*1 MARYLAND v. STATE OF JAMES McCLAIN Term, 94, September 1979.] [No. September 1980. Decided *2 cause was argued J., before C. and Murphy, Smith, JJ. Digges, Eldridge, Cole, Rodowsky, Davidson Logan, Defender, Patricia A. Assistant Public with whom was Alan Murrell, Defender, brief, H. for Public on the appellant.
Ray Stokes, E. Attorney General, Assistant with whom Stephen Sachs, Attorney was H. General, brief, on the for appellee. Smith, J., opinion delivered the of the Court. C. Murphy,
J., dissents and dissenting filed a 471 infra. opinion page (1) in this case: questions two presented
We are with appellate preserved McClain appellant Whether James him in from statements obtained review the issue whether Rule a were not Maryland District violation of evidence, ultimately as we held Johnson admissible (2) if State, so 384 A.2d our to a case tried before Johnson is whether review after appellate there but reached for decision in the affirmative. questions both decision. We answer Hence, of the Court unreported reverse the decision we shall September No. in McClain v. Special Appeals Term, 1978. necessary go here it is not
For of our decision purposes it to alleged crime. Suffice into all the lurid details degree in the first say that McClain convicted of murder *3 old a ten-month City jury. The victim was by a Baltimore of a high-rise down trash chute baby allegedly thrown on 2:43 P.M. He was arrested at building. residential an giving of completed September 12. inculpatory September statement at 2:55 P.M. Maryland District Rule 709 a read: Former conveniently A be taken before a defendant shall unnecessary delay judicial available officer without (1) the earlier of and in no event later than (2) or the first session twenty-four hours after arrest warrant, upon arrest a of court after the defendant’s or, a an been made without where arrest has warrant, charging session of court after the first charging place shall take of the defendant. Such after promptly arrest. McClain’s case.1
It was this rule which was July 1, adopted January extensive we 1. On effective (Criminal cases, Chapter applicable to revisions in the rules criminal (Criminal Causes) Maryland Chapter 700 Rules of Procedure and Causes) Maryland to M.D.R. A rule somewhat similar of the District Rules. Levine for the Court: Judge In Johnson said of an right of the opinion protection In our offi- production judicial before a prompt accused to effectively will be most following cer arrest per exclusionary se rule. Not accomplished rule calculated to deter unlawful only is such a integrity of the preserve detentions and to likely to justice system, but it is assure criminal of the application even-handed more certain and provide and will prompt presentment requirement courts, the bar and law enforcement officials to trial limits of guidance permissible as to the greater to an initial interrogation prior custodial Davenport, [471 Pa. appearanсe. Commonwealth [(1977)]. 278,] [301,] [Id. 328.] A.2d statement, any hold that voluntary We therefore otherwise, during obtained from an arrestee unnecessary delay in him before period producing officer, a, thereby violating M.D.R. 723 is judicial into evidence subject to exclusion when offered against prosecution’s part the defendant as automatically A case-in-chief. statement if, excludible at the it from the time was obtained defendant, produced he had not been before a com- appearance missioner for his initial within the earlier of 24 hours after arrest or the first session *4 arrest, following irrespective court of the reason for delay. [Id. the at 328-29.] adopted
709 a was as M.D.R. 723 a. Since our in Johnson decision M.D.R. 723 a has been amended so that it now reads: pursuant A defendant who is detained to shall be an arrest taken judicial unnecessary delay before a officer without and no event charging later than 24 hours after arrest. A documеnt shall be filed promptly already after arrest if not filed. with compliance that there was not
The State concedes contends, however, objection to the that the a. It M.D.R. 709 ground not admissibility upon the based statement Hence, it claims the Court Johnson. similar to that before the any that event waived. It further contends point the only to be applicable in Johnson should rule enunciated 6,1978, the date of our deci- subsequent to April tried cases in Johnson. sion
I his on the motion attorney argument said in McClain’s the statements: suppress given oppor- not
