15 F. Cas. 1261 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana | 1874
It is obvious to remark that there are insuperable objections to so much of the prayer for relief as asks that the defendants may be decreed to comply with and specifically perform the contracts of the state by estimating and collecting the interest and sinking fund tax, and applying it to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds. The objection is, that if there is a remedy at all, it is a remedy at law, namely, by the issuance of the writ of mandamus. If this suit were brought against a municipal corporation and its officers, to compel the collection of a tax to pay the interest on its bonds, the plain, adequate and complete remedy would be the legal writ of mandamus. It is true that before the writ could issue, the bondholders must have recovered a judgment at law on their bonds. Bath County v. Amy, 13 Wall. [80 U. S.] 247; Graham v. Norton, 15 Wall. [82 U. S.] 427. It may be replied to this that the bondholders cannot lay the necessary foundation for the writ of mandamus in the United States courts because they are prohibited from suing the state, by the 11th amendment to the constitution of the United States. But this fact may prove that there is no remedy for the complainants in the United States courts. It certainly does not follow that because there are obstacles to the adoption of the plain legal remedy, therefore the remedy is in equity. It might as well be claimed that because the bondholder could not go into a court of law and secure a judgment against the state upon his bonds, he might therefore go into equity and seek a decree against the officers of the state for the amount due on his bonds. When the 11th amendment to the constitution declares, “that the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit at law or in equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or subjects of any foreign state,” the purpose is clear to exempt states from suits upon their contracts, either at law or in equity, and the fact that this amendment interposes an obstacle to a suit at law against a state does not give a court of equity jurisdiction to enforce the same contract on the pretext that there* is no remedy at law. Suits in both forums against a state are prohibited. It is evident, therefore, that should this bill come on for final hearing, the decree prayed for could not be granted.
We may, however, consider the bill as one for injunction only, and the question now presented is, can and ought the court to al
The first question presented by the prayer for injunction is, can the officers of the state be compelled by injunction to do an affirmative act? The complainant claims that the funding bill and the act of March 14, 1874, which in effect prohibit the collection of taxes for the payment of the principal and interest of the outstanding bonds of the state, are unconstitutional and therefore void. If this be conceded, then the case is in the same plight as if these acts just named had never been passed, and as if the officers of the state, without pretense of warrant of law, were refusing to levy and collect the taxes which the state had agreed should be levied and collected and applied to the payment of these bonds. Has this court the power to compel them by mandatory injunction to do an affirmative act? The authorities are adverse. The case of Walkley v. City of Muscatine, 6 Wall. [73 U. S.] 483, was a bill in equity to compel the authorities of the city of Muscatine to levy a tax upon the property of the inhabitants for the purpose of paying the interest on certain bonds issued by the city. It appeared that a judgment had been recovered in the same court against the city for $7,666, interest due on the bonds held by plaintiff; that execution had been issued and returned unsatisfied, no property being found liable to execution; that the mayor and aldermen had been requested to levy a tax to pay the judgment, but had refused; that the city authorities possessed the power under their charter to levy a tax of one per cent, on the valuation of the city property, and had made a levy annually, but had appropriated the proceeds to other purposes, and had wholly neglected to pay the interest upon the bonds. The bill prayed that the mayor and aldermen might be decreed to levy the tax and appropriate so much of the proceeds as might be sufficient to pay the judgment, interest and costs. Upon this case the supreme court says: “We are of opinion that complainant has mistaken the appropriate remedy in the case, which was by writ of mandamus from the circuit court.” We have been furnished with no authority for the substitution of a bill in equity and injunction for the writ of mandamus. An injunction is generally a preventive writ, not an affirmative remedy. It is sometimes used in the latter character, but this is in cases when it is used by the court to carry into effect its own decrees, as in putting the purchaser under a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage into possession of the premises. Even the exercise of this power was doubted till the case of Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns. Ch. 609, in which the learned chancellor, after an examination of the cases in England on the subject, came to the conclusion he possessed it, not, however, by the writ of injunction, but by the writ of assistance.
