36 W. Va. 34 | W. Va. | 1892
John R. McClanahan, who was a resident of Kanawha county, was married twice, and died in the year 1887, leaving issue, as the result of both marriages, and his second wife, sui-viving him. The children by the first marriage were Elizabeth Bailey, Sallie Looney, Kachael Derrick, John W. McClanahan, and Samuel and James P. Mc-Clanahan. The last two named died before their father; said Samuel leaving two children, and James P. leaving six children. The children of said second marriage were C. H. McClanahan, and Kichard, Kobert, and Jarrett Me-
In the month of Eebruary, 1888, said C. II. McClanahan, and Richard McClanahan, Robert McClanahan, and Jarrett McClanahan, children of said JohnII. McClanahan by said second marriage, filed their bill in the Circuit Court of Ka-nawha county against Jane McClanahan, widow of said John R. McClanahan, and the other-heirs at law of said John R. McClanahan, in which they set forth the facts above stated in reference to the conveyances made by said John R. McClanahan in his lifetime to said Elizabeth Bailey, John W. McClanahan, James P. McClanahan, and his six sons; also as to the amounts of money advanced to the
The infant defendants filed a formal answer by guardian cul litem, aud the adult defendants also answered said bill, denying that any of said tracts of land were conveyed by JolmR. McOlanalian to them, or either of them, by way of advancement, and claiming that a good, valid, and adequate consideration was paid for said lands, notwithstand-iugthe recitals in said deeds of love and affection, etc. They deny that seven hundred and fifty dollars was advanced to said Sallie Looney, but admit that seven hundred dollars were given her by said John R. McOlanalian. They 'also deny that the three hundred dollars received by Rachel Derrick was so received by way of advancement, but allege that a full, adequate, and valid consideration was given said John R. McOlanalian for the same, pursuant to contract, and not by way of advancement; and they deny that any conveyances made or mono}'- paid to them by said John R.
On the 27th day of June, 1888, a decree was entered in saicl cause referring the same to a commissioner to make a report showing the advances, if any, made by said John ft. McClanahan to each of his children, when and how the same were made, and the amount and value thereof made to each child, and the amount with which each child should be charged at the date of making said report, or account of such advances, etc. Quite a number of depositions were taken before said commissioner, and on the 6th day of July, 1889, said commissioner closed his report, filing, however, a supplement to said report on the 9th day of July, 1889. Said commissioner in his report found that an advancement of seven hundred dollars was made in money by said John R. McClanahan to Mrs. SallieLooney in 1877 or 1878; that the tract of land, containing about seventy two acres, which was conveyed by said decedent to Elizabeth Bailey, was worth nine hundred and fifty five dollars and was an advancement to her, that John A. McClanahan and Rebecca McClanahan, who are infant children of Samuel McClanahan, are entitled to the share their father would have received had he survived said John R. McClanahan ; that the one hundred and sixty acres conveyed to James P. McClanahan and his six sons, of the value of one thousand
This report was excepted to by counsel for the defendants (1) because it reports that the conveyance to Elizabeth Dailey from John R. McClanahan, deceased, was an advancement, and that she paid no consideration therefor; (2) because it reports that the conveyance to John W. Mc-Clanahan was by way of advancement, and that he paid only two hundred and fifty dollars therefor ; (8) because.it reports that the three hundred dollars paid to Derrick was an advancement; (4) because it attempts to fix the value of the property received by said defendants as of the date of their receipt, and not upon the contract of conveyance; (5) because of all interest he has charged on said land conveyed or money received; (6) because of all charges made in said report against said defendants on account of the land conveyed and money received by them from said John R. McClanahan, deceased; and Rachel Derrick, J. W. McClanahan, and Elizabeth Dailey, defendants, further excepted to said report because of the advancements reported therein against them.