In the defendant was this case counsel, appointed or either court tunity to obtain the fact that the retained or virtue of privately charging the defendant without officer held oppor- not have an and the defendant did defendant If Commissioner. tunity to be taken before the been taken immediately, he should have charged purpose the Commissioner before rights and thеn the normally advising him of his be able to make Commissioner would either should that the defendant determination time, not have counsel at have or should results as to what Commis- depending on the did not have this sioner decided. defendant was arrested and after The defendant opportunity. had no saying he give he refused to a statement held happened, he was knowledge of what to go not overnight given opportunity and was opportu- the Commissioner before counsel, obviously defen- nity private to have counsel, has public he private dant couldn’t have trial. ... I him at think at representing defender obligation the officer’s was either point the defendant charge the defendant or release following day all again and not start over *5 to psychologically on him bring to pry or force try to It is conceivable his to resist. with will away do asking and day next officer, going back the by the on the questions the asking him and again him trying to the get thаt he was rights, explanation him to tell he him wanted to tell what defendant case, the defendant facts in this him. From the Commissioner before the have been taken should have had he should and September eleventh of the private either himself of to avail opportunity the . . . attorney. appointed court attorney or a have released they should I as an alternative say ... released,
him, charged not either but was he was being in without by police incommunicado held system. He was in the any kind of official status limbo, will; way getting no if he had you held attorney judge. If he had get to him before a an court, what get him before a private counsel to done was to file counsel would have private The fact try interpose and himself. corpus habeas I charged. respectfully that the defendant was by made the Defendant that the Statement suggest . in evidence. . . ruled inadmissible should be Appeals said: Special The Court of suppression that at record discloses case, at the trial on the merits
hearing and admissibility of the objection to the appellant’s on the fact that inculpatory statement was based voluntary in the traditional was not statement Although on the motion appellant, sense. about the
suppress argued, among things, other judi- him delay in before charging presenting officer, of the argument this was in the context cial per of the rather than the voluntariness statement exclusionary se rule which was never mentioned. for his specific ground appellant
Because stated statement, objection admissibility of the both at the hearing suppress on the motion to case, he is bound trial on the merits *6 and is deemed to have waived other stated ground State, v. Von Lusch grounds not mentioned. (1977). 255, [, 468] A.2d 262-63 the the issue of Accordingly, we conclude Rule 723a is Maryland [District] of State’s violation before this court. properly not at voluntariness disagree. argument was directed We was McClain included that a statement obtained while but it be, as may It held in of M.D.R. 709 a. well was violation of argument in this case one from the bench at suggested Johnson, bar majority in in that bench and judges the the the that the in Johnson had been of view prior to our decision rule was fact an individual was held violation factors to be taken into consideration simply one the certainly the It the statement. weighing voluntariness object ground on the upon not trial counsel to was incumbent as it was April we would decide Johnson that on decided. We hold that the issue raised.
II decisions retroactivity the matter of of court We discussed 701-07, A.2d 80 Wiggins v. 275 Md. 310, 336-38, 403 Hicks, in State 285 Md. recently and most pointed Wiggins, genesis out in the A.2d 356 As we is litigation in criminal retroactivity the modern doctrine Ed. Walker, 1731, 14 L. 381 U.S. 85 S. Ct. Linkletter said for the Court: 2d 601 in which Mr. Justice Clark accepted today appropriate rule is that [T]he may justice the make cases in the interest of rule at prospective. [Id. 628.]
* *
[*]
nor
prohibits
requires
[T]he Constitution neither
retrospective
[in
Justice Cardozo said
effect. As
Co.,
Ry. N.
Great
Sunburst
(1932)],
Ct.
