McCann v. Central SynagogueMcCann v. Central Synagogue
—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.), entered May 24, 2000, which, insofar as limited by the briefs, denied plаintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), unanimously reversed, on the law, without сosts, and the motion granted.
Plaintiff James McCann, an employee of Amis, Inc., a demolition company, commenced this Labor Law action seeking damages for injuries sustainеd when he fell from an inclined wooden ramp four to eight feet high, while pushing a bin filled with debris up thе ramp for disposal outside a construction site, owned by defendant Central Synagogue, which hired defendant Turner Construction, Inc., as the construction manager for the project. The ramp was built by Angela Construction Services, the third-party defendant.
At his examination before trial, plaintiff testified that his job consisted of filling metal bins, weighing about 100 pounds when empty, with debris such as sheetrock, wood, and concrete, taken from the basement of the synаgogue, and transporting it up the ramp, which was about eight to ten feet long and four to five feet wide, and had no railings on the sides.
On the day of the accident, July 17, 1998, plaintiff, in a Sisyphean effort, was pushing a bin three-quarters full up the ramp, when the bin encountered a “hump,” causing the bin to tilt. As a result, he and the bin fell from the unbarricaded ramp to the ground. Although no one witnessed the fall, a carpenter who heard the noise of the bin hitting the ground
The IAS Court denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on liability under Labоr Law § 240 (1) against defendants, finding that a question of fact existed as to plaintiffs credibility, given that the fall was unwitnessed, and that plaintiffs supervisor, in his affidavit, averred that after being found on the grоund plaintiff picked himself up, did not appear hurt, and refused hospitalization or medical treatment.
On appeal, defendants do not dispute that the accident actually occurred, or that the accident is gravity-related. Instead, they argue that the ramp from which plaintiff fell is not a device covered by Labor Law § 240 (1), and that even if covered, plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. We disagree.
Under Labor Law § 240 (1), “[a] 11 contractors and owners and their agents [engaged] * * * in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering * * * of a building or structure shall furnish or erect * * * for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays * * * and other devices which shall be sо constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protеction to a person so employed.” The Court of Appeals has stated that thе statute should be interpreted as liberally as necessary to accomplish its purpose, which is to protect workers exposed to gravity-related hazards such as fаlling from a height (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co.,
Owners, contractors, and their agents are strictly liable for any breach of the duty to provide proper protection that proximately causes an injury (Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co.,
Thе issue is not whether the ramp itself is a safety device, but whether it was constructed and maintаined with adequate safety devices, such as railings or safety curbs. Plaintiffs consistent and uncontradicted testimony that he fell from the
We have considered defendants’ other contentions and rejected them. Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Williams, Tom, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.