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McCloskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
460 A.2d 237
Pa.
1983
Check Treatment

*1 93 is remanded is vacated and case of sentence Judgment have Brown’s should on whether a hearing suppressed. been opinion. J., concurring and files a

HUTCHINSON, joins J., in the result. McDERMOTT, concurs Justice, HUTCHINSON, concurring. I believe the because in this case majority

I join by reopening better served “interests of are justice” Amendment claim to consider Sixth hearing suppression the convic- attack on collateral suffering possible than by of ineffectiveness. charge tion by A.2d (Widow),

Margaret Harold G. McCLOSKEY (Deceased), Appellant, McCloskey

v. and APPEAL BOARD J.H. COMPENSATION WORKMEN’S Refractories, Inc. Commonwealth France

Pennsylvania, Appellees. Pennsylvania. Supreme Court 7, 1982. Dec. Argued May 1983. Decided witness; pathologist (5) not have been should Commonwealth testify permitted ny of homicide when testimo- as to a conclusion hearsay supplied police; part based on information was testify (6) because it was the wife the decedent to error allow pursuant sequestered to a as were witnesses she was not other order; (7) sequestration juror when it was should have been struck juror’s wife and/or wife sat next to decedent’s discovered that the trial; during improper (8) because the the sentence relatives place sentencing on the record as alternatives court failed to various code; (9) provided by unduly sentencing of the court was the sentence case, appeal In the there is another this harsh. event remaining may again issues raised. *3 for appellant. Murrysville, R. Klotzbaugh, George for appellees. Horne, College, H. State James *4 LARSEN, NIX, ROBERTS, O’BRIEN, C.J., and Before HUTCHINSON, JJ. McDERMOTT FLAHERTY, OPINION McDERMOTT,Justice. the Commonwealth decision of from a

This is an appeal Compensation Workmen’s of the an order affirming Court reversed “Board”) (hereinafter Board Appeаl 58 McCloskey.1 Margaret to appellant, award of benefits A.2d 288. 29, 427 Pa.Cmwlth. 9, July the Act pursuant in this Court is vested

1. Jurisdiction 724(a). 2, § 42 Pa.C.S.A. No. 142 § P.L. filed a Fatal Claim Appellant Petition on December husband, that death of her alleging Harold McClos- key (hereinafter “deceased”), on the previous 4, was January silicosis, the result of pneumoconiosis or lung contracted the deceased allegedly during employment J.H. France appellee, Refractories, Inc., a brick manu- firm facturing (hereinafter The “employer”). deceased worked as a brick setter green bricks and out of loading kilns where the occurred. baking process contested claim on the employer appellant’s basis of causation, the deceased of a arguing died myocardial infarction or heart attack. Appellant countered that deceased, the entire during period his еmployment, was exposed silica dust which caused him silicosis, develop of the scarring condition that lungs appellant contends con- tributed to the fatal heart attack. before the

Appellant presented Workmen’s Com pensation Referee the of two medical experts, Drs. testified, Dreibelbis and Hall who essentially, silicosis have been may among causes of the decedent’s death. The referee ruled in favor of and the appellant Board affirmed his on findings causation, as to but appeal remanded the case to the referee for recalculation of the award. The referee then complied with the Board’s di rectives. In addition, he altered the original findings fact. On the Board appeal cautioned the referee against such making alterations2 and reversed its earlier as position agree 2. We must imрroperly with the Board that the referee acted only findings taking because it altered the without fact new evidence, power preeminent but also because the of the Board is compensation proceedings. Accordingly, workmen’s under circum- these, stances such solely where the Board’s remand was award, recalculation the referee should have confined his purpose revisions to the stated of the remand. To allow otherwise practice will condone proce- that would obfuscate administrative Compensation dures under the Workmen’s Act. See P.S. 854. Industries, See also Borovich v. Colt 492 Pa. 424 A.2d 1237 (1981), (holding may findings that a referee make new of fact when purpose). Contrary Board has remanded the case for that below, assertion of the Court Borovich does not allow the referee to *5 98

to causation.3 The Commonwealth Court affirmed this deci- sion. Board and Commonwealth Court relied upon

rationale of Consolidation Coal Co. v. Workmen’s Compensa- Board, 412, tion 37 Pa.Cmwlth. 14 Appeal (1978). 391 A.2d At the of this is question heart of whether controversy interpreted 301(c)(2)4 Consolidation Coal of properly § Act, Workmen’s which establishes the re- Compensation quirements must meet in order to receive death appellant this benefits under the circumstances of case. as follows: 301(c)(2) provides

Section (2) “injury The terms “injury,” “personal injury,” the course of his as used in this arising employment,” act, include, the context other- clearly shall unless requires 108 this wise, disease as defined section of occupational Provided, That whenever disease is act: ignore and act in its directives from the Board in remanded cases appropriate. whatever manner it deems Appellant itself on the issue 3. observes that Board reversed upon v. Workmen’s Consolidation Coal Co. causation in reliance Board, 412, (1978). Compensation Appeal 37 391 A.2d 14 Pa.Cmwlth. change represented in decisional law to case a Because this relevant issue and was decided between referee’s causation reversal, appellant concludes that Con- and the Board’s first award retroactively. improperly applied solidation Coal changes in is settled that argument is meritless. It well This during litigation applied cases will be decisional law which occur pending Co., 63, Reading Eagle 221 422 Pa. appeal. Brubaker v. on Insurance (1966); v. Farm Mutual Auto Daniels State A.2d 190 336, (1980); J.T. Pa.Super. Leland v. Company, 423 A.2d 1284 283 (1980). Co., Pa.Super. 573, More- 393 423 A.2d 282 Baker Chemical over, prospectively or applied as to whether decision the test rule and unforeshadowed retroactively articulates new is whether it 614, Corp., 375 Pa. Republic 473 v. International of law. Schreiber rule a new (1977). not articulate Coal did 1285 Consolidation A.2d statutory interpretation was not upon merely but relied long decisions precedent. held such wholly It has been without they original are relating because statute back are treated as existing legislation. v. Buradus nothing interpretations more than Harry 349, (1947); Products, C. 205 52 A.2d 356 Pa. General Cement Pa.Super. Co., Inc., A.2d Erb, Inc. v. Shell Construction retroactivity argument fail. Thus, must (1965). appellant’s 301(c), Act 2, 1915, as amended III Art. 4. P.L. Act June 411(2). 29, 1972, 77 P.S. § 61 § P.L. No. of March *6 basis for or death under this compensation, disability act, it shall or death from apply only disability resulting such disease hundred and within three weeks occurring the last in after date an employment occupation to which he was to hazards of such industry exposed further, And if disease: That provided employe’s has occurred within such compensable disability period, his death as a result of the disease shall likewise subsequent be compensable. (2) of this provisions paragraph shall or death of apply only respect disability an which results in or in from the employe part whole to the hazards of dis- employe’s exposure occupational ease. . . 411(2) supplied). P.S. (emphasis § Coal, from”, the words stressing “resulting

Consolidation in cases interpreted 301(c)(2) allowing benefits only § where the death was caused an immediately by occupational disease so as to where the disease preclude recovery merely contributed with other factors death. causing Recogniz- ing the harshness of its the court Consolidation position, Coal observed as follows: we are aware of the of obtain-

Although fully difficulty medical evidence which ing pinpoints unequivocally death, cause of in cases in which the deceased particularly diseases, suffered we from number interrelated be- lieve that the Act medical evidence to requires present- ed which establishes ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‍that a claimant’s death resulted from disease, not that the disease was a occupational simply factor. Even if the result seems to be a one, harsh we not may judicially expand coverage Act by ignoring statutory language pertaining qualifi- cation for benefits.

37 Pa.Cmwlth. at 391 A.2d at 19. This rationale as a standard for when the determining disease results in death is occupational an incomplete analy- sis of the statute.

It is obvious from statute that the did legislature causes, between results distinguish fail nor did are equate the two. not results since flow they may Causes factors, from numerous some more than others. directly 301(c)(2)provides compensable death Consequently, if it was caused “in whole or in part” by is, taken there аpproach disease. The Consolidation Coal *7 fore, not the statute. supported by courts have that where there are multi- recognized

Other death, of in addition to immediate non-com- ple causes one these cause, the determination as whether of pensable is an of rise to based on compensation analysis causes gives Thus, its fatality. recovery pre- contribution to immediate cause of death a heart cluded because the disease, non-occupational provided attack or some other causes among secondary an disease existed occupational factor in bringing of and that it was a substantial fatality Steel, Inc. v. Workmen’s Com- about death. See Crucible Board, 415, 65 442 A.2d 1199 Pa.Cmwlth. pensation Appeal Board, v. Compensation Appeal Elliott Workmen’s (1982); v. Workmen’s 425 A.2d 885 Hauck (1981); 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 554, 408 A.2d Board, 47 Pa.Cmwlth. Compensation Appeal (1979). 585 of with meaning in accord the plain cases are more

