Plaintiff Shawn McClain appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants University of Michigan Board of Regents and University of Michigan Medical Center pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). 1 We reverse and remand.
I
Plaintiff filed this medical-malpractice action in March 2001 following a miscarriage, which plaintiff alleged was caused by defendants’ negligence. Acсording to plaintiff, after a contact with her primary-care physician in July 1999 during her pregnancy, she was referred to the University of Michigan *494 Medical Center’s High Risk Clinic because of her history of a previous miscarriage. At the time, plaintiff worked as a hotel housekeeper and was concerned that her job could affeсt her pregnancy because she had experienced pain in the lower abdomen after engaging in physical tasks during work. The clinic physicians indicated that her employment would not affect her pregnancy, and she was given no work restrictions. Despite ultrasounds that showed that plaintiff had a shortened cervix and her history of a previous miscarriage, plaintiff was not offered a cerclage (stitching to hold the cervix closed) or a disability note. Although she was subsequently provided a temporary excuse from work, when she returned to work, she again experienced increased pain and bleeding. At that time, plaintiff was taken to a hosрital by ambulance and on September 29, 1999, delivered a 1772-week-old fetus as a result of premature labor. The fetus did not survive.
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition asserting that plaintiff was not entitled to recover for emotional distress, loss of consortium, or other damages arising from the loss of her nonviable fetus. In response, plaintiff asserted a claim for “bystander injuries,” i.e., a cause of action occurring when a parent witnesses the negligent infliction of injury to her child and suffers emotional distress as a result. See, e.g.,
Wargelin v Sisters of Mercy Health Corp,
II
The parties do not dispute that under Michigan law, an action for wrongful death, MCL 600.2922, cannot be brought on behalf of a nonviable fetus, because a nonviable fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of the wrongful-death act. MCL 600.2922(1);
Thomas v Stubbs,
In addition, plaintiff may not recover for loss of consortium for the loss of her unborn child. As noted in
Sizemore v Smock,
However, plaintiffs cause of action for damages in her own right as a result of her miscarriage is well grounded in Michigan law, and summary disposition on the grounds argued by defendants was improper, i.e., that plaintiff had no physical injury from her loss of pregnancy and that her emotional injuries stemmed solely from her grief and sorrow, which is not compensable in a tort action.
A
More than a century ago, in
Tunnicliffe v Bay Cities Consolidated Railway
Co,
The Carter Court was not presented with, and did not address, the question whether an expectant *497 mother may recover for mental suffering allegedly caused by medical malpractice resulting in a miscarriage in the absence of рhysical injuries. In Carter, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered “bodily injuries.” In this case, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that she suffered the loss of the fetus and emotional damages, and incurred past, present, and future medical expenses and wage loss. After examining whether this distinction in circumstances warrants a difference in outcome in mеdical-malpractice claims, we find that it does not.
More than three decades ago, Michigan abolished the so-called “impact rule,” which precluded recovery for injuries sustained by mental disturbance occasioned by the negligence of another where there was no immediate personal injury.
Daley v LaCroix,
Over seventy years later, the Daley Court joined an increasing majority of courts in repudiating the impact rule. Id. at 12. Noting an onslaught of exceptions to the rule and the changed circumstances of factual and scientific information available, the Daley Court adopted the current rule allowing recovery for physical consequences produced as a result of emo *498 tional distress proximately caused by another’s negligence even in the absence of any physical impact on the plaintiff. Id. at 11-13. The Court noted that a majоrity of courts regarded the physical consequences of mental harm, or the circumstances of the accident, a sufficient guarantee of injury. Id. at 12. Hence, the oft-cited rule that a plaintiff may not recover emotional-distress damages without a showing of physical injury.