As we noted of cases: application retroactive integrity of affects the rule involved
[W]here it where is process, or fact-finding a trial would render rule that non-procedural (e.g., a new double impermissible constitutionally type renders a certain it jeopardy ruling), where [Id. 285 Md. .... impermissible punishment 336.] Hicks: say on to
We went mandated under retroactivity Where *7 involving three test criteria, balancing a above the new whether to determine prongs employed is only. Those prospectively ruling applied should be (1) the new purpose are: three considerations (2) ruling; placed upon the old ruling; reliance (3) justice administration of on the the effect ruling. of the new application retrospective a 296-297, Denno, 293, 87 S. Ct. v. U.S. Stovall 388 v. (1967); Linkletter 1967, 1199 18 L. Ed. 2d 1731, 14 Walker, 636, Ed. 618, S. Ct. L. 381 85 State, supra, 275 Md. at (1965); Wiggins 2d 601 [Id. 718, 337.] 700-701, 737-741. a retroactive mаny unlike cases in which
This case is it is not a sought in that application of a rule has been new one on direct prior nor it judgment collateral attack on court and raised in the trial point review where the was not Here, as we sought it is be review. appellate raised and McClain held, point was raised below already have rule which the same in his case applied simply have seeks case. applied Johnson’s in battle involved have been and the scholars The courts prospectivity retroactivity of semantics where fact, In the decision are concerned. appellate decisions 464 application a retroactive of a new rule
Johnson amounts to
because it makes
to his case a rule of law relative
applicable
to admission of
which had not
enunciated at
statements
been
the time of
regard
point
being
trial. We
before us as not
so
retroactivity
muсh the issue
as it is the question
of what
appellate
law is
on direct
review of a conviction.
In Linkletter Mr. Justice Clark cited for the Court United
(1 Cranch) 103,
States
Peggy,
v. Schooner
Although this Court has followed the Linkletter formula
465 in has led us to cases, formula no case of this in number pending to a on direct review to a new rule case apply refuse in the the new rule which the the at time of formulation new rule was raised. issue 461, (1966), Lefkowitz, A.2d 242 Md. 378
In
Schiller
of whether its decision
question
faced with the
the Court was
(1965),
121,
State, 240
However, in the Court Desist L. Ct. 88 S. in Katz v. United point had been Ed. 2d a case where raised Appeals in the court and the United States Court of trial Katz Katz. held prior Court’s decision upon could not turn the reach of the Fourth Amendment any given into presence physical or absence of a intrusion said, argue petitioners In the Court "The enclosure. Desist effect, fully retrospective that even if Katz which, like the least it should those cases govеrn when Katz was petitioners’, pending were direct review Douglas prompted Mr. decided.” Id. at 252. Justice *9 "d[id] in Desist saying apply the decision not to Katz dissent justice the administration of with an not seem to to be [him] Id. at 255. He added: even hand.” peo- mystery It remains a how some convicted still given new trials for unconstitutional ple are any kept jail and others are without convictions though complaints equally their are hope of relief say the Court should not as meritorious. At least "wholly prospective Katz that it is respects when it was made retroactive his application,” 255-56.] at [Id. case. in his dissent:
In that same case Mr. Justice Harlan said
The unsound character of the rule reaffirmed
by
the
today
perhaps
exposed
considering
best
following hypothetical.
Imagine
Second
anticipated
case had
the line
present
Circuit
reasoning
subsequently pursued
this Court
352-353,
States,
supra,
Katz
v. United
—
— that "the
concluding
as this Court there did
States, 277
underpinnings
[v.
of Olmstead
United
(1928),] and
U.S.
48 S. Ct.
Mr. Justice of purposes differently considered application should be collateral attack purposes than for direct review Mackey United on his views expanded He review. 2d 1160, 28 L. Ed. 667, 91 S. Ct. opinion: dissenting in concurring stating before us direct If we not resolve all cases do understanding light of our best review to is difficult principles, it governing constitutional any at all. why adjudicate so case see we should fid. 679.] our perception proper
I that continue believe law, charged applying with duties as a court of every within legal dispute Constitution to resolve review, we jurisdiction mandates our on direct time, was. not as it once apply the law it is at the as nature, scope of a Inquiry purposes, into the rule is essential particular constitutional be made that rule should deciding task whether is, however, quite inquiry the law of the land. That been deciding, once rule has simply irrelevant fabric, cases then adopted part legal of our which as by it. governed pending in this Court should be fId.
at 681.] these cases conclusion, deciding
In
forgotten
have
the limitations
largely
seems
accompany
as a court of
its functions
law. For the
retroactivity
today
doctrine announced
bespeaks
policy
more considerations of
than of legal prin-
ciple. Treating direct and collateral
review
if
as
they
piece
faulty analysis,
were of one
seems to me
does,
ignoring,
jurisprudential
as
it
considerations
that differentiate the two kinds of
adjudicatory functions. As a court of law we have no
right on direct review to treat one
differently
case
from
respect
another with
to constitutional
provisions
to both. As
regards cases
review,
coming here on collateral
the problem of
retroactivity
truth none other than one of
resettling
Writ,
the limits of the
reach of
Great
*11
which under the recent decisions of this Court has
been
almost
at
sweep. [Id.