These the rationale contrary recognizes, 301(c)(2), § or in “in whole that death can caused Coal, Consolidation and still remain compensa- diseases occupational part” by a stan- stringent set too Therefore, Coal ble. Consolidation in articulated Crucible rule is more reasonable dard. The line of cases. its related Steel and 301(c)(2) under required testimony § medical The the existence establishing unequivocal must be be connection as the causal as well occupational Pittsburgh Wheeling death. See the disease tween Board, 61 Appeal Compensation v. Workmen’s Corp. Steel v. Electric Co. General (1981); A.2d 853 Pa.Cmwlth. Board, Pa.Cmwlth. Appeal Compensation Workmen’s v. Program Manpower Lehigh Valley (1981); 434 A.2d 841 Board, 61 Pa.Cmwlth. Appeal Compensation Workmen’s (1981). 433 A.2d 935 are multi that where there

Therefore, we hold today immediate cause was non-com of death and the causes ple be met 301(c)(2)may requirements pensable, § that, the de medical evidence showing unequivocal it was disease and that from an occupational ceased suffered caus substantial, secondary factor contributing among appellant Proving merely, about death. bringing es a contribu was or have been contends, may that the disease is inadequate. factor ting of death was case, the immediate cause

In the instant or sec contributing with numerous a heart attack coupled failed to factors. ondary disease existed unequivocally establish cause of death.5 was a substantial or that requirements failed to meet thus Appellant 301(c)(2). *8 which the upon we Consolidation Coal Although reject we the less standard relied, stringent lower court еven under need, no must fail. There is now claim adopt, appellant’s this matter. therefore, to remand Court is the order of the Commonwealth Accordingly, affirmed.

FLAHERTY, J., a concurring opinion. files ROBERTS, C.J., in the result. concurs Dreibelbis, expert Appellant’s Dr. testified that identification 5. merely contributing a in the deceased’s death was silicosis as a factor X-ray. Deposition, “supposition” of an made without the assistance Dreibelbis, Appellant’s was at other W.H. M.D. 4/30/75 11. reducing only may have been a factor certain that silicosis Deposition, surviving the fatal heart attack. deceased’s chances Thus, Hall, M.D., question serious at 11. there is a R.L. 1/19/77 requiring only appellant to whether met her own liberal standard showing factor. Neither of her that the disease was a experts unequivocally established that silicosis contributed deceased’s heart attack. LARSEN, J., files dissenting opinion. C.J.,

O’BRIEN, HUTCHINSON, J., former and did in the decision of participate this case.

FLAHERTY, Justice, concurring.

I concur in the result reached on this by majority record. The of Dr. Hall follows: pertinent is as

Q. Could tell us how he you long was a patient yours?

A. I’d nine say approximately years.

Q. And, us, doctor, tell the nature of please, basically Mr. treatments or nature of problems McCloskey having. infections,

A. His recurrent involved chest problems chronic to emphyse- obstructive related pulmonary ma and silicosis. letter, . . . doctor, to Cimino

Q. Now in your Attorney also said him ‘it is the obstructive you my opinion was a contribu- major silicosis emphysema pulmonary tion his death.’

A. Right.

Q. basically myocardi- he died Although Alright. what mean please explain al infarction. Could you you to his was a contribution major what nature of silicosis death. have McCloskey pneu-

A. We certain that Mr. did were disease. pulmonary and the chronic obstructive moconiosis *9 I for five or six Also, years. he hád at least angina had infarction myocardial the acute it was suspect possibly that if does death, but we know a patient that his caused infarction, myocardial or an acute have heart attack of chronic obstructive any that if have evidence he does pulmonary emphysema, disease pulmonary concentration oxygen indicate that blood gases usually de- to varying is decreased usually blood stream But, grees. we also know that if a patient does have acute infarction —a with myocardial patient chronic ob- structive disease makes the to survive pulmonary ability much more difficult because of a lack of oxygen, to the heart muscle due thrombosis be the amount coronary ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‍artery the heart mus- damage cle is related to how much directly oxygen gets into that tissue, and if a does have the chronic patient obstructive disease on pulmonary suрerimposed dis- coronary artery ease, it do evi- they’ll very badly having any will— dence of an infarction, acute so I myocardial felt that his lung was an important contributing factor to his death when he died in 1974. We know that with any attack, with a patient heart if their are lungs normal their chances of are much surviving better than if have they any degree chronic obstructive disease. pulmonary Q. Silicosisor the general classification of pneumoconi- osis, silicosis would be considered a chronic obstructive disease. pulmonary

A. Right.

IQ. understand to be that the your testimony possibili- of his ty survival is decreased he because has this silicosis condition.

A. Right. of his possibility surviving heart attack when he had it there was decreased because of that silicosis, in that the prime thing the amount of oxygen supplied the heart muscle that gingered, if they have the chronic obstructive disease, the pulmonary oxy- gen concentration into that getting heart muscle is de- creased much more than just the attack. So, heart really aggravates the infarction and heart attack marked- ly-

Q. tell, There’s no way can you though, whether he would have survived independent silicosis condi- tion? No,

A. there’s no way. Q. So, he could have expired had he not had silicosis. *10 Yes,

A. he could have. Q. then, there’s no can tell with a way you And certainty reasonable of medical the silicosis degree was the cause of death.

