83 Neb. 201 | Neb. | 1909
On the 21st day of March, 1907, the plaintiff, being the owner of certain property in the city of Fremont, described as lot 8, in block 182, made a writing in the words and figures following: “Fremont, Nebraska, March 21, 1907. Received of Esther London fifty dollars ($50) to apply on payment on sale of the north......feet of Lot No. 8, Bik. No. 182. Esther London agrees to pay for this property $1,250 in all, $550 cash June 15, ’07, $600 cash Aug. 1st 1907, with 6 per cent, interest from April 21, ’07 when Esther London is to get possession. Nanette E. McCarn.” Afterwards she brought this action to quiet title against the defendant, who, it was alleged, claimed to own a portion of said lot 8 by virtue of the writing above quoted. The defendant filed a pleading denominated an answer and cross-petition, in which she alleged
It is conceded that the only question presented by this appeal is the sufficiency of the above writing under the statute of frauds. It is a general rule that the description of land in a memorandum of a contract for the sale thereof must be sufficiently definite to identify the land by its own terms or by reference to external standards in existence at the time of the making of the contract, and capable of being determined beyond dispute. 20 Cyc. 270. The connection between the signed paper and the external standards cannot be made by parol. It must appear or be reasonably inferred from the writing itself. Johnson & Miller v. Buck, 35 N. J. Law, 338. In this case the contract fails to identify the property, and there is no reference to any external standard. The only way to ascertain what was in the minds of the contracting parties is to re
The defendant places stress upon the use of the words “this property” in the memorandum. The word “this” may be used to refer to something mentioned or about to be mentioned; but, where there is nothing elsewhere in the writing to which it can refer, it does not in any way supply the lack of such mention.
The defendant cites the case of Ruzicka v. Hotovy, 72 Neb. 589. In this case the vendor owned the southeast quarter of section 7, and the memorandum did not specify which quarter in the section named was to be sold. A reference to the records disclosed the fact that the vendor owned but one quarter in this section, and the contract in that case was held to mean the quarter owned by such vendor. If in this case the vendor had owned one-third of the lot mentioned, and the memorandum had described one-third of said lot without further specifying the property to be sold, we might, under the authority of Ruzicka v. Sotovy, supra, go to the record, and, having ascertained that the plaintiff owned but one-third of such lot, declare that her intention to sell that third sufficiently appeared from the contract. But no such certainty could be attained by an examination of the record of the title of this lot. Any determination of the number of feet of frontage intended to be sold must rest upon parol testimony unsupported by the writing or any legitimate inference to be drawn therefrom. The case cited does not apply.
We therefore recommend that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed,