140 P. 64 | Or. | 1914
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
The part of the Employers’ Liability Act particularly applicable provides as follows: “In the transmission and use of electricity of a dangerous voltage full and complete insulation shall be provided at all points where the public or the employees of the owner, contractor or subcontractor transmitting or using said electricity are liable to come in contact with the wire, and dead wires shall not be mingled with live wires, nor strung upon the same support, and the arms or supports bearing live wires shall be especially designated by a color or other designation which is instantly apparent and live electrical wires carrying a dangerous voltage shall be strung at such distance from the pole or supports as to permit repairmen to freely engage in their work without danger of shock.” Then
Plaintiff complains that defendant violated the statute in the following particulars: (1) That the wires were not insulated where the employees were liable to come in contact with them; (2) that dead wires were mingled with live wires; .(3) that the electric wires were so close to the poles that the workmen engaged in their work were in danger of a shock; (4) that the arms or supports bearing the live wires were not properly designated by color or otherwise; (5) that the cut-off switches were not near enough to the required work to make the use of the same practicable, and that an experienced electrician, should have been immediately present to superintend and warn the operator, and that it was necessary for the company to have rules and specific regulations for the protection of the employees, directing how the work was to be done. It
Mr. Loder, superintendent of the company, when questioned hy a juror, testified:
“Q. Let me ask — did you, as superintendent of construction, tell this boy he should cut the current off to make connection with hot wires?
“A. No; I didn’t tell him to do so. * *
“Q. Is it your judgment to-day that it wasn’t lack of judgment on McClaugherty’s part in failing to turn off the current?
“A. Well, as I feel to-day, and as I felt then, is tempered by experience of subsequent things that have happened. I might say to-day that a man ought to have pulled those plugs, where, at that time, I might have — I certainly did feel that he was perfectly able and perfectly capable to do that job, and I may have felt and possibly said that it was all right.
“Q. Yes; I understand there are things happened to change your judgment. I will ask you if now, to-day you would tell him, James McClaugherty, to turn that current off, or do the job hot or cold?
“A. You bet your boots I would tell him to turn that current off.
“Q. Did you tell him?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. And the company didn’t have any rules whether a man was to turn the current off, hot or cold?
“A. No, sir; they did not.”
The first requested instruction, the refusal of which is now urged as error, is based upon the contention that the defendant was not guilty of negligence if it furnished appliances and instrumentalities adequate to render the place safe where the decedent worked, and if he understood fully the dangers to be avoided, and the manner of using the instruments so as to avoid the danger, and voluntarily chose not to make use of them. This relates to the cut-off switches and their use.
The third is to the purport that, if the jury found that insulation of the wires would have furnished partial protection, and that switches would have supplied more adequate protection, and rendered insulation unnecessary, then it was not negligence for defendant to furnish switches, and not provide the insulation.
The fourth is as follows: “If the defendant furnished the deceased appliances and instrumentalities adequate to render the place where he was required to work safe and suitable, and the deceased understood fully the dangers to be avoided, and the manner of using the instrumentalities and appliances so as to avoid these dangers, but nevertheless the deceased voluntarily chose not to make use of them, the defendant is not liable for the injuries sustained by the deceased from the dangers which would have been removed had the appliances been made use of.”
The contention of the defendant as to all these requested instructions assumes that under the. Employers ’ Liability Act the company was at liberty to furnish substitutes for those things required by the terms of the act; that is, instead of ‘ ‘ full and complete insulation” being provided at all points where employees are liable to come in contact with the wires carrying electricity of a dangerous voltage, instead of dead wires not being mingled with live wires, nor strung upon the same support, and the arms or supports bearing live wires being “especially designated by a color or other designation which is instantly apparent,” and instead of such live wires being strung
The means of turning off the electricity was some distance from where the decedent wás directed to install the motor; the cut-off plugs being about one-half mile, and the substation about 1% miles therefrom. It does not appear whether McClaugherty had a key to the substation or not. The jury, in considering whether the company had complied with the general provisions of the statute referred to, may have believed that it was not practicable for the boy to turn off the current before making the connection of the wires. However this may be, the furnishing the switches would not exculpate the company from negligence in failing to comply with the other plain provisions of the statute, as to safeguarding the wires. There was no error in the refusal of the court to give the instructions requested by defendant. The trial court specifically instructed the jury as to the requirements of the statute, and that the question for them to determine* was whether or not the defendant failed to provide any of the safety appliances or conditions alleged in the complaint, and whether such failure resulted in injury to James McClaugherty. We think the question of negligence was fairly submitted to the jury.
The Employers’ Liability Act, as passed by the people, of the state, differs from any other statute which we have been able to find; therefore the adjudications of cases under other acts are of but little assistance in applying the provisions of our statute. Some expressions in the earlier opinions in cases under statutes somewhat similar to our own shed light upon the principle involved. In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McCloskey’s Admr., 23 Pa. 526, an action brought by an administrator for the loss of the life of Vm. Mc-Closkey by the negligence of the defendant, the trial court allowed the jury to find the damages according to the value of the life lost, to compute them by the probable accumulations of a man of such age, habits, health and pursuits as the deceased during his probable lifetime. Mr. Justice Lowrie, in affirming the judgment, after discussing the ancient laws, at page 530 of the opinion, said: “Our act of April 15, 1851, seems to express its purpose better than the English one heretofore referred to. * * The first of these sections is very plain, and it provides that the personal representatives may continue the action commenced; that is, may proceed and recover the very damages to which the deceased would have been entitled had he survived until verdict and judgment. The other section is somewhat less definite in regard to the damages intended; but this very indefiniteness is proof that no other thought was in the mind of the legislature than the wrong and damage done to the decedent, else it would have been made to appear. If one section related to damages done to the deceased, and the other to damages done to his relatives, these contrasted thoughts could hardly have failed to come out clearly
The case of Railroad Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90 (18 L. Ed. 591), was brought under a statute of Illinois giving the right of action to the personal representatives of the person killed by such an act as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled such person to maintain an action for damages. The statute provided that “in every action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the wife and next of kin of such .deceased person, not exceeding,” etc. It was held that it was not necessary to recovery that the widow and next of kin should have had a legal claim on the deceased for their support had he survived; that the damages in those cases must depend very much upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and that, when the action is brought by the party himself for injuries to himself, there could be no fixed measure of compensation for the pain and anguish of body and mind, nor for the loss of time and care in business, or the permanent injury to health and body, so that, when the suit was brought by the representative for his death, the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the next of kin was equally uncertain and indefinite; that in the latter and more difficult case, as in the former one, often difficult also, the result must be left to turn mainly upon the sound sense and deliberate judgment of the jury applied to all the
“But the statute in respect to this measure of damages seems to have been enacted upon the idea that, as a general fact, the personal assets of the deceased would take the direction given them by the law; and hence the amount recovered is to be distributed to the wife and next of kin in the proportion provided for in the distribution of personal property left by a person dying intestate. If the person injured had survived and recovered, he would have added so much to his personal estate, which the law, on his death, if intestate, would have passed to his wife and next of kin; in case of his death by the injury, the equivalent is given by a suit in the name of his representative.”
In Mollie Gibson Cons. Min. & Mill. Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321 (38 Pac. 850), the measure of damages was discussed. The court said:
“It is always described as compensatory, and never as a solace for wounded feelings. It is, however, exceedingly clear that, while it is permitted to give testimony concerning the relations of the deceased to the plaintiff, in order to form a just estimate of the probable damage, yet the recovery is not to be measured or determined by the extent of the contributions or support furnished by the one to the other. In other words, although the deceased as a son may never yet have contributed to the support of his father, yet, when the son’s age, habits, earning capacity and the age of the father are once established, a recovery may be had for the probable injury which the father has sustained in the loss of his son.”