A. No, but it was factor to markedly contributing the death because of the that had to damage been done . .. lungs. It was a factor in the sense that

Q. decreased his of survival of the possibility myocardial infarction? that, And with an anoxia like

A. Right. probably extent of the of the heart muscle would be larger. The medical is that silicosis was not the cause of testimony death; rather the describes silicosis as a condition to to recover from a ability which can operate impair The record is devoid of any unequiv- infarction. myocardial be- a causal connection testimony establishing ocal medical disease, silicosis, and McCloskey’s occupational tween the death. which is: governs language

The legislative disease is the basis for compensa- [Wjhenever occupational act, this it shall apply or death under tion, for disability from such disease.... resulting or death disability only shall (2) apply only this paragraph provisions of an employe or death disability respect the employe’s exposure from part results in whole or. . . . disease. the hazard of amended, III, 301(c), as 1915, P.L. art. June Act of of “result” The meaning 411(2) (Supp.1982-1983). 77 P.S. § proceed, common To result is “to usage: clear in its is quite conclusion,” effect, or consequence, as a or arise spring (1976). Dictionary New International Third Webster’s conclusion; it is end or that connotes is consequence “Result result Derivatively therefore, that achieves. consequence, of the idea back; something it contains means leap Opdycke, John Baker calculating.” or checking proving Expression Usage Modern Words, a Guide Mark My cause, from previous effect implies “Result” 210 (1949).

105 follows, an event which and “contribu- Id. at not simply A reading are not with causes. synonymous factors” tory words chosen statute, meaning by the the giving plain me to the conclu- leads inescapably the General Assembly, affirmed the Court correctly sion that the Commonwealth on causa- that the referee’s decision Board’s determination evidence of record. tion was not the medical supported by medical sufficiency expert “The test for the proper legal must expert on the of causation is that the issue testimony in question the result opinion testify professional Steel, Inc. v. W.C. came from the cause Crucible alleged.” 415, 420, 442 A.2d 1202 A.B., 65 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. Crucible, medical that silicosis (1982). testimony In supra, of death met the statutori- was “the most cause” significant contrast, In medical testimo- burden of prescribed proof. ly contribu- disease was a “substantial that an ny occupational factor,” “contrib- factor”, 241, “major at contributing ting manner,” or “contributed significant uted in a substantial is not suffi- to and accelerated” the death employe’s simply in whole or in from part cient to the death prove “resulted] dis- occupational hazard employe’s exposure 418, 442 65 at A.2d Steel, ease.” Crucible Pa.Cmwlth. supra, where, here, Thus, therein. at and cases cited disease was “a occupatiоnal testifies that death,” factor to the such contributing markedly the Act. prescribed falls short of the standard by LARSEN, Justice, dissenting. of the Common- rejection

I with the agree majority’s wealth standard for when death “re- determining Court’s 301(c)(2) sults from” an disease under section occupational Act), Act Compensation (the the Workmen’s P.S. first articulated in 411(2), which standard was Consolida- tion v. Workmen’s Board Compensation Appeal Coal Co. (1978). However, 391 A.2d 14 (WCAB), Pa.Commw. I of section cannot subscribe to the majority’s interpretation this case or 301(c)(2) presented under the circumstances by that, where an disease exists holding occupational death, causes of among (or non-immediate) secondary causal connection between death and the dis- requisite met “a ease can only showing unequivocal that the suffered from an occupa- medical evidence dеceased substantial, tional disease and that contributing causes in about death among secondary bringing factor Majority ... a factor. ...” merely [and not] 6. at slip opinion whether Mr. McCloskey’s issue in this case is specific from” an disease within the

death “resulted *12 is that the of the Act where the medical meaning factor in that it de- contributing markedly disease was infarc- chances of surviving myocardial creased decedent’s evidence”, 77 that “sufficient competent tion. I would hold the referee’s 834,1 exists on the record to support P.S. § (and suffered from silicosis pneumo- that decedent findings that silicosis was a “significant, and his coniosis), finding death, and McCloskey’s factor” in Mr. causative connec- causal requisite demonstrate findings that such i.e., disease, and the occupational the death tion between within the disease the occupational death “resulted from” 301(c)(2). of seсtion meaning claimants or is available for Act, compensation

Under for or employee to injury for personal their dependents 77 P.S. of employment. in the course an injury death by rele- in 411(1) provides, 77 P.S. 301(c)(1), § 431. Section § vant portion: as used injury,” and “personal terms “injury”