On the 8th day of April, 1890, said cause "was heard upon the bill, answers, replications thereto, and upon said commissioner’s report, and the depositions of witnesses taken before said commissioner accompanying said report, and upon the supplemental report of said commissioner, and upon the injunction awarded in said cause upon the petition of J. W. McClanahan, upon consideration whereof it was adjudged and decreed that said report of Commissioner Gallaher, as modified by said supplemental report, be, and the same was thereby, approved and' confirmed; and, the said C. II. McClanahan electing to bring into hotchpot the note of W. E. Kellar for two hundred dollars, advanced to him by his father, John R. McClanahan, deceased; and the
Erom this decree J. W. MeClanahan, Rachel Derrick, S. W. Derrick, Elizabeth Bailey, and Bushrod Bailey obtained this appeal.
The first error assigned and relied upon by the appellants is that the court erred in overruling each and all the exceptions of defendants to Commissioner Gallaher’s report. These exceptions were six in number, and, in order to determine the propriety of the action of the court with reference thereto, uearly-the entire testimony taken before said commissioner would have to be analyzed, and to some extent the credibility of the witnesses passed upon.
The first exception to said commsssioner’s report is : “Because he reports that the conveyance to Elizabeth Bailey from John R. MeClanahan, deceased, was an advancement, and that she paid no consideration therefor.” Said Elizabeth Bailey states in her deposition that she paid three hundred and fifty dollars for the land to her father— that she paid one hundred dollars down and two hundred and fifty dollars iu one year; and when asked what said
And again, the fact that the grantor on the face of the deed recites that the deed was made m consideration of love and affection should have great weight in establishing the fact that said conveyance ivas an advancement to Elizabeth Bailey, and not a sale; and again, the grantees in said deed were estopped by the recitals in the deed under which they claim, and, after they had accepted their deeds from said John H. McClanahan, will not be allowed to contradict such recitals. See 2 Herm. Estop, pp. 749, 750.
The next exception to said report is: “Because it reports that the conveyance to John W. McClanahan was by way of advancement, and that he only paid two hundred and fifty dollars therefor.” This deed recites on its face a consideration of three hundred dollars and love and affection, but when placed on the witness stand said John W. Mc-Clanahan swears that he paid his father one thousand four hundred dollars in cash for it, or, rather, subject to his or
It appears that John W. McClanahau had in June, 1871, contracted to purchase the prospective interest of his sister Mrs. Looney in said two hundred and eighty six acres of land for the sum of seven hundred and fifteen dollars, and lie states in his deposition that he paid something near five hundred dollars, and the balance he paid to his father. When this was paid does not appear. Ilis attention was called to the fact that the consideration recited in the deed to him from his father was three hundred dollars and love and affection, and was asked to explain why the deed was so written, and replied: “I owed my father, the day the deed was written, three hundred dollars. That is all the reason I can see why it was drawn in that way.” lie, however, states that he paid one thousand four hundred dollars or somewhere near that, for said tract of land, although he claims it was not worth more than one thousand dollars or one thousand two hundred dollars; and he only produces two notes that he had takeu up from his father, one for one hundred dollars and the other for two hundred and fifty dollars. It must be regarded somewhat remarkable that he would pay one thousand four hundred dollars for a tract of land which he says was only worth one thousand dollars, or at most one thousand two hundred dollars, subject to the incumbrance of his step mother’s dower, and subject also to the life-estate of his father. We are led to the conclusion from the circumstances disclosed by the evidence that said commissioner was warranted in finding that the amount of his advancement was one thousand six hundred and twenty five dollars, less three hundred dollars cash paid by him.
As to the three hundred dollars paid Mrs. Derrick by John R. McClauahan, the commissioner finds that to have been an advancement. It appears that Rachael Derrick and her husband moved on a tract of land belonging to
The fourth and fifth exceptions to said commissioner’s report were as follows: “(4) Because he attempts to fix the value of the property received by said defendants as of the date of their receipt, and not upon the contract of conveyance. (5) Because of all interest he has charged on said land conveyed or money received.”
