No. 248 | Pa. | Feb 11, 1869
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered, March 11th 1869, by
The only question presented hy the appeal in this case is, was the claim of the appellee barred by the Statute of Limitations ? It was not barred when the testator died, hut more than six years elapsed after his death before the executor settled an account of the money which came into his hands belonging to the estate. The auditor decided on the authority of MeClintock’s Appeal, 5 Casey 360, that the statute ceased to run at the death of the testator, and, therefore, that the claim was not barred. It was accordingly allowed by him, and the Orphans’ Court confirmed his report and decreed its payment. The appellants contend that the statute begins to run from the death of the debtor, against all claims on his estate then due. If the law is so, then this claim was barred, and the court erred in decreeing its payment.
As a general rule the death of a debtor does not suspend the running of the statute, as it respects the creditor’s right of'action; and therefore an administrator may plead the Statute of Limitations in an action brought against him to recover , a debt of the decedent if six years have elapsed from the time it occurred, although less than that period may have elapsed at the death of the debtor. But the statute cannot be pleaded in bar of the claim, when the creditor proceeds in the Orphans’ Court for a distributive proportion of the decedent’s estate: Micheltree’s Administrator v. Veach, 7 Casey 455. The reason why the statute is pleadable in the one case and not in the other is, that it acts on the remedy and takes away the right of action, unless suit is brought within the time limited for its commencement, but it does not extinguish the debt, nor affect a trust created for its payment, as long as the trust subsists, and is acknowledged and acted upon by the parties.
But to exempt the trust from the operation of the statute, if must be direct and exclusively cognisable in a court of equity, and the question must arise between the trustee and the cestui que trust: Lyon v. Marclay, 1 Watts 271" court="Pa." date_filed="1832-11-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/lyon-v-marclay-6311092?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6311092">1 Watts 271; Zacharias v. Zacharias, 11 Harris 452; Keller v. Rhoads, 3 Wright 520; Barton v. Dickens, 12 Id. 522; and this is precisely the character of the trust which the law creates and establishes between the personal representatives of a decedent and his creditors. It commits the decedent’s personal estate to the care of his personal representatives, upon the express trust and confidence that they will give to the creditors their just proportions, and distribute the residue, if any,
Our Orphans’ Courts have chancery powers, and they have exclusive jurisdiction of the trust administered by an executor or administrator, and as the trust is direct, it comes strictly within the description of the class of trusts which are not reached or affected by the Statute of Limitations. It was upon this principle that the case of McClintoek’s Appeal was decided, and not, as the appellants contend, because six years had not elapsed from the death of the decedent to the time of distribution. There is nothing in the opinion delivered by Black, J., in that case which countenances the doctrine that the statute begins to run from the death of the debtor against all claims on his estate. On the contrary, though the precise point raised here was not decided in that case, it is said the creditor need not bring suit; the assets applicable to his debts are already in the hands of the legal officer, whose duty to pay them over will be enforced by the proper authority, without an action. All that he is required to do is to make known his claim within a given time. Of course the trust of the administrator is for the use of all the creditors, whose debts are subsisting, and valid in law and equity at the time of the decedent’s death. He has no right to give one a preference over another. The assets belong to all, and he must pay all, if there be enough to reach; in case of a deficiency, the loss is to be equally borne. He cannot object to a claim, which was good when he accepted the trust, on the ground that it has since reached an age greater than six years.
Lapse of time then will not bar the debt, so long as the estate is unadministered, and the trust subsists. Undoubtedly a creditor by gross laches may forfeit his right to a distributive portion of the estate of h'is deceased debtor, and lapse of time may raise a presumption of payment. If, after notice, he suffers the funds in the hands of the executor or administrator to be distributed and paid over, without making known his claim, his right to any portion of the fund will be barred, but it will be barred by his laches and not by the statute.
Aside from the trust, it is by no means clear that the appellants ought to be allowed to plead the statute in bar of the claim in this
The appeal is dismissed and the decree affirmed at the costs of the appellants.
Concurrence Opinion
The following concurring opinion was delivered by
I concur in the judgment in this case on the ground that the Statute of Limitations was suspended by the want of letters testamentary. But I cannot assent to the principal ground on which the case has been rested in the opinion. It seems to me contrary to the policy of the state, to the spirit of the laws regulating the settlement of estates, and to the interests of all persons in succession; and is an extension of the doctrine of McClintock’s Appeal beyond its just limit. That case decided that a debt not barred at the death of the decedent was not barred at the settlement within two years thereafter. This case decides that it is not barred six years afterward, and in effect that the creditor may hold his debt back as long as any estate remains. He may go into the Orphans’ Court at any time, and be allowed his claim nolens volens, even though he cannot recover at law. This is to make two rules for the administration of estates: one at law and another in equity. In Man v. Warner, 4 Whart. 465, a case most elaborately argued, and decided on a discussion of ali the authorities, it was held that a debt was barred though not due at the testator’s death, notwithstanding a provision in the will for the payment of all debts and for carrying on the business. The same doctrine was held in Mitcheltree’s Administrator v. Veach, 7 Casey 455, in which it was said McClintock’s Appeal does not, apply to actions at law. The result is that the debt has under these decisions a double status. In Kittera’s Estate, 5 Harris 416, a creditor, and in Hoch’s Appeal, 9 Harris 280, a legatee was held to have the right in the Orphans’ Court to contest a creditor’s claim on the ground that it is barred by the statute; and in -Ritter’s Appeal, 11 Harris 95, it is held that the executor or administrator, though not bound himself to set up the statute, is compellable to do so if required by distributees or legatees. Now, if the reason given for the decision in this case be law, we have the singular consequence that the claimant, though he cannot recover at law, can come into the Orphans’ Court at any time less than twenty years after the death of the decedent, and be