194 Iowa 1387 | Iowa | 1922
Tbis litigation bas its origin in conflicting claims affecting tbe title to about 30 acres of land (spoken of in tbe record as tbe quarry property) in or near tbe city of Cedar Rapids. Any attempt to trace in detail tbe bistory of the title to tbe several smaller tracts comprised in tbis area would entail much labor, and, in our judgment, is not essential to a proper disposition_of this. appeal. It is enough, for present purposes, to say that plaintiff founds her claim of title upon a quitclaim deed of tbe property, made and delivered to her by Lewis Heins, who acquired bis title by conveyance from one Beatty, who held it in trust to secure payment of a debt owed by J. J. Snouffer, Junior, to tbe Farmers & Merchants Bank of Cascade. Though the record is more or less confused and uncertain as to tbe manner of tbe acquirement of tbe property, it is reasonably clear that, for twénty years or more prior to these conveyances, said Snouffer was tbe beneficial owner of tbe property; but at no time does be appear to have held tbe record or legal title. During all tbis period, be enjoyed tbe possession and use of tbe.property, except when such enjoyment and use were interrupted by officers and trustees, seeking to enforce
The trial court, having heard the evidence, found for the defendant, that the title to the property obtained by Heins was taken and held by him as security only, and that the property constitutes a part of the estate of Snouffer, and was subject to the payment of claims against said estate, and set aside as fraudulent and void the deed by which Heins undertook to convey
I. In support of the claim of the appellant, counsel first argue that the deed from the bank to Heins vested him with the fee of the property, and that, by his conveyance of July 21, 1917, to the plaintiff, she became and now is the unqualified owner. There is evidence in the record by which, if not otherwise qualified or explained, this proposition could be sustained; for, assuming the validity of the trust deed held by Beatty for the bank, a sale and conveyance made by him to a stranger or third person, under the decree of court, would have wholly eliminated the title and interest of Snouffer, and vested it in the grantee. Had Heins acquired the title in that manner, plaintiff’s title as his grantee would probably be impregnable. But while there is evidence that Heins regarded himself as a purchaser of the land, and professed to hold the title in his own right, subject only to an option given Snouffer to buy it on certain terms, the record as a whole is very convincing that he advanced the money for such purchase for or in the interest of Snouffer, and took the title to himself, to be held as security for the repayment of the amount so advanced in his behalf, and for whatever other expenses or advances said Heins was required to make, to preserve the property for Snouffer’s benefit. Without further elaboration at this point, we hold that, hi so' far as the decree below finds the title acquired by Heins to have been held in trust as security for the debt owed by Snouffer, it is 'to be affirmed.
II. Coming now to the transaction in which Heins conveyed to plaintiff, we are also of the opinion that the essential character of the title held by the former and by him transferred to the latter remained unchanged; that plaintiff received and holds the title so conveyed as security for the payment of whatever it cost her to satisfy the claims of Heins and the payment of Snouffer’s indebtedness to herself and Mrs. Benjamin; and that, subject to her lien thus acquired, the beneficial ownership of the land remained in Snouffer until his death. To this extent also, the decree of the trial court may be affirmed. It may
III. The beneficial ownership of the land being in Snouf-fer, and the apparent or legal title being held originally by Heins, and subsequently by plaintiff, as security for the valid indebtedness of Snouffer, is there any sufficient reason shown for denying plaintiff all equitable relief, or for setting aside the conveyance to her as void or fraudulent? It is upon this question that we are led to differ with the court below. In the first place, the trial court found, correctly, we think, that Heins took the title as security for moneys advanced to Snouffer. There is no finding, and we think no sufficient evidence, that such indebtedness was not of a valid and enforeible character. 'Were Heins living, still holding such title, and in court, with the present record, it would have to be said that he was entitled to priority of lien, and to have same enforced accordingly. The debt to him was never paid, except as it was paid by plaintiff and Mrs. Benjamin, in consideration of the conveyance by Heins to plaintiff. Such deed operated to convey the title held by him to plaintiff, subject, of course, to the equities attaching to it in his hands; and she may enforce the lien to the same extent, that he could have enforced it, had he not conveyed to her. Such is manifestly the plaintiff’s position and equitable right, unless, as appellees contend, she is to be barred of such right on the theory that she accepted the conveyance as a part of a fraudulent scheme to defraud the creditors of Snouffer,—a question to which we now give attention.