The question was dealt with in Trimmier v. Atlantic 6 C. A. L. Ry. Co., 81 S. C. 203, 213 (62 S. E. 209, 212), a case which was submitted to the jury, practically the same as the one at bar. It was contended that the life expectancy of the person for whose benefit the action was brought should have been considered. The
The cases of Barksdale v. Railway, 76 S. C. 183 (56 S. E. 906), and Hull v. Railway, 76 S. C. 278 (57 S. E. 28, 10 L. E. A. (N. S.) 1213), sustain the proposition that it is not essential to the recovery of damages that the person for whose benefit the action is brought should be dependent upon the deceased for support, nor that the beneficiary should suffer pecuniary loss: See, also, Clark v. Tulare Lake Dredg. Co., 14 Cal. App. 414 (112 Pac. 564); Peters v. Southern Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 48 (116 Pac. 400). The case of Matthews v. Warner’s Admr., 29 Graft. (Va.) 570 (26 Am. Rep. 396), was brought under a statute of Virginia providing that the claim for damages may be maintained by the personal representative of one whose death has been occasioned “by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person or corporation.” In that case an instruction was requested and refused as to the measure of damages, similar to the one requested in the case at bar, to the effect that, in assessing the damages, the jury must confine themselves to the injuries of which a pecuniary estimate can be made, with reference to a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, as of right or otherwise, to his mother from a continuance of the life of the deceased son. The Virginia statute declared that ‘ ‘ the jury in any such action may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just, ’ ’ etc. In affirming the judgment, at page 577 of the opinion, Mr. Justice Christian said: “I think it is manifest that the legislature intended, as in Kentucky, Iowa, Connecticut and California (which states are exceptional to the English statute), to allow the jury
Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [Fed. Stats. Ann. Snpp. 1909, p. 584, U. S. Comp. Stats. Snpp. 1911, p. 1322]), in case of the death of an injured employee, his personal representative brings the action for the benefit of those surviving him. They are entitled to the proceeds of any judgment recovered in the following order: (1) The surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; (2) if there be no husband, widow or children, then for the benefit of the employee’s parents ; (3) if there be no beneficiaries in the first and second classes, then for the benefit of the next of kin dependent upon such employee: Thornton’s Fed. Em. Liability etc. Acts (2 ed.), p. 168. On page 169 this author states: “If there be no widow or husband and children or parent of the deceased employee, then ‘the next of kin dependent upon’ bim are entitled to the proceeds of the action. # # Partial dependency is sufficient to authorize the maintenance of the suit. But in the case of a widow, husband, child or parent no question of dependency is involved.” In support of the last statement, which is very pertinent to the construction of our statute, the case of Beaumont Traction Co. v. Dilworth (Tex. Civ. App.), 94 S. W. 352, is cited. In cases under the federal act the reason for requiring evidence that a beneficiary coming within the third class is dependent upon the deceased person is on account of the use of the words ‘ ‘ dependent upon such employee. ’ ’ These words make a marked difference between the federal statute and the Oregon statute. It may be noticed, however, that under Section 7054, L. O. L., parents are bound to maintain their children when poor and unable to main
Mr. Justice Moore, in McFarland v. Oregon Elec. Ry. Co., 70 Or. 27 (138 Pac. 458), referring to Section 4 of the Employers’ Liability Act, says that it “is remedial, and, as far as possible, ought to be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries. ” In that case, Neal McFarland having died unmarried, without lineal heirs or adopted children, but leaving a mother surviving him, it was held that she was the sole beneficiary of any sum that might be recovered as damages resulting from the son’s death, to the exemption of his father.
In Hawkins v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. (D. C.), 202 Fed. 340, 341, Mr. Justice Wolveeton considered some features of this statute. He said: “It would seem that this statute gives an action for negligence arising from particular acts, and, so far as it gives a right of action for the death of a person, it is akin to Lord Campbell’s Act. This may be termed a survival action. At common law there was no right of action for the death of a person; but it is the purpose of this act to give to certain individuals such a right. In my view of the statute, it gives but one action, which is not cumulative in its purpose or character. This action survives to the widow of the person killed, his lineal descendants or adopted children, etc., and the right of action is without limit as to the amount of damages.”
In Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, Section 158, commenting on the use of the word “pecuniary” as used in the New York act and others, it is stated: ‘ ‘ The use of ‘pecuniary’ to designate the kind of loss for which recovery can be had is misleading, for the damages are by no means confined to the loss of money, or of what can be estimated in money. * # The word
In. Olivier v. Houghton St. Ry. Co., 138 Mich. 242 (101 N. W. 530), an action by an administrator for an injury causing death through negligence, at page 244 of the opinion, the court said: “When the deceased received his injury, he stood entitled to recover then and there the loss sustained by being deprived of the power to earn money during the period he would have lived had he not suffered the injury. It would not, under these decisions, have been any answer for defendant to say that, ‘while this is precisely what we have deprived you of, you cannot recover at all, as we have, in addition to crippling you, shortened your life.’”