701-02.]
boundless
Mr. Justice Marshall
in his
in
opinion concurring
part and
in
dissenting
part
in Williams v. United
401 U.S.
1148,
(1971),
91 S. Ct.
Sound
reasoning,
so well
by
articulated
Mr.
Harlan in
separate
Justice
his
opinion
cases,
covering
present
675,
post, p.
in
my view requires that cases still on direct review
should receive full benefit of our supervening
constitutional
[Id.
665.]
decisions.
at
Mr. Justice Marshall again expressed such views in his
concurring opinion in
Carolina,
Hankerson v. North
432
233, 245, 97
U.S.
Ct.
S.
469 States, 401 U.S. Mackey v. United Harlan in Mr. Justice (1971) adding: (separate opinion),” hold new declines When retroactive, chance one rule constitutional — lucky individual whose case beneficiary prin- the new announcing chosen as occasion — while others application, enjoys retroactive ciple adjudicated their claims similarly situated have comports with hardly This the old doctrine. under justice with an even the ideal of "administration States, supra, at United hand.” Desist v. J., 247.] at dissenting). [Id.
(Douglas, 2214, 65 Louisiana, U.S., S. 100 Ct. in This summer Brown concurred (1980), Mr. Powell Ed. Justice L. 2d saying: judgment, decision Burch Court announced its
This
Louisiana,
while
He was Mr. Justice justices expressed A that of these view similar to *12 Bender, Overruling an The Effect of Retroactive Ohio, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. v. Mapp Constitutional Decision: 650, (1962), ought he to be less says, 675 "There where relevantly litigants.” For way to identical capricious treat Mishkin, The 438; Haddad, op. similar see cit. at views — Court, High Term Foreword: Supreme Court 1964 Law, Writ, Time 79 the Process of and The Great and Due (1965); Schwartz, 56, and Rev. 61 n. 23 Harv. L. Reply A to Reliability, Due Process: Retroactivity, and (1966). 719, A 764 less Mishkin, Professor U. Chi. L. Rev. 33 470 way
capricious
by
was found
they
the
when
courts
made
applicable
decisions
upon
Bowen,
direct
in Lopez
review
v.
(Alaska
1972);
495
P.2d
Fresneda
458 P.2d
(Alaska
1969);
n. 28
Commonwealth,
Brumley v.
1964);
(Ky.
Jersey
Smith,
S.W.2d
New
37 N.J.
481,181
(1962);
Loria,
A.2d 761
People
and
10 N.Y.2d
(1961).
223 N.Y.S.2d
We have
constitutional
in this case.
we
legal principles
believe
by
enunciated
Justices
Harlan, Marshall,
Douglas,
Powell, and Stevens more
nearly conform with fairness
Maryland
and trаditional
than would
holdings
a determination that Johnson is not
applicable to this case. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said for the
Ry.
Co.,
Court in Great N.
v. Sunburst
S. Ct.
Our interpreted here is not being be as any case arising other than one under similar facts and circumstances.
Judgment reversed; case remanded Special Court of Appeals for passage of an order reversing the judgment of the Criminal Court of Baltimore and further remanding trial; the case for a new costs to be paid Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. *13 J., dissenting: C. Murphy, a divided by error committed majority compounds
The
A.2d 709
(4-3)
State, 282 Md.
in Johnson
all criminal
exclusionary rule to
(1978), by applying its
was decided
that that case
on the date
not final
convictions
1978)
appellate
preserved
the issue was
where
(April
underlying
trial. The
at the
timely objection made
review
application
majority’s retroactive
for the
rationale
opinion,
of the
concluding paragraph
in the
is found
Johnson
to hold
and unfair
i.e.,
unjust
it would be
"In our view
issue,
have the benefit
Johnson,
an
is to
who raised
issue,
McClain,
the same
case,
raised
but
who
holding in his
one
makes fish of
holding. It
of that
not to have the benefit
with the
comport
simply
It
does
of the other.
