58 Minn. 104 | Minn. | 1894
The evidence in this ease conclusively established that hay and ties claimed by plaintiff as his property were destroyed by fire about October 6, 1889. The fire had been raging for several days. The ties had been piled up for delivery to defendant company on its right of way, and were there destroyed, while the hay was in stacks upon a meadow not far distant. It was shown that some days before, about October 1st, a small fire was seen to break out on defendant’s right of way, north of and close to the track, immediately after a freight train which had parted in two was coupled up at that point, and had proceeded on its way. The witness who first saw the fire was walking along the track behind the train, and, when he passed (about fifteen minutes after the train started up), the fire was burning briskly, and running in a northerly direction. This witness saw the fire the next day, and it had then burned over quite an area. Another witness saw the fire about half an hour after it broke out, and, for several days afterwards, until it had reached the plaintiff’s ties, was engaged with him in an effort to put it out. That this fire was not kept under observation during all of each of the nights which intervened between the day it was first seen and that on which the hay and ties were destroyed
The court was requested by counsel for defendant to instruct, in substance, that if there were two fires, — one starting on the south side of the track, with which the defendant was in np way connected, and one starting on the north side, with which the company had
By the sixth assignment of error, counsel for defendant call attention to a part of the charge as to the liability of one party, to whom negligence in setting one fire has been traced, where two. have met, mingled, and then destroyed property. The instruction complained of was really more favorable to their client than it should have been. If two fires have been set, the origin of one or both of which can be traced to the negligence of a party or parties, either or both of these parties can be held responsible for resulting damages in case the fires mingle. All of the legal consequences of being joint wrongdoers must follow, one being that each is liable to the full extent of the damages growing out of the wrongful acts; or, as it is sometimes said, where the injury is the result of two concurring causes, one party is not exempt from full liability, although another party is equally culpable.
In the fifth subdivision of their brief, counsel for appellant contend that there was no competent evidence as to respondent’s ownership of the hay, for the value of which the verdict was rendered. It was not necessary for the respondent to show paper title to the land on which the grass was cut from which the hay was made. He cut grass, and made 60 tons of hay, all of which was burned. He was in actual possession, under claim of title, of.the land from which he obtained forty five tons thereof, according to his own estimate. As to this amount, at least, he made a prima facie case for recovery, and appellant made no attempt to rebut it. Evidently, he was allowed by the jury the value of forty five tons of hay, and no more; the balance of the verdict being for the value of the ties and for interest.
Judgment affirmed.
(Opinion published 59 N. W. 978.)