OPINION
This is аn appeal from a conviction for burglary of a building, a second degree felony under Section 30.02 of our new Penal Code. After the jury found appellant guilty, the trial court sentenced him to life *886 in accord with the provisions of Section 12.42(d), V.T.C.A., Penal Code.
The State first called three employees of Clockwise Fashions, a Dallas manufacturer of women’s clothing. James Whiteman, production manager for Clockwise, testified that he had carе, custody, and control of the Clockwise warehouse at 3003 Commerce Street and that he did not give the appellant consent to enter the warehouse or take any property from the premises. He stated that a particular line of tennis dresses and shorts were delivered to this building by a subcontractor on March 11, 1972. He also stated that since these dresses and shorts were not yet available on the retail market, all of them were loсated either at the Commerce Street warehouse or at the subcontractor’s in Sherman.
Darlene Porter, a garment inspector for Clockwise at the Commerce Street warehouse, testified that on March 12, 1974, she was eating lunch at a table near the back door of the warehouse. With her was Emma Reager, a stock clerk with Clockwise. The back door, described as an overhead delivery door, was closed when the two women sat down to eat at 11:30. Presently, the women heard the door open and the sound of someone walking. They then turned around and saw a black man with an аrmful of the tennis dresses running toward the back door. They followed the man and watched him get into a dirty, light colored station wagon with two other men. One of the women memorized the license number of the car as it drove away. Neither woman was able to see the face of the man who took the dressеs from the store, and neither identified the appellant at trial.
The woman reported the theft to White-man, who testified that after examining the merchаndise he discovered that approximately twenty-five to thirty of the dresses were missing.
The appellant was stopped for a traffic violation thе following day. He was driving a dirty, light colored station wagon and was accompanied by his brother Jessie Lee McCloud. The officer who stopped аppellant observed a pair of white tennis shorts lying in the back floorboard in plain view. Aware of the details of the burglary at Clockwise, the officеr examined the shorts and discovered that they matched the description (as to style number and brand name) of those taken in the burglary. He then arrested thе two men.
Police officers then searched the apartment in which appellant had been staying with his brother and two other men! There they found several of the dresses taken in the burglary.
Appellant’s first contention is that the court erred in failing to charge that Jessie Lee McCloud was an accоmplice witness as a matter of law.
The State called McCloud as part of its case in chief. Like the appellant, Jessie McCloud was indictеd for the Clockwise burglary. Prior to appellant’s trial, Jessie pleaded guilty to this charge and was sentenced to three years, probated.
At the аppellant’s trial, Jessie’s testimony was initially evasive, but when confronted by the evidence from his own trial, Jessie testified that appellant and one Dorsey took the dresses while Jessie waited in the car.
The State then introduced a copy of the transcription of the court reporter’s notеs taken at Jessie McCloud’s trial. That record reveals that Jessie took the stand and unequivocally stated that appellant and Dorsey stole the dresses while Jessie waited in the car.
Clearly, Jessie McCloud, as a co-in-dictee, was an accomplice as a matter of law.
Hendricks
v.
State,
In this case, the trial court utterly failed to give
any
charge on accomplice testimony,
*887
either as a matter of law or as a question of fact for the jury. See, e. g.,
Bentley v. State,
Nor can we conclude that the error in the charge was harmless. Hendricks v. State, suрra. Jessie McCloud’s testimony was the only direct evidence connecting appellant with the offense. And, as in Hendricks, much of the co-indictee’s testimony wаs not covered by the testimony of other witnesses. Finally, we cannot find support in the record for the State’s contention that Jessie McCloud’s testimony tеnded to exculpate the appellant.
The only remaining question is whether the error was properly preserved, since the omission of a сharge on accomplice testimony is clearly not fundamental error.
Hammonds v. State,
Appellant presented his two handwritten objections to the court’s charge on a single piece of paper. The first of these complained of a failure to charge on accomplice testimony; the second, of the absence of a charge on circumstantial evidence.
There is no question that the objections were presented to the trial judge, since his denial of the objections is noted over his signature at the bottom of the page on which the objections are found. Cf.
Terry v. State,
The record reflects that the charge was presented to the jury on July 24,1974. The charge bears a filemark for that datе. Appellant’s objections also bear a filemark showing that they were filed on July 24, 1974. In addition, appellant specifically prefaced his objections with the statement that they were presented “pursuant to Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal [Procedure].”
The strongest indication that the objections were timely filed is the trial court’s notation itself. It is a cardinal rule of appellate procedure in this State that we must indulge every presumрtion in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and documents in the lower court. E. g.,
Martinez v. State,
Acсordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Notes
. Compare
Casarez v. State,
At the second trial in Casarez, no new objections or requests were filed, and no new filemark was placed on the previously-filed objections and requests. Hpwever, the transcription of the reporter’s notes showed that the trial court treated those previously-filed objections as refiled, and he made a notation to this effect on his docket sheet. Despite the absence of an affirmative statement on the face of the objections as to the time of their filing, we held that the objections and requested instructions were timely filed.