and fowl
hold
We
under
law.
equal justice
American tradition
support its
case.” To
to McClain’s
that Johnson is
retroactivity
upon the
primarily
relies
holding,
majority
Walker, 381 U.S.
in Linkletter
formulation announced
(1965);
of law
1731, 14
change
L. Ed. 2d 601
85 Ct.S.
Peggy,
v. Schooner
in United States
enunciated
doctrine
(1 Cranch)
applied
and
103,
On McClain *14 improperly maintained that his confession was admitted in because, reasons, among evidence other it was obtained (M.D.R.) Maryland a, violation of District Rule 723 which requires person that an arrested judicial
"shall be taken before a
officer without
unnecessary delay and in no event later than the
(1)
(2)
earlier of
24 hours after arrest or
the first
session of court after the defendant’s arrest
a
upon
or,
warrant
where an arrest has been made without
warrant,
first
session of court after the
charging document is filed. ...”
Special
The Court of
held that McClain had
Appeals
brought
judicial
been
before a
officer in accordance with the
requirements
confession,
of M.D.R. 723 a and that his
arrest,
twenty-four
obtained more than
hours after his
was
taken in
violation of
dictates of the rule. The court noted
that under
Johnson
We certiorari to consider whether the — exclusionary rule articulated in Johnson a case decided — five months after McClain’s trial determining whether McClain’s confession was inadmissible — majority under M.D.R. 723 a. The has concluded and I —agree because, question properly this before us contrary Special to the conclusion reached the Court of admissibility to the confession’s object did McClain Appeals, right of his in violation obtained that it was ground judicial officer before a to be taken M.D.R. 723 under unnecessary delay. without
(1) police taken to McClain was The record discloses 11 for the September morning on the headquarters At 2:43 baby’s death. him about the questioning purpose and Miranda formally arrested day he was p.m. that had no stated that he to him. McClain warnings were read it, talk about did not want to of the crime and knowledge examination polygraph to a although agreed he to submit police lockup in the overnight held day. the next He was *15 officer. McClain judicial before a being without taken 12, after September on polygraph underwent a examination a examiner gave polygraph he the p.m., which at 12:45 At 1:25 in the crime. admitting complicity written statement time to guilt, this again admitted his p.m., McClain writing, his statement to Shirey, who reduced Detective written statement A more detailed signed. which McClain in which he admitted from McClain was therеafter obtained chute; that statement baby the down the trash throwing Thereafter, September on 12. p.m. at 2:55 concluded officer, by required judicial a as McClain was taken before the rule.
(2) M.D.R. of provisions that the held in Johnson The Court confession, though even that a mandatory and 723 a were if it objection upon in evidence voluntary, was inadmissible the rule. of requirements in violation was obtained adopted, The Court the rule was long said that before a common law under police officers Maryland placed law magistrate without before a person arrested duty to take an doctrine Court observed unnecessary delay. The legislation guaranteeing of the enactment "portended City right prompt presentment detainees to Baltimore Id. Montgomery County.” July It noted 319. that in a adopted application, of the Court rule of statewide as which designated right prompt M.D.R. secured of an before production judicial arrestee a officer. M.D.R. 709 when, M.D.R. change became 723 a without material criminal July comprehensively rules were revised.
In holding mandatory, that M.D.R. 723 a was merely directory guideline suggested a as Johnson that the word "shall,” Court said as used in the rule, imperative obligation part denoted an on the an police promptly present judicial arrestee a offi before cer, obligation and that this was inconsistent with the exer cise of Court discretion. The said that the prompt presentment requirement designed of the rule was "to insure that an accused will be the full promptly panoply afforded Id. at 321. safeguards provided initial appearance.” at the proceeded then determine the effect of a viola admissibility tion of M.D.R. 723 a on of a confession during delay. obtained a period unnecessary It observed that in federal adopted per trials the Court had otherwise, exclusionary confessions, voluntary se rule for which during period unnecessary delay were obtained an producing arrestee before judicial officer (a). contravention of Federal Criminal Rule 5 The Court Johnson recognized federally-fashioned this Mallory exclusionary rule, v. United which derived from (1957); 1356, 1 Ct. 2d 77 S. L. Ed. *16 Upshaw States, United 410, 170, 335 69 U.S. S. Ct. 93 L. (1948); McNabb United 332, Ed. 100 and 608, (1943), 63 S. Ct. 87 L. Ed. not of 819 was constitutional dimension, product but rather the was of exercise of the Supreme authority Court’s supervisory over the justice administration criminal in federal the courts. not, exclusionary therefore, states, rule binding was on the Maryland (1957, Repl. Vol., Code 1. We Code referred 1968 1971 Cum. 97(h) 52, (1957, Repl. (Montgomery County) § Art. Supp.) 1966 Vol.) (Baltimore 26, City). repealed § 115 Art. These statutes were in 1972.
