8 Ind. 79 | Ind. | 1856
Jeffrey sued McClure upon a promissory note for tbe payment of 1,000 dollars. Tbe defendant’s. answer to tbe complaint is as follows: 1. That tbe note was given in part consideration of two deeds made by Jeffrey to McClure, whereby be conveyed to bim tbe right to make, use and vend, an alleged new and useful improvement in force pumps, for which letters patent had been granted to Jeffrey; that tbe pretended improvement consists alone in tbe piston of the pump being so constructed as to keep itself packed with water, and was so patented; and that Jeffrey warranted said inven
The second and third defenses are each subject to the same rule of decision. Under the patent laws of the
Kernodle v. Hunt, 4 Blackf. 57, is relied on in support of the demurrers. That case, however, is not strictly applicable. There, the reasoning of the Court relates exclusively to averments in pleas, neither of which made any point as to the novelty of the invention; nor did the defenses then before the Court, in any respect question the validity of the patent. Mullikin v. Latchem, 7 Blackf., is also cited; but the same distinction plainly exists between that case and the one at bar.
The next inquiry relates to the validity of the third paragraph. That defense assumes the ground, that the patent and specifications do not describe the pump in use so that it may be known in what the improvement consists. The demurrer admits this to be true, and being so, the patent cannot be sustained. The statute requires the patentee to give a written description of his invention or discovery.- This involves the necessity, in all cases where the patentee makes use of what is old, of distinguishing what is old and what is new. Curtis on Patents, s. 151. Justice Story says, “If the description in the patent mixes up the old and the new, and does not distinctly ascertain for which in particular the patent is claimed, it must be void; since if it covers the whole, it covers too much, and if not intended to cover the
In the record, there is a bill óf exceptions wherein it is shown that upon the trial the defendant offered to prove “that the plaintiff, when he assigned the patent, by parol warranty warranted to the defendant,” as alleged in the fifth defense. The Court refused to admit the proof. As a general rule, where the contract of sale has been consummated by writing, the presumption is, the writing contains the whole Contract. Van Ostend v. Reed, 1 Wend. 424. Here, the contract stated in the defense is an entire contract, the whole of which is to be considered as included in the deeds and note. The rule is, that all oral negotiations or stipulations between the parties, which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument, are to be regarded as merged in it, and that the latter is to be treated as the exclusive medium of ascertaining the agreement to which the contractors bound themselves. Gowen and Sill’s notes to Phil. Ev. part 2, p. 594. Where the warranty is not contained in the written contract, it cannot be proved by parol evidence, unless, in addition to the averment that there was such warranty, there be an allegation that it was false or fraudulent, and that thereby the vendee was deceived. And in such ease, parol proof is only evidence of a representation. Salem India Rubber Company v. Adams, 23 Pick. 256. In the fifth defense there is no averment of fraud. The evidence was therefore properly refused. Hut the demurrers to the second,
The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.