The Employers’-Liability Act authorizes an action to recover compensation for the life lost through the negligence specified in the act. It contemplates but one action for such injury. The amount is not confined to the pecuniary loss occurring to the beneficiary, occasioned by the death of the employee. It was evidently intended that the surviving relatives named in the law should have the right to recover for the wrong causing the death. The instruction asked by defend
There is necessarily difficulty in fixing a pecuniary value upon human life. In all actions for the wrongful death of a person, the amount of compensation to be recovered must depend to quite an extent upon the good judgment of the jury upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of each particular case under proper instructions as to the law applicable thereto: 13 Cyc. 375; Carlson v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 21 Or. 450, 459 (28 Pac. 497). The physical condition, age, etc., of the father, the beneficiary, were not material as bearing upon the amount of recovery: Seattle Electric Co. v. Hartless, 144 Fed. 379 (75 C. C. A. 317). The right of recovery does not depend upon such conditions. The law confers the right in certain cases upon certain named beneficiaries. There was no error in failing to instruct the jury as requested by defendant’s counsel.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Afetrmed. Rehearing Granted.
Rehearing
Affirmed November 10, 1914.
On Rehearing.
(144 Pae. 569.)
A rehearing having been allowed in this case on the 7th day of July, the cause was reargued on July 28, and former opinion adhered to on November 10, 1914.
Aeeirmed on Rehearing.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Neff & Medley, Mr. Asa C. Hough, Messrs.
For respondent there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Alfred E. Reames.
In Banc.
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the casé mentioned, under a statute providing that damages recovered for death caused by negligence must inure to the benefit of the widow and children, if any, testimony in regard to the habits and moral character of the widow of the decedent was held to have been properly excluded. The court carefully stated the issues made by the pleadings and instructed the jury in part as follows:
“The law provides that if an electric company, transmitting high voltage current, fails to comply with those requirements to which I shall call your attention, and death shall result from such failure, then the electric company shall be liable for the damages actually sustained, and there shall be no limit as to the amount of damages which can be recovered, excepting, of course, that the same cannot exceed the amount sued for, nor can they exceed the damages actually sustained. ’ ’
After fully explaining the provisions of the act, the court further instructed the jury as to the measure of damages, to the effect that, if they found for the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover the same amount James McClaugherty would have been entitled to recover, had he survived, but'received the injury “under the same circumstances, and in considering that question you will take into consideration his age at the time of receiving the injury, his probable expectancy of life, as shown by the evidence, and his earning capacity, and determine the amount, in case you shall find for the plaintiff.”
“So far as it gives a right of action for the death, * * it is akin to Lord Campbell’s Act. * * This -action survives to the widow of the person killed, his lineal descendants, or adopted children,” etc.
We quote from the brief of one of defendant’s counsel:
‘ ‘ The Employers ’ Liability Act of 1910 is not a dependent statute, but a survival statute, and is akin to Section 34, L. O. L., and Section 380, L. O. L.”
As stated in our former opinion, the act authorizes but one action for an injury caused by a violation of the law in case of death. Where there is any one of the- beneficiaries named living and in a position to bring the action, it cannot be brought by the personal representative of the decedent, under Section 380, L. O. L. The act obviates the necessity and expense of the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of bringing the action. Nevertheless an action under Section 4 of the act takes the place of, and serves practically the same purpose as regards the amount of compensation to be recovered as, an action by an administrator under Section 380, L. O. L., save that there is no limit as to the amount. The proceeds of a judgment take a different direction, not going to the estate of the decedent, but direct to the beneficiary.
“There is an inherent difficulty in placing a pecuniary value upon human life; and in an action for the wrongful death of a person, the amount of damages recoverable must depend very much on the good sense and sound judgment of the jury, upon all the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The jury may make the estimate of damages themselves, from the facts proved, yet their estimate must be based upon the facts in evidence, and they should be properly instructed as to the law applicable to the facts before them”: Carlson v. Oregon S. L. Co., 21 Or. 450, 457 (28 Pac. 497, 499).
The actual loss, within the meaning of Section 4 of the Employers’ Liability Act, as applied to the facts in the case at bar, is the net amount which the decedent would probably have saved from his earnings by his skill and bodily labor, in his calling or profession, during the residue of his life, had he survived, taking into consideration his age, health, ability, habits of industry, sobriety and mental and physical skill, so far as they affect his capacity for earning money by rendering service to others or accumulating property. This is substantially as the trial court gave the law to the jury in a general way. It is not contended,upon this rehearing that the instructions requested as to the measure of damages were strictly accurate, or should
After a careful examination of the record, and a consideration of the able argument and briefs of counsel, we do not find any reversible error in the record.
The judgment of the lower court will therefore be affirmed.
Affirmed. On Rehearing Former Opinion Approved.