475
Connecticut,
as the
Court held in Culombe v.
367
(1961).
568,
1860,
81 S. Ct.
Mallory-Upshaw-McNabb any the Court held that statement during period obtained from an arrestee unnecessary delay officer, him producing judicial before a thereby a, violating M.D.R. 723 subject to exclusion when against offered into evidence part defendant as prosecution’s case-in-chief. Id. at 329. Johnson,
In
deciding
so
the Court departed from our
expressly considered,
earlier cases which had
but declined to
adopt, the Mallory-Upshaw-McNabb formulation. In Cox v.
State,
192 Md.
64 A.2d
public
local laws
City2
Baltimore
required the police
immediately to take an arrested person before the nearest
judiciаl officer if the arrest
daytime.
was made in the
No
sanction was provided in the statute
for failure of
compliance. Cox was held over
days
police custody
two
without being taken
judicial officer,
before a
during which
time he confessed to the crime. After considering McNabb
and Upshaw, our predecessors held that the confession was
per
se inadmissible because of
statutory
violation.
Coxwas
See,
followed later
e.g.,
State,
cases.
White
(1953);
A.2d 447
State,
Grear v.
194 Md.
(1950);
State,
A.2d
James v.
193 Md.
Baltimore *17 procured
"[T]he fact that a confession is
while the
custody,
held in
illegally
accused is
because of
magistrate
failure to
him
a
produce
before
judgé
hearing,
for a
has not
held
preliminary
been
sufficient in and of itself to render the confession
inadmissible,
involuntary and thus
although this
may
fact
be one of the circumstances cоnsidered
determining
when
voluntariness.”
"No time limit is set in the Section as to when it is
compulsory
person
that an arrested
be taken before
judges;
one of the
and no mention is made to the
person
effect that a failure to take such a
one
before
judges
specified
of the
time shall render a
voluntary
confession inadmissible. Had the
intended, it
Legislature
very
so
would have been a
task to manifest
simple
such intention. We hold
that the failure to take the
appellant
judge
before
Municipal
prior
to his confessions did
not render them inadmissible.”
Neither
we decided
and it was not until
for its violation
sanction
exclusionary rule of McNabb and
in
that the
1978
Johnson
circumstances, even
In these
adopted.
was
progeny
its
mandatory since
rule have been
of the
provisions
though the
exclusionary sanction should
Johnson’s
adoption,
the rule’s
to
apply
application
only prospectivе
afforded
be
1978,
Johnson
6,
the date
April
after
taken
statements
decided.
689,
In
336-38,
403
Hicks,
285
in
v.
recently
State
most
principles
detail the
great
we recited
A.2d 356
rulings
newof
application
retroactive
governing
restated,
no constitutional
there is
Briefly
cases.
criminal
complete
be either
that decisions
which demands
rule
effect
all
retroactive
or absolute
application
prospective
States,
U.S.
91
v. United
Williams
circumstances.
States,
(1971); Desist v. United
1148, L. Ed. 2d 388
Ct.
S.