As preliminary thereto, it will be helpful to consider the condition of Snouffer financially at that time, as disclosed by
IV. It appears to be fairly established that, at the time plaintiff took the deed from Heins, Snouffer was already indebted to her and Mrs. Beniamin to the amount of about $8,000, and this indebtedness entered into the .consideration for such conveyance, upon Snouffer’s promise to pay it at an early date. The title taken from Heins not only vested plaintiff with the security afforded by the Heins loan, but, as between plaintiff and Snouf-fer, she acquired a lien upon the property for payment of this personal indebtedness. At this time, however, the rights of the interveners had accrued by virtue of their judgment liens; and plaintiff’s security for such personal indebtedness is necessarily junior thereto. In other words, while plaintiff holds the first lien upon the property, as security for the Heins claim, to the extent of the consideration paid therefor by her, the liens of the interveners’ judgments are next in order and next in right, followed by plaintiff’s lien for the amount of Snouffer’s debt to her and Mrs. Benjamin.. Subject to the liens thus established, the property in controversy is an asset of the Snouffer estate.
V. Accepting the correctness of appellees’ contention, and of the trial court’s finding that the conveyance to Heins was, in fact, made and intended as security for the payment of Snouffer’s debt, it is difficult to see what there is in the transaction of which defendants can justly complain, as a fraud upon the creditors of his estate. The question as between Heins (or his assignee) and the interveners is solely one of priority of liens, a proposition which is in no wise affected by the deed from Heins to plaintiff. A conveyance by which no property or property right which might otherwise have been subject to levy
Much is said in argument upon the extravagant claims of the plaintiff, as indicating fraud; and it is to be admitted that the claim primarily asserted by her was largely in excess of what she may properly recover in this action. It seems to have been the theory of her counsel that the conveyance from Heins vested her with the right, not merely to recover what she paid for the Heins title, but to add thereto the amount of the judgments of which he had taken assignments, and reassigned to her. But in our view, while she had the right to purchase Heins’s lien, and to be protected in the title so acquired, to the extent of her investment therein, she could not be allowed to increase the burden of her priority over subsequent creditors by adding to her actual investment, as a profit, the amount of real or apparent discount made by Heins. "Were the deeds from the bank to Heins and by him to plaintiff to be treated as absolute conveyances, and not as in the nature of mortgages, a somewhat different question might arise. But the fact that- such
“The only question with me has been whether the plaintiffs ought to be left to their legal remedy, or whether the case affords sufficient ground for a limited interference, by allowing the deed of the real estate to stand as a security only for such consideration as has been shown by the younger Dunlap. There appears to be very considerable inadequacy of price, even admitting the consideration expressed in the deed; and to allow the deed to stand as security only for the true sum due, would be doing justice to the parties, and granting a relief which cannot be afforded at law.”
To like effect is Morrell v. Sharp, (Iowa) 74 N. W. 749 (not officially reported); Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Hart, 77 Iowa 597; Leqve v. Stoppel, 64 Minn. 74 (66 N. W. 208, 211); Anderson v. Fuller, McMullan’s Eq. (S. C.) 27 (36 Am. Dec. 290); Sanford v. Wheeler, 13 Conn. 164; Horton v. Bamford, 79 N. J. Eq. 356 (81 Atl. 761, 771, Paragraph 13); Cox v. Collis, 109 Iowa 270; Thomas .v. Beals, 154 Mass. 51; Demarest v. Terhune, 18 N. J. Eq. 45, 532, 539; Coley v. Coley, 14 N. J. Eq. 350.
Indeed, counsel for appellee virtually concede, in argument, the soundness of the rule recognized by the cited cases. Their brief is very largely devoted to the proposition that, notwithstanding, the deeds from the bank to Heins and from Heins to plaintiff did not divest Snouffer of his beneficial ownership; and in so doing, they say, in substance, that, if the plaintiff acquired any right by these conveyances, it was, at most, a lien for the amount of her payment to Heins. It is also pointed out
Applying the rule of the cited cases to the record, an equitable result will be accomplished by a decree along the lines already pointed out, declaring the beneficial ownership of the property to have been in Snouffer, establishing the plaintiff’s first lien thereon for the amount of the consideration paid by her for the Heins title, and subject thereto, confirming the liens of the judgments held by the interveners, followed by plaintiff’s lien for the amount of Snouffer’s personal debt to her and Mrs. Benjamin. The remnant, if any, of said property, when these
We omitted to mention at the proper place that the claims of Mrs. Benjamin in the matters here being litigated were assigned to the plaintiff, who represents her interests.
It is also proper to say that the examination of the record and the reaching of a satisfactory conclusion have been, in some respects, rendered very difficult by the fatality which seems to have marked the ease in the course of the years of its development. Snouffer and Heins both died, soon after the transaction of July 21, 1917. Snouffer’s mother, who figured.in the title to the land, and in the making of the trust deed to Beatty for the Cascade Bank, is dead, as is also Beatty himself. Several of the lawyers who, at one time or another, have had some part in the multitudinous proceedings affecting the property, have passed away, so that the best evidence now obtainable is not always free from obscurity and doubt; but in our best judgment, the conclusions we herein announce are fairly borne out by the record.
For the reasons stated, the decree appealed from is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court below, for the entry of a final decree in accordance with the views above expressed. — Affirmed, in part; reversed in part; and remanded.