The to an an injury to mean construed act, this shall be condition, physical of his previous regardless employe, there- and related of his employment in the course arising from results as naturally infection or to, and such disease accelerated reactivated or or is aggravated, the injury cause as a is mentioned death wherever and injury; mean death only it shall act, under this for compensation effects, and resultant and its such from resulting findings fact shall portion, “all provides, in relevant 1. Section justify to same.” competent upon evidence be sufficient based weeks the injury, within three hundred after occurring added). (emphasis added, 411(2), 301(c)(2)

In P.S. section diseases within which embraced provision occupational portion: That section relevant “injury” concept. provides, aris- “personal injury,” “injury “injury,” terms act, used in this course of his ing employment,” in the otherwise, include, the context clearly requires shall unless of this act2 as defined in section 108 disease is the basis Provided, That whenever occupational act, this or death under for compensation, disability from such resulting shall or death only disability to apply weeks after within three hundred disease and occurring occupation industry in an employment last date of such disease: And he was hazards exposed which further, if dis- That the employe’s compensable provided within occurred such ability period, subsequent has death result the disease shall likewise compensa- as a this shall paragraph (2) apply only ble. The provisions or death of an disability employe respect exposure whole or in from the part employe’s results in *13 30, 1973 in disease after June the hazard of occupational the Workmen’s by Pennsylvania covered employment added). (emphasis Act. Compensation an occupa- In death resulted from determining whether 77 301(c)(2), tional within the of section P.S. meaning disease interpretation. our 411(2), guide several salient principles § nature and consideration is the remedial overriding Act liberal objectives require humanitarian v. of its and Krawchuk scope construction application. Co., 115, 497 627 120, Electric Pa. 439 A.2d Philadelphia 1972, 1 Act of Pa.C.S.A. (1981); Statutory Construction 1982-83). This Court has held that 1928(c) (pamphlet § the disabili- need not be the sole or exclusive cause of injury 27.1(k), compensation 108(k), 77 under which 2. Section P.S. § disease,’ referee, by provides: ‘ocсupational “The term awarded act, following only mean diseases.... as used in this shall of, with, handling any involving occupation Silicosis in direct contact exposure or to the dust of silicon dioxide.” 108 Hotel, 313, 319, Hilton 487 Pa. 409 A.2d 367 Halaski v.

ty, nor, as the does an or (1979), majority acknowledges, to be the sole or exclusive cause of need 70, WCAB, Elliott v. 57 Pa.Commw. 425 A.2d E.g., death. Moreover, it the Act if 885, 887 is sufficient under (1981). disease) an occupational “aggravates, injury (including condition which reactivates or accelerates” preexisting cause of condition was the immediate primary preexisting v. Bernard 411(1), 77 WCAB or death. See P.S. disability Halaski v. Co., (1978) Pa. 388 A.2d 659 and Pincus 479 S. 318-19, (“it A.2d 367 Hotel, at 487 Pa. 409 supra Hilton to the disabili- if the contributed injury materially sufficient from the natural resulting than the disability rather ty, condition.”) of the preexisting progression the prin- to our determination is importance Of particular Bashline, 481 Pa. in Hamil v. enunciated this Court by ciple in medi- and followed (1978) consistently 392 A.2d 1280 Montefiore Hospital, cases. Jones v. cal See malpractice 491 Pa. Inouye, and v. (1980) A.2d 920 Gradel Pa. Bashline, supra, In Hamil v. (1980). 421 A.2d imme- sounding negligence, case medical malpractice infarction. death was myocardial of decedent’s diate cause defendants, a was that the complaint The basis of hospital, with the associated personnel and medical hospital treat the decedent’s ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‍and diagnose to properly had failed have prevented which might in a manner condition treatment hospital gone Decedent had death. Plaintiff’s chest pains. severe upon experiencing dece- opinion his professional offered medical witness were infarction surviving myocardial chances dent’s Defend- negligence. defendants’ decreased substantially imminent death was witness opinеd ant’s expert *14 not had treatment even if defendants’ occurred would have been negligent. the cause did not negligence their argued

Defendants the increased have it though may even infarction myocardial of 323(a) on section Relying the decedent. harm to risk of Performance Torts, Negligent of (Second) the Restatement rejected this Services,3 Render Court Undertaking to of Pa. causation, and at 484 of theory defendants’ narrow 273, held: majority Court Superior

