boundaries governing the protection to be accorded information,”
Tavou-lareas v. Washington Post Co.,
Ill F.R.D. 653, 661 (D.D.C.1986) (quoting
Zenith Radio v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
. See supra note 7.
. Specifically, my Findings of Fact cites or quotes from (1) AFL-CIO 001614-16 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.1.1; Leon's Opinion at Findings ¶ 298), (2) AFL-CIO 001582-84 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.1.1; Leon's Opinion at Findings ¶ 298), (3) AFL-CIO 001702-04 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.1.1; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 298), and (4) AFL-CIO 005244 (Cited, Kollar-Ko-telly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.1.1; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 298).
. The Paul Plaintiffs include: Representative Ron Paul, Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners of America Political Victory Fund, RealCampaignReform.org, Citizens United, Citizens United Political Victory Fund, Michael Cloud and Carla Howell.
. The RNC Plaintiffs include: the Republican National Committee, Mike Duncan, Republican Party of Colorado, Republican Party of Ohio, Republican Party of New Mexico, and Dallas County (Iowa), Republican Central Committee.
. The Court commends RNC Plaintiffs for carefully indexing hundreds of documents and for significantly narrowing the universe of contested documents.
.Consistent with the accompanying order, RNC Plaintiffs need not disclose a physical copy of RNC 0275390-96 because it was quoted in my Findings of Fact.
. The California Democratic Party Plaintiffs include: the California Democratic Party, Art Torres, Yolo County Democratic Central Committee, California Republican Party, Shawn Steel, Timothy J. Morgan, Barbara Alby, Santa Cruz County Republican Central Committee, and Douglas R. Boyd, Sr. The California Republican party filed objections with the RNC Plaintiffs. See supra Discussion at 936-37.
. None of the contested CRP Plaintiff documents were cited or quoted from by the Three-Judge District Court. Therefore, consistent with the rest of this opinion and the accompanying order, none of these documents will be disclosed.
.The Adams Plaintiffs are Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald, Amura-da Joshi, Nancy Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Peter Kostmayer, Rose Taylor, Stephanie L. Wilson, California Public Interest Research Group, Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, United States Public Interest Research Group, the Fannie Lou Hamer Project, and Association of Community Organizers for Reform Now.
. The Thompson Plaintiffs are Representative Bennie G. Thompson and Representative Earl F. Hilliard.
. The Defendant Intervenors are Senators John McCain, Russell Feingold, Olympia Snowe and James Jeffords and Representatives Christopher Shays and Martin Meehan.
. Unlike the non-party interests discussed in "(a) Government Defendants,” see infra Discussion at 940-42, these quotations involve the internal operations and affairs of non-parties to this proceeding, and do not involve general observations about the campaign finance system. Moreover, the specific identities of these protected non-parties are not necessary for the public to evaluate the substance of the quotations. The characterizations of these protected non-parties, alone, should satisfy the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings while respecting the rights of these non-parties.
. The parties need not disclose the underlining documents, cited in support of Government Defendants’ and Government Interve-nors' Proposed Findings of Fact, as these materials are too attenuated to be deemed pertinent to the Three-Judge District Court’s inquiry.
. The Government Defendants include: the Federal Election Commission; the United States of America; the United States Department of Justice; the Federal Communications Commission; John Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America; and David M. Mason, Karl J. Sandstrom, Danny L. McDonald, Bradley A. Smith, Scott E. Thomas and Michael E. Toner, in their official capacities as Commissioners of the FEC.
The Government Defendants submitted third party documents and testimony, filed under seal, to bolster their defense. According to the Government Defendants, the unsealing of this information could prejudice these third party witnesses and the Government’s ability to obtain voluntary witnesses in the future. Mot. of the DOJ and FEC to Maintain Certain Portions of the Record Under Seal and Memorandum in Support Thereof at 1-3. As a result, the Court will entertain these objections as if they had been filed by non-parties in this litigation.
.Non-party NRSC also filed separate objections with the Court, entertained below. See infra Discussion at 943-44.
. In
Johnson,
the D.C. Circuit noted that a protective "order should be no broader than is necessary to protect those specific interests identified as in need of protection.”
Johnson,
. Government Defendants made no effort to distinguish between those portions of non-party testimony that were and were not protected under Hubbard. See Gov’t Defs.’ Objections at 1 ("The Department of Justice and the Federal Election Commission ... oppose the wholesale unsealing of the record.”). In many instances, the Court had to compare redacted and un-redacted copies of Defendants’ Amended Proposed Findings of Fact to ascertain which portions of the testimony that Government Defendants did and did not contest disclosing, despite the Three-Judge District Court’s Oral Order, which notified the parties that they were supposed to raise specific objections regarding the portions of the record that they wanted to remain under seal. See Tr. at 387-396.
. In fact, Government Defendants already disclosed much of this information in their redacted Amended Proposed Findings of Fact. As a result, this information is accorded even less protection under
Hubbard
because it has already been made available to the public.
See Hubbard,
. The Government Defendants also disclosed large portions of this testimony in the redacted Amended Proposed Findings of Fact. See supra note 39.
. The Three-Judge District Court’s opinions cite or quote from Ryan’s deposition at the following places: Ryan Dep. at 10-11 (Quot
.Specifically, the opinion quotes the following documents: CBM 0029 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.63.1; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 301); CBM Who We Are ... (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.63.1; Leon's Opinion at Findings V 301); USA-CBM 0004 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.33).
. Castellanos Dep. 63-66 (Cited, Kollar-Ko-telly's Opinion at Findings ¶¶ 2.6.33, 2.63.4; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 301), 94 and 95 through line 12 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings V 2.6.3.3), 103-04 (Cited, Kol-lar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.63.2), 111-12 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.26.7.3; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 144).
. The Court already entertained Government Defendant’s objections on behalf of NRSC above, see supra Discussion at-, with regard to the declaration of Alexander N. Vogel, General Counsel to NRSC. Non-party NRSC also filed its own objections to the disclosure of NRSC documents hied with the Court. See generally Objections of Non-Party NRSC to Lifting the Confidentiality of Agreed Protective Order to Certain Docs. Therefore, the Court will entertain NRSC's objections to the disclosure of these contested documents here.
. Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA").
. Specifically, the Three-Judge District Court opinions include: (1) PH 0379 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.3.1; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 301), (2) Bello Dep. at 39 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.80.1), (3) Bello Dep. at 82 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly's Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.77.7; Leon’s Opinion at Findings ¶226), and (4) Bello Dep. at 149-50 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 2.6.3.3).
. Lux Dep. Ex. 2 (Cited, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.88).
. Lux Dep. at 50-52 (Quoted, Kollar-Kotelly’s Opinion at Findings ¶ 1.88 and Henderson's Findings of Fact at Finding ¶ 79.d.(l)).