8 R.I. 297 | R.I. | 1866
It appears that, after the expiration of a certain lease, the owner of the premises had made a second lease to the plaintiff, and the first tenant had underlet to the defendant, and that the second lessee had never been in possession of *301 the premises. The question is, whether he can maintain this action of ejectment.
The provisions of our Statutes are as follows: —
"CHAPTER 322. Section 1. Special Courts of Common Pleas, in addition to the powers conferred upon them by chapter 167, section 2, of the Revised Statutes, shall have cognizance concurrent with the Supreme Court and Court of Common Pleas, of actions brought for possession of tenements or estates, against tenants and others who hold and occupy the same, by wrongful entry or detainer, or as tenants at will or by sufferance."
"CHAPTER 359. Section 1. In actions of ejectment and trespass and ejectment to recover possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments, the plaintiff shall not be required to prove an actual entry under his title, but if he proves that he is entitled to such an estate as he claims in the premises, whether as heir, devisee, purchaser or otherwise, and also that he has a right of entry therein, this shall be deemed sufficient proof of his seizure, as alleged in his declaration, but no such action shall be maintained unless the plaintiff has, at the time of commencing the same, a right of entry into his premises."
The last statute seems to us to have no other meaning than to provide that such action may be brought by any plaintiff who has a right of entry.
And as to the construction of the language of the statute, chapter 332, we see no reason to differ from the decision of the Court already made in the second volume of our reports (Diman v. Arnold et al.
