*1 The Court of Appeals reversed relevant part.* Although it noted that there has been considerable confusion the Courts of Appeals concerning availability § of a contours 198Bmali prosecution claim, cious Camble[sic], Brummett v. see 946 F. 2d 2n. (collecting cases), the court observed that recent Fifth Circuit eases “have assumed that malicious prosecution violates 1983.” Ibid. The court then held that re spondent’s claim was not time barred because a cause of action prosecution §1983 malicious does under not accrue until the underlying prosecution has terminated in favor the criminal Id., defendant. at 1184. Third, Sixth,
The and Tenth Circuits follow the rule that Fifth Circuit applied here. See Robinson Maruffi, 895 F. 2d (CA10 649, 654 Bartle, Rose v. 1990); (CA3 331, 871 F. 2d 1989); McCune v. Rapids, Grand (CA6 1988). 842 F. 2d However, the First Circuit has held that a malicious prosecution claim accrues the time of arrest not when the allegedly abusive proceeding conclusion, comes to a which be years Walden, III, later. Island, v. Rhode 576 F. 2d n. 5 (1978). The Ninth Circuit’s treatment of question has been Brusett, inconsistent. Cline Compare (1981) v. 661 F. 2d Altmiller, Gowin (following majority rule), with F. 2d (1981) rule). (following minority Clearly, this is an area of law that requires our attention. Therefore, I would grant certiorari to determine if a cause of action for prosecution malicious is available and, under if is, it when the cause of action accrues. McCleary Navarro et ux. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. White, Justice with The Justice, whom Chief O’Connor, and Justice join, Thomas dissenting. Respondents filed this lawsuit after police, who were attempt- ing to execute a warrant, search began kicking at their door at 11 o’clock one night. The police were looking for a suspected * The agreed Fifth Circuit with prosecutors the District Court immune, were but vacated the as to county to allow “for fur ther in light consideration of later the trial court.” Brummett events Camble[sic], 946 F. 2d The county is not party to petition. dealer, cocaine but they got house. wrong question The pre- *2 sented is whether petitioner, the officer who drafted the search warrant affidavit describing searched, the house to be is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the of Appeals Court applied the wrong legal standard in answering that I question, would reverse the judgment and remand the ease for further consideration.
Petitioner, detective, a received a from tip a confidential inform- ant that one Andres had drugs home, Villa his one of several small houses on an access road to a plant. The first building was back road, set from the along separate a driveway. The inform- ant did not count this structure when he told petitioner that Villa lived in the second house on the right. Consequently, the war- rant that obtained directed to go officers to the second house on the right. The officers executing the warrant counted differently, so they up ended at the wrong house.
Respondents sued petitioner and others not party to this peti- tion under Rev. Stat. 42 U. S. C. alleging violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment grounds on qualified of immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding “that the question in this case is whether a police officer in [petitioner’s] would position reasonably have described the location with suffi- cient particularity to direct those executing warrant to the correct house on the right” and “that it jury is for the to decide whether [petitioner] acted reasonably Barthel, . . . .” Navarro v. curiam). F. 2d (per
The decision of the Appeals Court of was just entered a few days after our judgment in Hunter v. Bryant, (1991), in which we explained that the appropriate inquiry was whether a reasonable officer could thought have that he had acted Constitution, accordance with the and not whether an officer (the would have acted otherwise standard by the Ninth applied case). Circuit in Hunter and the present This distinction pro- vides “ample room for mistaken judgments,” because qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly or those who incompetent knowingly violate the law.” Malley Briggs, U. S. (1986), Hunter, quoted supra, at 229.
In Hunter we also reiterated the principle questions of immunity ordinarily should be decided by court, not S., jury, U. because “[t]he entitlément is an immunity suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” Mitchell v. from Hunter, Forsyth, U. S. See supra, at 227 cases). (collecting
Because the did not Appeals Court have benefit of our case, decision in Hunter when it was I deciding this would sum- marily reverse and remand the case so the Ninth light Circuit reexamine its decision in legal the correct standards. C. A. 4th et al. McDonald et al. CenTra
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice White would grant certiorari. 503 U. S. Oklahoma, No. Williamson
No. 91-7648.
States,
Anderson
v. United
Lloyd
No. 91-7655.
June (91-8475). No. A-913 App. Ct. Crim. Granviel v. Texas. Application Tex. for stay death, of execution of sentence of presented to Court, him referred to the Scalia, granted pending disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates In automatically. the event the pe- tition for writ of certiorari is granted, stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court.
June No. A. C. 9th Airlines, Northwest West. Cir. Certiorari granted, vacated, judgment and case remanded for further consideration in light Morales v. Trans World Air- lines, Inc., ante, p. 374. Corley C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- United States.
tion to proceed leave pauperis granted. forma Certiorari granted, vacated, and case remanded for fur-