112 Ga. 291 | Ga. | 1900
The Inland Acid Company brought, in the superior court of Haralson county, an action against J. M. McCandless and others, for the recovery of a lot of land, the mineral interests in three other lots, and for injunction, the cancellation of certain deeds, and other relief. The defendants in their answer disclaimed title to the lot first indicated, and at the trial of the case in the superior court at its January term, 1899, the entire controversy seems to have been resolved into a determination of the question whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover the mineral interests in the three lots, and, as a consequence, to a cancellation of the deeds described in its petition. Eelatively to the adjudication of this question, 'the plaintiff stood squarely upon a claim of legal title to the mineral interests, and did not in its petition set up, or by its evidence attempt to show, any equitable ground for recovery. The case came to the March term, 1899, of this court, upon a bill of exceptions sued out by the defendants, in which error was assigned upon the direction by the trial court of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. See 108 Ga. 618. It appeared from the record then before us that both sides claimed title to the property in dispute, viz., the aforesaid mineral interests, under one M. T. Singleton. In the official report preceding the opinion of this court it is stated that the action was “ based upon a deed to
That there may be a statutory investiture of title in a corporation created hy act of the legislature, in the event the General Assembly expressly declares such a purpose, was recognized hy this court in Wardens of Christ Church v. Savannah, 82 Ga. 656. But it is to he observed that not only does the charter with which we are now dealing entirely fail even to suggest such a scheme, but it was one granted by a superior court under and by virtue of statutory provisions which clearly do not contemplate anything more than that corporate existence may be conferred upon an unincorpo-. rated association of individuals who apply for a charter. See Civil Code, § 2349 et seq. We therefore hold that the court ought not to have directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and base our ruling upon the simple proposition that so doing was erroneous for the reason that inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to show title in itself, it did not establish a prima facie legal right to recover.
We deem it proper, before dismissing this branch of' the case, to state what follows: An examination of the bill of exceptions in this case sent to the March term, 1899, of this court, discloses that the deed upon which the plaintiff relied at the first trial in the superior court was a “deed of M. T. Singleton to M. T. Singleton, J. W. Singleton, Chas. H. Clark, and Geo. H. Clark, incorporators of the Inland Acid Co., dated Jan. 9th, 1895, and recorded in Book Q, page 329, July 9th, 1897.” This description as to date of the execution and names of parties is identical with that appearing in the
Justice’s Court 1332 District G. M., Jan. Term, 1896, Fulton Co. Ga.
Plaintiff’s Attorney. Parties. Style of Case..
.............................. J. B. Bedwine. Suit on note.
No. 45 vs. $36.00.
Defendant’s Attorney. M. T. Singleton.
Summons issued 2nd day of January, 1896. Constables entry:
Personal service: Continuances........................ Judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant for principal...... Interest............Interest after judgment at ......per cent......... Attorney fees............. Justice’s costs: — Original summons, 35c. ......subpoenas............ Trial 35c.; Judgment 35c.......Consta-ble’s cost: — Serving one copy 35 ........ Additional copies at 30c. each; summoning.........witness.........; Attending Court, 35c. This 22nd day of January, 1896.
[Signed] J. E. Nabel, N. P. Ex-off. J. P.
Execution issued 28th day of January, 1896.
The question therefore is, does an entry in this form upon the. ■docket of a justice’s court evidence the rendition of a valid judgment? We think not. It is the duty of justices of the peace:. "To keep a docket of all causes brought before them, in which, must be entered the names of the parties, the returns of the officer, and the entry of the judgment, specifying its amount and the day of its rendition.” Civil Code, § 4082 (6). In Ramsey v. Cole, 84 Ga. 147, this court held that the original summons issued in an action in a justice’s court, though a judgment had been in fact entered thereon, was not admissible to prove its rendition, but that “the judgment should have appeared on the justice’s docket.” In Scott v. Bedell, 108 Ga. 209, Mr. Justice Cobb said: “The entries upon the docket of the justice of the peace are in the nature of minutes of a court, and’every fact transpiring in connection with ■cases tried in -his court, essential to the validity or regularity of the judgment rendered, skotdd be entered upon the docket.”. In support of this, he cited a number of the decisions of this court, and added: “When a justice renders a judgment in a case tried'
Our present inquiry is therefore restricted to simply this: Is the docket entry now under consideration sufficiently full and- explicit to show that a, judgment for any specified amount of either principal or interest was rendered in favor of John B. Redwine against M. T. Singleton ? Certainly there was neither specification of any sum as interest, nor reference to anything on the face of the-docket by which the amount of interest which had accrued up to the date of the judgment could be ascertained. Was it, then, a good judgment for $36.00 as principal ? In support of the contention that it was, counsel for the plaintiffs in error cited Gunn v. Tackett, 67 Ga. 725, and Collins v. Camp, 94 Ga. 460. It appeared in the former of these cases that “ on the left hand side of the page ” of the justice’s docket there was “ a statement of the case,” and on the right the following: “plea entered May 3d, 1879; principal $100.00; interest after deducting credit up to suit, $35.50; judgment for plaintiff for principal, interest, and costs.” It was held that an itemized statement of the costs was not essential to the validity of the judgment, and that, so far as related to principal and interest, the amounts were sufficiently indicated. This latter ruling was doubtless based upon the maxim: “That is certain which can be made certain,” and upon the fact that the docket itself showed the precise amounts of principal and interest for which the suit was brought. We do not, therefore, think this case pertinent to our present question. The Collins case does, apparently, afford some support for the position taken by counsel for the plaintiffs in error. In that case, the justice’s docket showed “the names and order of the parties, . . the fact that the suit was founded upon a note,” and the following judgment entry: “Judgment in favor of..................against..................for principal $57.45. Interest %f> from date of note............ Interest after judgment at 8fo per annum............... Attorney’s fees 10 fo on principal and interest____,................... Cost............” We do not understand the decision in that ease to amount to more than an adjudication that the judgment was a good judgment for the principal sum specified therein, with interest after judgment, and for ten per
Counsel for the plaintiffs in error also cited Mitchell v. Addison, 20 Ga,. 50, in which it was held that when a jury in a justice’s court returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for “ principal, interest, and costs,” it was to be presumed that the jury meant, “ by the word principal, the principal sued for.” It is one thing to interpret a verdict in the light of the pleadings, which is the settled rule, and quite another to violate a positive statute by attempting to ascertain the amount of a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace by looking elsewhere than upon the docket of Ms court.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the so-called judgments upon wMch the sheriff’s sale was based were void for uncertainty, and that the sale was accordingly a mere nullity. .
Judgment on main bill of exceptions reversed; on cross-bill affirmed.