The rule in regard to this matter has been laid down by this Court in the case of Kyle v. Conrad, 25 W. Va. 760, point 1 of syllabus, where it is held that, “if a father dies having advanced to some of his children, by conveying to them real estate, and giving to them personal property by way of advancement, when his estate is divided and distributed his children to whom such advancements have boon made should be charged, when their advancements are brought into hotchpot, with the value of the property advanced when received, but not with the rents and profits of the land conveyed to them severally, nor with the increase of the personal properties, nor with the interest on the value received of either the real or personal property during the lifetime of the father; but they must be charged with interest from the death of the father on the value, when received, of all property, real or personal, so advanced.” Said commissioner, in his supplemental statement, which was confirmed by the court, has calculated the interest in accordance with this decision.
Now, while it is true that there is some conflict in the testimony upon which the report of said commissioner was based, and he was compelled to grope among the circumstances detailed in order to ascertain the true intention of said John R. McClanahan in making the gifts and conveyances which are disclosed by the record to have been made,
Again, the evidence of advancement need not be conclusive, but a preponderance of testimony is sufficient. Bon-vier, in his Law Dictionery, defines “advancement” as follows: “A gift by anticipation from a parent to a child of the whole or a part of what it is supposed such child will inherit on the death of the parent.” And in Lawson's Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 85, it was held that “advancement is a question of intention; that which was a gift at first cannot subsequently become an advancement.”
In the case of Watkins v. Young, 31 Gratt. 84, the court of appeals of Virginia held that, “if a' gift, unexplained, in the lifetime of a father, who dies intestate, to one of his children, is to be presumed in law to be an advancement, this presumption may be repelled by evidence;” and Christian, J., in delivering the opinion of the court (page 88) says: “In some of the states it is held that a gift of any considerable amount is prima fade an advancement, and is to be treated, in case the party to whom, the advancement was made comes in for a distributive share, as a debt due from him to the estate ;” citing Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. 170; Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. 91; Bemis v. Stearns, 16 Mass. 200. “In other states it has been held that the mere gift, unexplained, by father to child, does not make even a prima facie case in favor of an advancement, but that there must be evidence of intention to treat it as an advancement beyond the unexplained act. The mere gift furnishes no prima facie case of an intention to constitute an advancement;” citing Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322; Hatch v. Straight, 3 Conn. 31; Bulkeley v. Noble, 2 Pick. 337; Partridge v. Havens, 10 Paige 618. And he continues : “But, whatever conflict may seem to exist on this question, all the cases agree that a gift in the lifetime of the intestate, unexplained, is only a presumption in favor of an advancement, and makes only a prima facie case which with the legal presumption may be rebutted by evidence.”
In Kingsbury’s Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 460, it was held that •“where, in a deed of land by a father to his son, the consideration expressed was natural love and affection, and a bond for support during life, after the death of the grantor, on distribution of his estate, oral testimony is admissible to explain the attending circumstances of the conveyance, and that it was intended in part as an advancement.”
The question, then, as to whether these transfers of property from John R. McClanahan to certain ones of his children were so conveyed and transferred by way of advancement depends upon the evidence and the surrounding circumstances. The solution of this question was referred to a commissioner, before whom the witnesses appeared and gave their testimony, and he had an opportunity of witnessing their demeanor, and judging of their credibility 5 and where the determination of a fact is referred to a commissioner, and depends mainly upon the weight of the evidence, which is conflicting, 'and the finding of the commissioner is confirmed by the Circuit Court, this Court will not reverse the action of the Circuit Court therein, unless the evidence before the commissioner was clearly insufficient, in any reasonable view, to support the finding of said commissioner.
So in the case of Broderick v. Broderick, 28 W. Va. 379, p’t 4 of the syllabus, this Court held that, where a cause has been referred to a commissioner to ascertain and report the debts due from a decedent, and he returns with his report, as part thereof, all the evidence which was before him on which he acted, and the report is excepted to as unsupported by the evidence, and the Circuit Court has overrul
The Circuit Court, in the case at bar, in the decree complained of has overruled the exceptions to the commissioner’s report, and confirmed his action in finding as here-inbefore stated, and, under the rulings of this Court in the cases we have cited, we do not think that this Court would be warranted in reversing the decree complained of. Said decree must therefore be affirmed, with costs and damages to the appellees.
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