196 Mo. App. 318 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1917
This action is upon two insurance policies issued May 9, 1907, by the Great Western Life Insurance Company upon the life of Charles A. McCall in favor óf Nita B. McCall, then his wife and now his widow, and plaintiff in this suit. Said policies, numbered 63 and 64, were for $3000 and $2000 respectively. In November, 1912, the business of the Great Western was reinsured by the International Life Insurance Company, hence the suit is against the latter company, it having stepped into the shoes of the former.
The policies contain the same provisions and differ only in amount and in premiums, which, in each policy, was a stipulated sum payable annually on or before May 9, with thirty days grace, throughout insured’s life. Hence, the issues, under both counts of the petition, are identical.
On March 30, 1912, and after paying six full annual premiums, insured borrowed on policy No. 63 its full loan value, to-wit, $183, and on policy No. 64
There is no question but that, if there had been no loan on each policy, three-fourths of the net value of each, computed as directed in section 6946, Revised Statutes 1909, would have been sufficient to have carried the policy, as extended insurance, beyond the date of insured’s death. And in March, 1915, insured made a tender of, or sent to the Insurance Company, the full amount of said loans with interest, which the company declined to accept, and returned to the insured. If the defendant had accepted payment of said loans at that time, or, if it was required or bound to do so in law, then it is unquestioned that there was more than sufficient reserve value in each policy to carry the same beyond the date of insured’s death. The controversy herein, therefore, grows out of the situation created by the existence of said loans, and the conduct of the insurer and insured with relation thereto subsequent to the insured’s default in premiums on May 9, 1913. The position of the respective parties hereto may be stated thus:
Plaintiff’s view is that when default occurred, notwithstanding the fact that on the date of the default in premiums the loan on each policy equalled the value thereof, so that deducting said debt from said value nothing remained on which extended insurance could rest, nevertheless, defendant did not deduct such debt nor apply the net value in payment thereof, nor attempt to do so, until after insured had tendered full payment of ,said debt with interest, and, therefore, defendant was bound to accept payment of said loan and must
On the other hand, defendant’s view is that since there was no value of the policies in excess of the loans thereon, there was no balance on which extended insurance could be based. Its contention is further that the relationships created by the loans were not independent of those created by the policies but are closely interwoven therewith and dependent thereon and must be so treated when considering the present rights of the parties. The defendant also contends that it did apply the net value of the policies to the payment of insured’s debt and notified him of such action and that he acquiesced therein, but long afterwards attempted to create different rights for himself by making a tender of th debt, at the same time refusing to re-establish the policy by making the required showing as to health and paying up the defaulted premiums.
At the conclusion of the trial the court instructed the jury to find for defendant, which was done. Judgment being thereupon rendered in defendant’s favor, the plaintiff appealed.
Prior to the * amendment of 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 208), our non-forfeiture statutes, section 6946, Revised
Each of the policies contained a provision that:
“In case of default in the payment of any premium or interest the company will reinstate the contract at any time, if not previously surrendered for its cash value, upon written application by the insured to the company at its Home Office with evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company, payment of all premiums that would have been paid in the intervening time if no default had been made, with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent, per annum computed from the premium due date, and payment of reinstatement, with interest at like rate, or any indebtedness existing at the time of default.”
They further provided that:
“On demand in writing to the Home Office of the Company, the insured may borrow on the sole security of this contract the amount specified in the' accompanying table for the year in which the loan is to be taken, subject to interest in advance, at the rate of five per cent per annum, provided the contract shall have been in force two years; the contract shall be assigned to the company as security according to the terms of the company’s loan agreement, and the premiums on the contract shall be paid in full to the anniversary of the insurance next succeeding the date when the loan shall be made.”
“If any premium shall not be paid on or before the date when due, and if there be no indebtedness to the company, the insurance will automatically continue from said due date as term insurance during the term, including the period of grace, specified in column 4 of the accompanying table; or in lieu of such term insurance, the company will indorse on this contract the amount of paid-up insurance, if any, specified in column 3 of the accompanying table, upon written request therefore made by the insured within said six months from said due date. Upon similar written request within said.six months, and surrender of the contract the company will pay the cash value, if any, specified in column 2 of the accompanying table.”
