24 P.2d 457 | Cal. | 1933
THE COURT.
Petitioners, on February 5, 1932, sought to file articles of incorporation for Lincoln Shares Corporation, and tendered the nominal filing fees then required by statute for a corporation having only nonpar stock. Upon refusal of respondent Secretary of State to file the articles unless paid a filing fee of $1,000, petitioners sought and obtained an alternative writ of mandate from this court. Our final decision after rehearing was rendered March 15, 1933, and a peremptory writ was issued, requiring respondent to file the articles upon payment of the fees previously tendered. (McCann v. Jordan,
[1] The contention of respondent is that, conceding the force of this court's holding that the fee demanded was not required by the statutes in force at the time of petitioners' application, nevertheless this stipulation was corrected by urgency legislation which went into effect while the case was pending in this court. (Stats. 1933, chap. 20, amending Pol. Code, sec. 409, subd. 5.) Under the amended statute the fees demanded by respondent are proper. Hence, the sole question before us now is whether respondent may require compliance with the statute in its present form, notwithstanding the prior application of petitioners. This issue was not raised or considered in the former proceeding.
In our opinion the amended statute is clearly applicable to petitioners' application, and no satisfactory reasoning or authority has been presented to us which casts any doubt upon this conclusion. The statute in terms applies to any *579
application now pending before the respondent; hence no question of statutory construction is presented. [2] The retroactive operation of a civil statute is by no means unusual, and no constitutional objection exists to such operation save where a vested right, or the obligation of a contract, is impaired. (County of San Bernardino v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
In State v. Crawford,
This case is almost directly in point, there being no substantial distinction between the rights of foreign corporations and the incorporators of a domestic corporation, so far as the legislative power in question is concerned. *580
Such cases as Rose v. Estudillo,
[3] Had the point now urged been called to the attention of the court prior to the time the peremptory writ of mandate was issued, the writ would have been refused. Consequently, respondent cannot properly be adjudged in contempt.
The order is discharged.