We with the view of agree to 323(a) of is in Bashline I that effect expressed required plain- of normally relax the of certitude degree for as to jury order to make a case tiff’s evidence in held for plaintiff’s liable whether a defendant may that a has introduced evidence injuries: plaintiff Once or increased the risk act omission negligent defendant’s and that the harm in plaintiff’s position, harm to a person sustained, it for the jury was fact becomes a question increased risk a substantial to whether or not that the harm. factor in producing it fol- 323(a), In of our of Section light interpretation is a factor in case medical causation lows that where is that the Section, not necessary within coming to that medical evidence—in addition plaintiff introduce increased defendant’s conduct prove adduced to already asserted that the negligence risk of harm —to establish Rather, once the is in plaintiff’s injury. jury resulted result- that defendant’s conduct apprised the likelihood harm, jury, leaves to the ed in that Section plaintiff’s task of balancing probabilities. the medical expert, the well-es- In do not intend to undermine so we saying medical cer- of “reasonable degree tablished standard on norm for medical accepted opinions as the tainty” it would be unreasonable and causation. But we think to of case to expect physician unrealistic this type degree certainty” with a “reasonable of medical state (Section law 323(a)) when the happened what have might 323(a) provides: 3. Section consideration, undertakes, gratuitously to render who or for One necessary recognize as should services to another he subject liability protection things, person or is of the other’s resulting physical his failure to exercise the other for harm from undertaking, (a) perform if his failure to reasonable care harm, (b) the harm such the risk of such exercise care increases upon undertaking. reliance suffered because the other’s *15 recognizes involved. D. contingencies See generally Danner and E. Segall, Mediocolegal Causation: A Source of Professional 3 Am.J.L. & Med. 303 Misunderstanding, Where (1978). there is at issue the of medical adequacy services rendered in a fact situation to Section therefore, 323(a) a facie case of applies, prima is liability established where presented did, to the effect that defendant’s conduct a reasona- ble of medical increase the risk that the degree certainty harm sustained would occur. by plaintiff held, in v. Montefiore This Court further Jones Hospital, at 494 Pa. 431 A.2d 920: supra art, Proximate a term of and be estab- may cause is act lished evidence that a defendant’s negligent failure to act was a substantial factor in about bringing law the harm inflicted has upon plaintiff. Pennsylvania be, that this substantial factor need not long recognized i.e., factor, incorrectly charged, only the trial court (citations “that cause which . .. the result.” produces A need not exclude omitted) every possible plaintiff сause concurs “the fact that some other and explanation, of the defendant producing with the negligence he unless liability relieve defendant from does not cause would have produced can that such other show v. Brod- Majors of his negligence.” injury independently at 205 A.2d at 878. Hotel, head 416 Pa. would adopt to me that this Court

It is inconceivable compensation causation in workmen’s stricter standard of decided under Sec- cases malpractice cases than in medical recognizes That section of the Restatement. 323(a) tion to render undertaking one part on duty higher ordinary negli- of the a relaxation which justifies services and statutory Surely of causation. standards gence to provide employee’s to his of an employer moral obligation more no environment justifies working safe conditions Compensation under the Workmen’s a stаndard stringent

Ill we construction which Act, liberal especially light *16 the Act. must give 77 language 301(c)(2), from” of P.S. “resulting Section not a referee’s 411(2), preclude finding does surely

§ death injury causal connection between or and disability testi- an where the medical disease) (including contributed to materially establishes that mony 487 Pa. 409 death, Hotel, Halaski v. Hilton at supra v. Pa. 415 WCAB, 367 and Comm. A.2d Crucible Steel in increasing was a factor (1980), A.2d 458 or substantial or risk of accelerating”) reactivating, (“aggravating, have more harm to the which harm been may employee or some condition non-com- “caused” other immediately by and 301(c)(1) or ailment. occurrence See Section pensable Bashline, Hamil v. supra. treatise, Workmen’s Compensation

In Professor Larson’s 13.11, observations: Law, following the author makes the § cases The second of medical-causation comprises grouр cases in which the existence of the primary compensable indepen- in some exacerbates the effects injury way causal dent weakness or disease. The sequence but as complex, long these cases be more indirect may as the is in present compensa- causal connection fact is beyond condition bility subsequent question.4 that condition compensable injury produces “[W]hen have interferes normal curative processes might See, Welfare, e.g., Department 210 Kan. 4. Drake v. State of Social (1972) (decedent’s compensable injury pre- back 499 P.2d 532 coughing lungs his him to clean contributed to vented from —this lung immediately non-compensable condition and death caused death; compensation causally award so connected to affirmed) School, Buckley and Petit v. 284 N.Y.S.2d 28 A.D.2d (1967) years (decedent compensable suffеred heart attack — later, independent immediately he died from an thrombis related prior prior to heart attack —medical heart attack was significant of death decedent’s vulnera- element because it enhanced bility compensation harm sustain increased risk of sufficient award).

alleviated the preexisting independent condition, the pro- gression condition independent is compensable.... It is also of note that worthy federal (20 regulations CFR 718.205) pertaining benefits to miners whose death was due to pneumoconiosis5 provide:

(b) Death will be due considered to pneumoconiosis if any following criteria met: (1) Where competent medical evidence established that the miner’s death was due pneumoconiosis, or death (2) Where was due to causes multiple including pneumoconiosis and it is not feasible to medically distin- guish diseasе caused death or the extent to which *17 pneumoconiosis contributed to the of cause death. . . . (c) the this section, For of shall be purpose death con- to be sidered due to the pneumoconiosis where cause of death is to or related significantly aggravated by pneumo- coniosis.