“If there shall be an indebtedness to the company, and if any premium shall not be paid on or before the date when due, an amount of insurance, equal to the face amount of this contract less the indebtedness, will automatically continue from said due date as term insurance, for the term, including the period of grace, which the excess of the cash value of the contract, if any, over the indebtedness, will purchase at the then age of the insured, according to the company’s present table of single premiums. In lieu of such term insurance, provided the insured shall make written request therefor within six months from said due date, the company will, as the insured may elect, either indorse on this contract the amount of paid-up life insurance which said excess will purchase at the then age of the insured, according to the company’s present table of single premiums, or upon surrender of the contract pay said excess- in cash.”
“If any premium shall not be paid on or before the date when due, the liability of the company shall be only as hereinbefore provided.”
“Pursuant to the provisions of Policy No. (63 in one and 64 in the other), issued by the Great Western Life Insurance Company on the life of Charles A. McCall, the undersigned have this day obtained a cash loan from said company of the sum of (here $183 was specified in one and $122 in the other), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, conditioned upon pledging as collateral said policy with said company as sole security for - said loan and giving assent to the terms of this Policy Agreement: therefore,
In consideration of the premises, thé undersigned hereby agree as follows:
1. To pay said company interest on said loan at the rate of five per cent, per annum, payable in advance from this date to the next anniversary of said policy, and annually in advance on said anniversary and thereafter. j
2. To pledge, and do hereby pledge, said policy as sole security for the payment of said loan and interest and herewith deposit said policy with said company at its Home Office.
3. To pay said company said sum when due with interest, reserving, however, the right to reclaim said policy by repayment of said loan with interest at any time before due, said repayment to cancel this agreement without further action.
4. ' That said loan shall become due and payable—
(a) Either if any premium' on said policy or any interest on said loan is. not paid on the date when due, in which event said pledge shall, without demand or notice of any kind, every demand and notice being
(h) Or, (1) on the maturity of the policy as a death-claim or an endowment; (2) on the surrender of the policy for a cash value; (3) on the selection of a discontinuing option at the end of any dividend period. In any such event the amount due on said loan shall be deducted from the sum to be paid or allowed under said policy.”
It will he observed that the policies were issued in 1907, after the amendment of 1903 was made, and hence the policies are subject to the law as it now stands, which says that “ after deducting from three-fourths of such net value . . . any evidence of indebtedness to the company . . . the balance shall be taken as a net single premium for” the insurance therein provided for, which is, for brevity, termed extended insurance. In other words, the statute requires that, of the three-fourths net value of the policy, whatever balance there is, in excess of any indebtedness due the company, shall be considered and' taken to be a net single premium for the extended insurance. It would seem that if there was no balance, there would be nothing on which extended insurance could rest, and hence nothing in the law compelling extended insurance where that is the situation.
When we turn from the requirements of the law to the terms of the policy, we find that its provisions are in harmony with and not in conflict with the law. It provides: 1. That upon default in premiums, and there is no indebtedness to the company, extended insurance automatically continues, thus giving to insured the same benefits which section 6946 enforces (and perhaps greater benefits since the policy does not require three annual payments to be made, as does the statute); or, if insured wants a paid-up policy, in lieu of extended insurance, he will he given that, as enforced by section 6947; or, the company will pay the cash surrender value as provided for in section 6949, Revised Statutes 1909 . 2. If there is an indebtedness to the company
Is there anything in the facts or in the conduct of the company, at the time of and subsequent to the default in the payment of premiums, that compels the company to grant extended insurance or which prevents it from applying the indebtedness to the extinguishment of the debt leaving nothing of value in the policy on which extended insurance could rest? Or could the insured, by tendering the amount of the debt in February, 1915, while still in default of premiums and refusing to give a health certificate, compel the company to accept payment of the indebtedness in cash instead of treating said indebtedness as being liquidated by the net value of the policies?
It would seem that if there is nothing in the law, nor in the wording of the contracts between them, to compel the company to grant extended insurance, or to accept cash rather than the value of the policies after a default in the premiums, then there is no reason why plaintiff is entitled to say that the company must do so now; unless indeed, the company by its conduct misled the insured to his disadvantage whereby it is estopped from standing upon its rights. However, there is no evidence of this and no'pleading of estoppel.