[A consideration of the second branch of the injunction asked, namely, to restrain the state officers from receiving delinquent taxes in auditor’s warrants, will show that this is an indirect way of praying for an injunction to compel the state officers to receive the delinquent taxes in lawful money of the United States, according to the contract of the state as claimed by complainants. The complainant would not be satisfied should the state officers suspend the receipt of state warrants. The evident purpose of this part of the injunction is to compel them to receive lawful money; for, unless the officers, after declining to receive auditor’s warrants, proceed to collect the taxes in lawful money, the complainant would take no advantage from his motion.] 2
In Rogers Locomotive Works v. Erie Railway Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 379, the court, after a learned review of all the cases, both English and American, bearing upon the sub
It is clear to my mind that the injunction asked for falls within the category of mandatory injunctions, and cannot therefore be granted on motion. But the fatal objection to the motion of complainant is found in the character of his bill. It is either a suit in effect against the state of Louisiana, or if not, the parties defendant are merely nominal parties, having no real interest in the controversy. In either case,. no decree ■can be made in the cause. This case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. [22 U. S.] 738, and Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 203, and other cases cited by complainant. . In the case of Osborn v. Bank [supra], the bill was filed by the bank to restrain Osborn, who was auditor of the state of Ohio, from acting under a void law of a state in the collection of a tax levied upon the bank, and for a ■decree against Curry, the late treasurer, and Sullivan, the incumbent treasurer, and Osborn, the auditor, for money illegally collected by them from the bank. It was alleged in the bill that neither Curry nor Sullivan held the money as officers, but individuals. The court in this case held that the suit was well brought, because the state was not nominally a party to the record, and the parties made defendant had a real interest in the cause, since their personal responsibility was .acknowledged, and if denied, could be demonstrated. In the case of Davis v. Gray [supra], Davis,, who was defendant in the ■court below, and who was named upon the record as governor of Texas, wras sought to be enjoined from casting a cloud upon the title of complainant to certain lands in Texas, by locating warrants thereon in pursuance of a void and unconstitutional enactment of the state. Although he professed to act as governor, he was impairing the rights of complainant without the authority of any valid law; he was acting in his own wrong .and upon his own responsibility, and was personally liable. In both these cases the object was to restrain individuals holding public offices from doing acts to the injury of complainant, for which there was no legal warrant, and by the doing of which they incurred a personal liability. How different is the case under consideration. Here is an attempt to compel the public officers of a state to do positive and affirmative acts as such, to compel them to carry out what the complainant conceives to be the' law of the state, not in accordance with their own sense of duty, and their own interpretation of the law. In the case of Kentucky v. Dennison, Governor, 24 How. [65 U. S.] 109, it was held that neither the congress nor the courts of the United States could coerce a state officer, as such, to perform any duty imposed upon him by act of congress. Does it not follow, a fortiori, that a court of the United States cannot compel the governor of a state to execute a law passed by the state? In Osborn v. Bank, and Davis v. Gray [supra], it was held that a United States circuit court might, in a proper ease in equity, enjoin a state officer from executing a state law in conflict with the constitution, or a statute of the United States, when such execution would violate the rights of complainant. But no case has yet decided that a circuit court of the United States can compel the executive and administrative officers of a state to execute the laws of the state. The dilemma is this: If the suit is against the defendants in their official character, and the claims made upon them are in their official character, the state may be considered a party to the record. Madrazo v. Governor of Georgia, 1 Pet. [26 U. S.] 110. If the suit is against the officers as individuals merely, and the offices they hold are given merely to describe their persons, they have no interest in the subject matter, and no decree should go against them.
In the view I have taken of the case, I have conceded what complainants claim, that the funding bill and the act of March 14, 1874, are both unconstitutional and void, and have regarded the bill just as if those acts had never been passed, to-wit, a bill to compel the defendants, officers of the state, to execute its laws. This may be done in the ease of the officers of municipal corporations, but the sovereign power of a state cannot be so coerced. To do so would be to substitute this court for the executive officers of the state, to supplant their views of duty and the obligations imposed upon them by their official oath, by the discretion of this court and its official oath. In other words, it would be an undertaking upon the part of this court to administer the state government. This the court has no power and no inclination to do. In my judgment, this is to all intents and purposes a suit against the state. The officers of the state, including the chief executive, are sued in their official capacity to compel them to execute the law's of the state. It is a suit to enforce a contract of the state to pay money. The officers are not sued as individuals who happen to be in public office, to prevent them from doing some act to the prejudice of complainant not warranted by law', as was the case in Osborn v. Bank of U. S. and Davis v. Gray. If a suit like this can be sustained, then the 11th amendment
[From 1 Cent. Law J. 164.]
2 [From 1 Cent. Law J. 164.]