(1969); Tehan
1030,
None decision. brought promptly
First,
is not
fact that an arresteе
integrity
not affect
officer does
judicial
before a
purpose
The
courts.
function of the criminal
truth-finding
said,
an arrested
a,
is to insure that
we have
M.D.R. 723
as
panoply
the full
promptly
will be
afforded
person
include
appearance,
initial
which
provided at the
safeguards
further
cause exists to
probable
of whether
a determination
defendant,
finding
eligiblity
pretrial
detain the
of his
release,
to inform the accused
and a forum which
M.D.R. 723
by compliance with
Triggered
to counsel.
right
.. the due
in substantial fashion.
protections
a these
"bolster
investigatory
be free from coercive
right
process
of coercive
prevention
Md. at 322.
methods.” 282
however,
not,
the main function
methods is
interrogatory
Moreover,
are not intended
protections
these
the rule.
made
the accused.
reliability of a statement
assure the
privi-
the defendant’s
Rather, they
by which
are measures
Mallory
protected.
self-incriminatiоn
lege against
Shott,
452-53. See Tehan v.
supra, 354 U.S. at
United
*19
Tehan,
382
supra,
stated in
Supreme
As the
supra.
416,
against
privilege
"the Fifth Amendment’s
U.S. at
of
adjunct to the ascertainment
is not an
self-incrimination
—
Furthermore,
right
process
has a due
truth.”
a defendant
—
M.D.R. 723 a
rights
from his
under
separate and distinct
confession,
involuntary
or
any
from trial
coerced
to exclude
Denno,
falsity.
See Jackson v.
regard
without
for its truth
(1964);
1774,
When retroactive application required by is not above, criteria listed empowered courts are in appropriate apply cases to a new rule prospectively. Johnson v. New Jersey, 726-27; supra, Walker, 384 U.S. at Linkletter v. supra, 381 at U.S. 628. The Court has set out three
479 determination. The by guide criteria which to courts this (1) by to be served the new purpose considerations are (2) by the old rule law ruling; placed upon the reliance (3) authorities; the effect which retroactive enforcement justice. on the administration of application would have 1966, 47, Payne, 412 93 S. Ct. 36 L. Ed. 2d Michigan v. U.S. Denno, (1973); States, supra; Stovall v. Desist v. United (1967); 2d State 87 S. Ct. 18 L. Ed. Hicks, supra; Wiggins supra. criteria, important Of these three factor is the most purpose to be served the new rule. Desist v. United supra, 394 a decision establishes an U.S. 249. When rule, exclusionary whereby concededly relevant evidence is statutory excluded in order to enforce a or constitutional right integrity fact-finding which does not affect the process, usually application interpretation the new Peltier, limited to subsequent cases. See United States v. (1975); 45 L. 2d 95 S. Ct. Ed. State
Hicks, supra.
exclusionary rule
Like the
discussed
Peltier
Hicks,
ruling
supra,
interpretation
and our
State v.
prophylactic
announced
Johnson is a
measure "calculated
to deter
Because the purpose adopted rule *20 clearly Johnson little prospective application, favors consideration need be to the of reliance on the effect old rule or justice. the burden on the administration of Michigan Payne, 55; 412 supra, U.S. at Desist v. United States, however, supra, case, 394 In U.S. at 251. this both of these considerations support prospective application undoubtedly Johnson. Law enforcement on officials relied our past rulings delay holding presеntment was merely one factor to in determining consider whether a Quite statement voluntary. obviously, apply Johnson’s exclusionary rule retroactively impose could
480
I
justice.
on the administration
burden
substantial
exclusionary
of the
purpose
the deterrent
that both
conclude
demon-
enforcement officials
of the law
rule and the reliance
only
applied
be
decision should
that the Johnson
strate
the date of the Johnson
occurred after
interrogations which
almost
conducted
interrogation was
decision. McClain’s
in Johnson and
the Court’s decision
prior
months
eighteen
therefore,
new
not,
subject to the
be
his confessions should
in that case.
exclusionary rule announced
in Johnson was afforded
that the defendant
It is true
rule,
exclusionary
while
newly
established
benefit
not. But in a number
I
McClain will
espouse
under the rule
Linkletter,
the Court
after
cases decided
retroactivity formulation
Linkletter
from the
departеd
of a .new
affords the benefit
of a rule which
favor
raised the
litigant
who first
ruling to
constitutional
others,
those
including
it to all
denying
question while
otherwise
appeal
or were
pending
were
whose convictions
See, e.g., Johnson
time of the new decision.
not final at the
719,
1772, 16 Ed. 2d 882
S. Ct.
L.