However, this rule must not be construed more broadly thаn intended. The geneses of the impact rule and the modem rule requiring objective physical consequences for emotional-distress recovery were situations in which a plaintiff sought recovery for mental disturbance caused by a defendant’s negligence, but without accompanying physical injury or physical consequеnces, or any independent basis for tort liability. Id. at 8. As the Daley Court observed, id., the law has always permitted recovery in closely analogous situations where the “plaintiff’s mental or emotional reactions were a necessary element in the chain of causation.” Further, “compensation for a purely mental component of damagеs where [a] defendant negligently inflicts an immediate physical injury has always been awarded as ‘parasitic damages.’ ” Id.
Thus, recovery for emotional distress differs from recovery for mental anguish, and various specific nonpecuniary, personal damages beyond the ambit of emotional distress are available to a plaintiff who can establish proof of such damages. Patek, McLain, Granzottо & Stockmeyer, 1 Michigan Law of Damages and Other Remedies (ICLE), § 2.15, p 2-15 and § 2.17, p 2-16. These include: physical pain and suffering; mental anguish; fright and shock; denial of social *499 pleasure and enjoyment; embarrassment, humiliation, or mortification; or other appropriate damages. Id.-, see also SJI2d 50.02 and comment.
B
In this case, defendants argued, and the Court of Claims agreed, that plaintiff’s claim for “emotional damages” failed because she conceded in her deposition testimony that she had suffered no physical injuries:
Q. Have you, as a result of the pregnancy loss, suffered any physical injuries?
A. Physical, no.
Q. Okay.
A. Emotionally, yes.
We do not find plaintiff’s response to defense counsel’s inquiry dispositive of plaintiff’s claim. This case is not properly analyzed in the context of an emotional-distress claim, i.e., where the alleged negligence results in a purely mental disturbance in the absence of any physical impact on the plaintiff. 3 Daley, supra at 12-13. Defendants’ negligence is alleged to have resulted in the miscarriage. It would seem self-evident that the miscarriage of a 17V2-week-old fetus involved a physical impact on plaintiff, legitimately encompassing her claim for the mental or emotional consequences. Id. at 8; cf. id. at 11 (fright, allegedly caused by a defendant’s negligence, resulted *500 in a miscarriage). That is, the loss of the pregnancy itself is the physical injury giving rise to damages. Thus, the policy concerns underlying emotional-distress claims are not implicated here. Whether plaintiff in fact suffered emotional harm as a result of the miscarriage is not questioned. Defendants’ position on appeal is, as it was before the Court of Claims, that defendants do “not dispute that plaintiff experienced еmotional distress at the loss of her fetus.”
Moreover, counsel’s phrasing of the deposition question concerning physical injury begged the answer. As noted, the miscarriage itself was a physical injury, and counsel’s reference to it as a “pregnancy loss” does not alter the factual, physical injury.
While we agree with defendаnts’ assertion that plaintiff’s claim was not well-pleaded, we do not find this shortcoming fatal to her claim. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered “emotional damages.” Emotional damages are not necessarily limited to “emotional distress,” but may also encompass mental anguish.
Mieras v DeBona,
C
Defendants, while acknowledging that plaintiff experienced emotional distress at the loss of her fetus, argue that plaintiff’s deposition testimony establishes that she is seeking damages for grief and *501 sorrow over the loss of her nonviable fetus, noncоmpensable pursuant to the holding in Tunnicliffe. We disagree.
In allowing recovery of mental-suffering damages incident to a miscarriage caused by a defendant’s negligence, the Tunnicliffe Court drew a line of demarcation between permissible damages naturally attending a miscarriage and impermissible damages for sorrow and grieving of the mother following thе miscarriage, which are too remote to be considered:
While the jury are allowed to consider the case with all its facts, and to take into account, for the purpose of compensation, not only the physical pain, but also mental suffering, in determining the award of damages, and while, of necessity, this involves tо some extent a consideration of the nature of the injury, and cannot exclude from the consideration of the jury the fact that the physical and mental suffering of the mother by reason of such an injury would be more intense than in the case of the ordinary fracture of a limb, yet beyond this it would not be competent for the jury to gо, and to attempt to compensate for the sorrow and grieving of the mother. [Tunnicliffe, supra at 629-630.]
