41 Minn. 37 | Minn. | 1889
The defendants are partners, engaged in the business of real-estate agents and brokers. This action is for the recovery of a share of commissions earned by them in the sale of certain real estate. The evidence went to show that the defendants had agreed to share with the plaintiff their commissions from such business of this kind as she might secure for them, and that she did bring about negotiations resulting in the sale referred to. The jury awarded a recovery of $243.75, and the verdict should be sustained, unless a release executed by the plaintiff was effectual to bar her action.
The only question upon which there can be doubt is whether the execution of the release was procured by such fraudulent means as to avoid it. Prior to the executing of the release, the plaintiff had •contracted, through the defendants as agents of one Foulke, for the purchase of certain land of the latter. She had paid to the defend-^ ants $100 of the purchase price, and had obligated herself by contract to make other payments. In October she wrote to the defendants, stating that she had experienced difficulty in securing money to
The peculiar circumstances of this case are such, and the weight of the evidence, including that which is involved in the undisputed circumstances, is so opposed to the verdict, that in our judgment the verdict should be set aside. There was no relation of trust and confidence between the parties. There is no claim that the plaintiff did not understand that in dealing with the defendants it was necessary for her to exercise that care for her own interests which is ordinarily required of contracting parties. She is a woman of intelligence, as is apparent from her testimony, and there is no claim made that she was not fully capable of understanding the import and effect of this release. She had written to the defendants, proposing, of her own accord, a rescission of the Foulke contract, upon the terms of her forfeiting the $100 paid thereon, and also relinquishing her claim in respect to this commission. She never retracted that offer, nor indicated, so far as the case shows, that she was unwilling to abide by it; her only claim being that, in the subsequent negotiations when the release was executed, nothing was said about it. It is extremely improbable that in this purely business transaction the defendants, instead of openly accepting this distinct offer of the plaintiff to relinquish her claim for commission, and which the defendants had no reason to suppose she was not still willing to do, would say nothing about that, but, by fraudulent means, seek to relieve themselves from the obligation which she had thus voluntarily proposed to release. Again, the plaintiff’s only claim to avoid the effect of the release is that, by the defendants’ misrepresentation that its purpose was to
It is inexpedient, upon grounds of public policy, that a solemnly executed instrument, known at the time to have been executed for the very purpose of embodying and evidencing the agreements and accomplishing the purposes of the parties, should be set aside upon the ground of fraud, unless the proof be clear and strong. Parlin v. Small, 68 Me. 289; Brown v. Blunt, 72 Me. 415; Martin v. Berens, 67 Pa. St. 459; Cannon v. Jackson, 40 Ark. 417. The instrument .itself, knowingly executed, becomes a strong “wall of evidence,” not to be lightly overcome by unsatisfactory oral testimony. We do not place our decision at all upon the ground of the plaintiff’s negligence, this action being' between the original parties to the transaction, but solely upon the ground that the evidence of fraud was insufficient to justify the avoiding of the release.
Order reversed.