It seems that after default was made in the payment of the premiums due May 9, 1913, and after the expiration of the thirty days of grace allowed therefor, the company, by letter dated June 19, 1913, notified
Insured made no reply to this letter and nothing further was heard from him for more than a year thereafter or until. February 25, 1915, when he sent a telegram asking the company to advise him by wire the amount of loan against the policies. The company immediately wired back that there was $183 on Policy 63 and $122 on Policy 64. Thereupon, at some time between February 25, and March 1, 1915, insured sent a draft for $305 to pay same and asked that the policies be returned to him at Manhattan, Kansas.
To this, the company, on March 1, 1915, replied that they could not apply the remittance to the payment of the loan as the policies were in a lapsed condition. The letter suggested 'that insured sign new
"Under the terms of your policy the loan if unpaid at the time the next succeeding premium is due is liquidated by the Cash Value and the policy remains entirely out of force until either the satisfactory medical health certificate is furnished and back premiums together with interest is paid up, so we could not accept your money to pay off this loan at the present time.”
The letter then suggested another method by which, with the money he had sent, he coaid obtain insurance for a term of four years or more, and inclosed a contract to that effect for him to look over, at the san e time telling him he must furnish satisfactory health certificate and that if he was in bad health it would be useless to have himself examined. The letter closed
“We are holding in our office bank draft for $322.40 which you wished to use in liquidating old loan on policies of above numbers which have already lapsed. As previously advised we cannot apply this for the reason that loans on your policies were liquidated by the cash value of the old contracts which have expired. I am returning the bank drafts which you may have cancelled. If you decide to take the five year term contract as outlined in my letter of the 9th, kindly attach bank draft for $74.90 to your application.”
On May 15,1915, the company wrote another letter, evidently in answer to one insured had caused to be sent to it, for the company’s letter says:
“We are just in receipt of a letter from Mr. Wilburt requesting information as to whether or not the Company would place your policies oh extended insurance providing you paid off the loan. As previously advised this cannot be done unless the policy be reinstated, back premiums paid, and evidence of insurability furnished us. This proposition was made to you some time ago.”
With matters standing thus, insured, as stated, died on May 19, 1915.
By the terms of the Loan Agreements, insured’s indebtedness to the company was due on the same date the premiums were payable. Hence the indebtedness was due when insured defaulted in his premiums on May 9, 1913. Now, while there does not seem to have been any actual or physical cancellation of the loan agreements, yet it is clear that, from and after the default in premiums, the company treated the indebtedness and the net value of the policies as balancing each
But plaintiff says the relation of pledgor and pledgee was created and that relation was- never changed, and insured had the right to pay off his debt at any, time even after default, and having offered to do so, plaintiff may do so at this time. This would be true if the loans were matters wholly separate and independent of the insurance contracts. But they are not. As said in Burridge v. New York Life Ins. Co., 211 Mo. 158, l. c. 174:
“The loan and pledge contract in the case at bar is in no fair sense a contract distinct and independent from the policy. To the contrary, such loan and pledge was contemplated by the policy itself. It involved the policy, it may be likened unto an egg laid in the policy and subsequently hatched — i. e., was made in pursuance of its terms.”
The policies provided that the insured could borrow the loans on the sole security of the insurance contracts and that they should be assigned as security according to the terms of the loan agreements. And the loan agreements show on their face that they were
The insured forfeited nothing. He obtained a loan which equalled the net value of each policy at the date of his default, and, in so obtaining that loan, he lawfully contracted away any right he otherwise "would have had to extended insurance either under the statute or under his policies. We say “lawfully” because the statute now allowes any indebtedness to the company to be considered before requiring any net value to be taken as a basis of extended insurance.
The policies by their terms automatically adjusted the rights between th& insured and insurer, and the values thereof balanced and offset the indebtedness. Nothing remained upon which extended insurance could
We cannot see how the use of the word “lapsed” in the company’s correspondence, could change the rights of the parties. If the word “lapsed” in insurance parlance means that the policies were “temporarily in suspension” that was true since, under the right of reinstatement at any time contained in the policies, they were subject to revival in that way and so could not be deemed wholly extinct so long as there was a chance of insured’s exercising that right.
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff, under the conceded facts in the case, is not entitled to recover, and accordingly the action of the trial court, in peremptorily instructing the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant, is upheld' and the judgment affirmed.