A related consideration this case is the issue of the of the medical causation. sufficiency testimony regarding has Commonwealth Court rule pronounced general that, where no obvious exists relationship between injury cause, its and work said to be medical activity “unequivocal” is establish the causal connection. testimony necessary See, Commission, Breen v. 52 Pa. Crime e.g., Pennsylvania 41, (1980). 415 A.2d This has accepted Commw. 148 Court Hotel, the of this rule. v. Hilton validity” Halaski “general 317, However, 487 367. an examina at Pa. 409 A.2d supra tion cases that does not mean “unequivocal” of the discloses must to an absolute testify certainty that the medical expert all other causes. As we as to or eliminate possible causation lungs generic the caused term for disease of 5. Pneumoconiosis is the particles. by irritant mineral or metallic habitual inhalation of the Silicosis, Dictionary (1977). particular Collegiate New Webster’s fibrosis type pneumoconiosis, condition of massive of by prolonged lungs the breath and caused shortness of marked of silica dusts. Id. inhalation

113 2, at 487 Pa. n. Hotel, supra in Halaski v. Hilton stated 2:n. 409 A.2d 367 of testimony medical sufficiency test for legal

The proper the condition of not that has expert testify, is: ... the did, from the even come have, or probably claimant might result in the opinion that in his professional but [injury], A less direct alleged. the cause came from question standard of required falls below opinion expression evidence. competent not constitutе legally and does proof Co., 497, 376 Pa. Menarde v. Philadelphia Transportation (1954). 103 A.2d standard made evidentiary elaboration of Further at Pa. 421 A.2d v. Inouye, supra Gradel stated: wherein we need be unquali- on not causation medical

Expert opinion terms”; ordi- absolute, i.e., “categorical fied stated in “reasona- was, to a it must establish ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‍narily, caused by alleged ble of medical certainty,” degree negligence. ques- human body place the complexities

[When] or injury beyond cause pain tions as . the law re- . . average layperson knowledge In testimony employed. quires the defend- on whether bearing to its addition is needed to conduct was such negligent, ant’s *18 did, with a reasona- in establish that the question from the negligent stem certainty, ble of medical degree act alleged. (citations at 1285 267, 392 A.2d

Bashline, 481 Pa. at omitted, emphasis supplied). the infi- and languagе vagaries English

Given the use, may which a medical expert nite of words combination in cases review- find wide the variety it is to surprising competent for sufficient on causation ing referees’ findings commentator noted: As one evidence. that assert the must unequivocally

the medical witness the cause. assigned did result from attack actually heart A less direct expression falls the opinion below requisite standard of and thus does proof not constitute legally competent evidence sufficient to support findings of fact. Statements of medical opinion phrased terms of “could cause”; have” or “could be or “probably was” “proba- a cause bly and effect relationship”; “highly possible” or “very probable and highly possible”; related”; “might or “I assume” “Ior have been presume” too equivocal held to establish causation. On other hand, opinions ren- dered “with a reasonable of medical degree certainty,” phrased, example, as “I it think accelerated certainly death,” his “it is that my opinion was [the accident] or “it is aggravating,” my opinion precipitated [the work] that which his death, caused namely, occlu- coronary sion” were all held sufficiently unequivocal establish The witness causation. need not establish causation to a medical nor need he rule out all other certainty, possible There in all be an causes. must cases factual adequate basis the record witness upon predicates opinion.

Heart Attacks and the Workmen’s Pennsylvania Compensa tion Act: between Establishing Relationship Causal III, Employment (1976) Dick.L.Rev. 130-31 Injury, (footnote omitted). references apparent

From the seems there are foregoing, In different of causa- degrees “equivocаtion”. realm evidence”, tion, “sufficient means competent P.S. § that the must no more— expert medical establish testimony that, to a and no less—than reasonable medical degree certainty, disability the death connected causally No disease). “magic the injury (including words convey are so as the chosen required long words” de- as to causation to reasonable professional opinion WCAB, v. 54 Pa. Wilkes-Barre certainty. gree course, And of (1980). 420 A.2d 795 Commw. suf- whether the medical referee’s determination entitled substantial demonstrate causation is fices to *19 has with broad Act vested the referee deference as the and mak- the of witnesses credibility in assessing discretion Hotel, 487 Pa. Halaski v. Hilton supra of fact. ing findings A.2d 319, at 367. fact that finding case made a of