Jersey, 384 U.S.
v. New
(1966)
Illinois, 378
of Escobedo v.
principles
(applying
(1964), and
1758,
the benefit of a new rule litigants nоt to other in which it is announced but similarly appellate process in the trial or situated regard the who have raised the same issue. But we are chance involved parties fact cost for adherence insignificant beneficiaries as an decisionmaking.” sound 388 U.S. at principles (footnotes omitted). (3) unjust in the nothing unfair or I see majority,
Unlike the denying the benefits of this case circumstances where like McClain’s exclusionary Johnson to cases rule of was decided. at the time Johnson was not final conviction 461, 219 Lefkowitz, 242 Md. in Schiller recognized We law preexisting changing A.2d 378 that a decision Wade, 1926, 18 3. United L. Ed. 2d 1149 L. Ed. 2d 1178 States v. 87 S. Ct. (1967); (1967). California, 1951, 18 Gilbert v. 87 S. Ct. wholly application without even prospective can be made *22 case in the is announced. As that change the case which however, a clear, prospective overruling—not purely makes — "makes opinion the decided case itself an applicable to adjudication, only prophecy legitimate a instead of an chills erroneous, unfair upon existing law believed and is attacks brought about the litigant to the whose initiative has these Md. at It is that change.” apparent 466. not because a criminal applicable simply considerations are not at the raising question the was final conviction same ruling. the time of new that Linkletter’s majority correctly indicates applied Schowgurow
principles retroactivity were that State, 240 That case held A.2d a Maryland Rights, required which the Declaration as qualification as for service demonstration of belief God In so the federal constitution. grand petit juror, a violated a Schowgurow constitute concluding, the Court deemed rule, Maryland overruling earlier new constitutional State, Hays Wainwright 240 Md. precedents. In And for- applied 214 A.2d the Linkletter the judgments mula to all of conviction not final the date decided, Schowgurow relying part upon generаl the was that a Peggy, supra, States Schooner rule United judgment change the law after conviction but before final requires judgment ground on the reversal of final decision accord with the law as it is at time must judgment, regard to the issue was raised without whether Later, however, Lefkowitz, supra, trial or not. in Schiller v. to civil Schowgurow equally we held that while applied cases, appeal it as retrospective pending to a civil expressed no had made trial. We objection where been at the limited required in Schiller that Linkletter belief retroactivity as essential to the administration proper justice, recognized changing criminal but we that a decision preexisting rights wholly prospective can be made without change to the case in application even which announced. formula, from retroactivity overly simplistic
Linkletter’s
in number of
departed
since
Court has
which
does not
cases,
this case. Linkletter
govern
should not
test,
constitutionally mandated
as we
promulgate
Hicks, 285 Md.
interpreted Maryland
requiring
Rule 746
120-day
to be
period,
of a criminal case for trial within
sanction
mandatory. Although
express
the rule contained no
violation,
the sanction of dismissal of the
imposed
for its
we
120-day
noncornpliance
with
indictment
rule, we in effect
requirement.
interpreting
In so
Young v.
266 Md.
precedent,
overruled an earlier
similarly
provisions
Both Hicks and Johnson involved nonconstitutional 4. Hicks rule in his case was denied the benefits of the new established majority extraordinary because a postponement of the Court concluded that cause established, justifying beyond had been a continuance 120-day period, рermitted prevailed, as Rule 746 a. Had Hicks there can be little doubt that he would been afforded the benefit of the new have ruling judgments, including while all where the same other nonfinal cases point raised, would denied the same benefit. have been changed law. There is rules, preexisting and each
procedural be requirement applied that Linkletter no constitutional new each Hicks and Johnson established either case. indicated, already in cases As I have exclusionary rule. circumstances, has involving similar Williams, Peltier, supra; departed from supra; Linkletter. Stovall, Jersey, supra. Desist, supra; supra; Johnson New cases, only should, Johnson apply these We consistent with upon after the date which that interrogations conducted done, not, has decided, majority as the case was earlier, a time when eighteen months taken confession Maryland relied earlier police rightfully upon unwisely and majority I has precedents. fear the Linkletter test unnecessarily "locked” itself into impact on the long-range its regard future cases without this justice State. administration