A close review of the
Tunnicliffe
Court’s basis and reasoning for this distinction raises clear questions of its continued viability. Quoting from the holdings and reasoning of other jurisdictions, the Court observed that if a plaintiff lamented the loss of her offspring, such grief involved an element of sentiment that would be inappropriately subject to the caprice and conjecture of the jury.
Id.
at 630. Further, if a mother wept for her children and would not be comforted, a question of continuing damage was presented, “ ‘too delicate to be weighed by any scales which the law has yet invented.’ ”
Id,.,
quoting
Bovee, supra.
Finally,
*502
the Court cited the reasoning of the Geоrgia courts, wherein the court stated, “ ‘[t]he loss of a child by a miscarriage would affect women so differently that it would be hard for
men,
sitting as jurors, to estimate it as an element of damage,’ ” and it therefore would be better to omit from any instruction to the jury on the question of sorrow.
Id.
at 630-631, quoting
Augusta & S R R Co v Randall,
85 Ga 297;
It goes without saying that such reasoning is clearly no longer vаlid in today’s world, and this Court would be reluctant to sanction any rule drawn from such outmoded bases. Citing
Bovee, supra,
as well as cases from other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, the Maryland Court of Appeals recently noted that a number of decisions that have expressly denied recovery for grief related to a miscarriage, in effect, were denying solatium or loss-of-consortium damages, not recovery for distress over the unanticipated termination of the pregnancy or having had to endure a miscarriage or stillbirth.
Smith v Borello,
370 Md 227, 244;
While it may be argued that the letter of the law requires continued adherence to the strictures of the
Tunnieliffe
Court’s reasoning, we agree with the statement in
Carter, supra,
that
Tunnieliffe
indicates that the physical and emotional damages generally
*503
available in negligence actions apply. Negligence cases in general havе not been so limited over the course of time, and the modern-day rules permit recovery for pain, suffering, and mental anguish, such as shame, mortification, mental pain and anxiety, annoyance, discomfiture, and humiliation. Patek, § 2.17, pp 2-16 and 2-17;
Veselenak v Smith,
D
This Court reviews de novo a motion for summary disposition.
Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley,
Plaintiff testified during her deposition that she had isolated herself from her family and friends, had seen a psychiatrist four to five times, and that she suffered *504 from depression. Although discovery in this case was not yet complete, and the record is minimal, the record indicates that plaintiff was hosрitalized and had to have a D & C 4 at the time of her miscarriage. Plaintiff also alleged that she incurred past, present, and future medical expenses and wage loss.
The summary-disposition standard requires that the evidence be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritchie-Gamester, supra. In light of our analysis, we conclude that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to withstand the motion for summary disposition.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
The Court of Claims did not indicate whether it was granting defendants’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (C)(10). Because the court considered documentary evidence, we review plаintiffs claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). See
Verna’s Tavern, Inc v Heite,
Plaintiff argues on appeal that she is entitled to recover under a “bystander recovery” theory. See
Wargelin, supra.
However, as noted by defendants, plaintiff indicated during the hearing on defendants’ motion that she was not, in fact, seeking recovery under a “bystander recovery” theory. Her afSrmative waiver hаs caused this issue to be extinguished for
*495
appeal.
People v Carter,
As noted, plaintiff agreed at the hearing on the motion for summary disposition that she was not pursuing a bystander claim, in which recovery is sought for the infliction of emotional distress. See Wargelin, supra at 80-81.
Dilatation and curettage (D & C) is a gynecological procedure used to clean the uterus after a miscarriage. Plainsense, D and c, <http://www. plainsense.com/Health/Womens/dnc.htm>. “Dilаtation is the dilating or opening of the cervix. This is done by inserting a series of metal rods of increasing diameter into the cervix until the opening is large enough to pass the curette (scraping tool) into the uterus. Another form of dilatation is to insert a laminaria plug (a seaweed rod) into the cervix. After six to 12 hours, the cervix will dilate sufficiently. The curette, which looks like a tiny spoon, is inserted into the uterus and it gently scrapes away at the uterine lining. The procedure takes about 20 minutes.” Id.