The the instant referee haz- to a silica dust exposed had been continually decedent at Frаnce his of J.H. employment ard during years found Dr. William H. Refractories, He further that Inc. was concluded, in deposition, pneumoconiosis that Dreibelbis Hall, in and that Robert L. cause of death Dr. contributing major that silicosis was a contribu- concluded deposition, cause.6 ting case,

In characterization majority’s the instant may that silicosis as being “essentially, medical testimony 239, death,” is, causes of decedent’s at have among been me, unfair. To this characteriza- it seems to rather support tion, excerpts depositions isolates from the majority 241, In this viewing Drs. Hall. At n. 5. Dreibelbis and I agree in its am to entirety, compelled deposition testimony set at 3-4 Board, as forth following synopsis by 8, June 1978: of the Board’s dated opinion is not the Referee did essential issue whether or [T]he which to base his evidence competent upon have sufficient he did. the testimo- Certainly We thаt believe findings. was not in and of itself sufficient of Dr. Dreibelbis ny the causal opinion expression constitute direct 6. misleading majority to It for the state that testimony unequivocally that failed to establish existed, slip opinion light at of the uncontradicted disease years testimony that had treated for of the doctors decedent been regarding pneumoconiosis/silicosis and the nonmedical workplace exposure As scilica dust. was decedent’s constant opinion Compensation Appeal Board in its noted the Workmen’s specific appeal been to the issue of June 1978 “this has limited pneumoconiosis cause to the or not whether question apparently death of the decedent. Defendant does exposed findings hazard and that had been to a silica decedent only suffering pneumoconiosis. how from It is he was Slip death is at issue.” rеlates decedent’s opinion June at 2. *20 connection between injury and the decedent’s death. We believe that when his is testimony read as background of Dr. testimony Hall, however, that isit clear there is sufficient competent evidence upon the record to sup- port the findings the Referee. Among other Dr. things, Hall specifically testified that: “I felt that his dis- lung ease was an important factor to contributing his death when he died in further, 1974.” And on cross-examina- tion, Dr. Hall stated:

A. “The of his possibility heart surviving attack when he there, it

had was decreased because of silicosis, that that the thing is the amount of prime oxygen supplied heart muscle that gingered, and if they have the chronic disease, obstructive pulmonary con- oxygen centration into getting that heart muscle decreased much more than the heart just So, attack. it really the infarction and aggravates heart attack markedly.” Q. no that tell, “There’s can way you whether he though,

would have survived independent silicosis condi- tion?” “No,

A. no there’s way.” “So, Q. he could have had he not had silico- expired sis.”

A. “Yes, he could have.”

Q. then, tell, “And no that way you there’s can

reasonable of medical that the silicosis degree certainty, was cause of death.” “No, it A. but was a factor to the markedly contributing death because of the that had been done to damage to ...” lungs prior “It factor in the sense that

Q. myocardial decreased his of survival possibility infarction?” that, the

A. And with an anoxia like “Right. Probably to the heart muscle would extent of larger.” the doctor reveals testimony of this

A review could not be a definite determination recognized it is of an but autopsy, because of lack made, especially or contradict his not compromise that he did our opinion the cause of death. as to expressed opinion previously establish- ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‍I hold that the would that Mr. medical certainty, es, degree a reasonable resulted from death McCloskey’s from the the risk of harm silicosis increased in that (silicosis) accelerating infarction, thus aggravating myocardial *21 competent condition. Sufficient preexisting independent, finding the referee’s exists, therefore, to support evidence causative fac- silicosis was a “significant, and to sustain award of Mr. McCloskey tor in the death” of benefits. quot- medical I believe that

Finally, causation, standard of also meets the majority’s ed above evidence” establishes that “unequivocal namely, “substantial, contributing and was a that silicosis existed about death. factor” bringing Court I reverse the Commonwealth would

Accordingly, computation the Board for remand the case to of compensation schedule appropriate benefits under the inordinate time of death.7 Given existence at to reach final case has taken of time that this amount remarkable and is to resolution (appellant’s perserverance Board render its direct that the commended), I would be all due haste. computation inappropriate would be of the referee’s award

7. Reinstatement First, purported original award of June two reasons. compensation in the computed pursuant to the schedules However, compensa- the amount Compensation Act. Workmen’s week) specified in ($54.00 per amount seems to be the tion Second, Act, 1407(4). the subse- Occupational 77 P.S. Disease remand, following quent rendered on December award per compensation week inexplicably $100.00 alters the amount of per The record does $95.34 1975 and week thereafter. until June weekly benefits. The better basis for the alteration of not disclose a course, therefore, computation simply to the Board for is to remand of benefits.

Case Details

Case Name: McCloskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: May 19, 1983
Citation: 460 A.2d 237
Docket Number: 81-3-424
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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