MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff MCC Mortgage LP (“MCC”) sued Defendant Office Depot, Inc. (“Office Depot”) in Minnesota state court, seeking to evict it from certain commercial property it had leased from MCC. Office Depot timely removed the action to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. MCC now moves to remand. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the Motion.
The following facts are gleaned from the parties’ pleadings and the documents attached thereto. In 1999, MCC leased to Office Depot, a nationwide chain of office-supply stores, nearly 27,000 square feet of retail space at an office/retail complex in Minneapolis known as Minneapolis City Center. 1 Pursuant to the lease, Office Depot agreed to pay MCC a monthly rent of slightly more than $15,000. The lease was for an initial ten-year term, and Office Depot, at its discretion, had the option to renew it for additional five-year terms, up to four times (i.e., up to an additional 20 years); the rent would change with each renewal, but would always remain at least $10,000 per month.
The presence of other retail stores at Minneapolis City Center was an important consideration for Office Depot entering into the lease, as such stores would drive customers to the Office Depot location. Accordingly, MCC agreed to include in the lease an incentive for Office Depot: a “rent-abatement” provision. Under that provision, MCC agreed that if less than 65% of the space in Minneapolis City Center were leased to retail establishments, Office Depot’s rent would be abated — that is, it would owe no rent until the retail occupancy exceeded 65%.
Beginning in mid-2008, the required retail occupancy level at Minneapolis City Center was not achieved. Accordingly, Office Depot invoked the rent-abatement provision and informed MCC that it would not be paying rent. MCC agreed with Office Depot’s assessment and abated its rent. That abatement continued for more than 5 years, into 2009, after Office Depot had exercised its first renewal option.
According to Office Depot, MCC eventually tired of having a rent-free tenant in prime Minneapolis real estate and began coming up with ways to justify Office Depot’s eviction. In early 2009, it sent Office Depot a letter complaining of sign and awning problems at the store. Office Depot quickly corrected the sign problems but could not correct the awning problem without MCC’s approval, which, according to Office Depot, was slow in coming. Approval was finally granted in October 2009, and Office Depot then undertook the task of hiring a contractor to fix the problem, but repairs were not completed until January 2010. In the meantime, MCC claimed that Office Depot’s failure to remedy the problem within 30 days of being authorized to do so rendered it in default under the lease — it then asserted that the rent-abatement provision no longer applied and began demanding monthly rent, which Office Depot has not paid.
On December 29, 2009, MCC commenced the instant action in Hennepin County District Court, seeking Office Depot’s eviction pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 504B.001
et seq.;
the matter was set for a hearing on January 11, 2010. Office Depot answered the Complaint and demanded a jury trial, and at the January 11 hearing, the parties jointly agreed to a February 2, 2010, trial date before a Hennepin County District Court Judge. A short time later, MCC amended its Complaint, and Office Depot then removed the action to this Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. In its Notice of Removal, Office Depot asserted that the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied because “the value of the alleged right sought to be enforced by
MCC then moved to remand this action to state court. In its Motion, it asserted that an eviction action under Chapter 504B seeks possession of property only and not damages, and therefore the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold had not been met. After reviewing MCC’s Motion, the Court, sua sponte, also raised two additional issues: (1) whether jurisdiction is lacking because of the summary nature of eviction proceedings versus the plenary nature of civil actions in federal court, and (2) whether the Court should abstain from hearing this action even if subject-matter jurisdiction exists. 2 The Court directed Office Depot to address these issues in writing on or before February 8, 2010. Office Depot timely filed a response, and on February 10, 2010, MCC filed a reply. The matter is now ripe for disposition.
ANALYSIS
1. The amount in controversy
A. Removal and remand generally
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) permits the removal of “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” If a case over which the Court lacks jurisdiction is removed from state court, it must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Under the diversity-jurisdiction statute, district courts enjoy original jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Where a case is removed on diversity grounds, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.
E.g., Bell v. Hershey Co.,
B. The amount-in-controversy requirement here
The crux of MCC’s argument is that this action seeks only repossession of the leased property, not damages (save
de minimis
costs and disbursements incurred in connection with filing this case).
{See
PI. Mem. at 6.) Because eviction actions in Minnesota “provide [no] vehicle for a monetary award,” it argues that this lawsuit “does not meet the ‘amount in controversy’ requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”
(Id.
at 6-7.) In support, it has cited one case:
Mousel v. Knutson Mortgage Corp.,
In order for diversity jurisdiction to exist, the action must be between parties of different states, and the amount in controversy must exceed $50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Although the parties to this action are citizens of different states, the amount in controversy does not exceed $50,000. In its unlawful detainer action, Knutson seeks only restitution of the premises and its costs and disbursements. Because Knutson’s complaint does not meet the amount in controversy requirement, diversity jurisdiction does not exist.
Id. at 662. MCC seizes on this dicta to argue that diversity jurisdiction is lacking here. The Court does not agree.
It is true that the Complaint in this case seeks only repossession of the leased property and not monetary damages. But federal courts often are confronted with cases seeking various types of non-monetary relief, such as declaratory judgments, confirmation or vacation of arbitration awards, injunctions, and other equitable remedies. Under MCC’s logic, subject-matter jurisdiction would be lacking in all such actions, because no money damages are sought therein. Clearly that is not the law.
See, e.g., City of Univ. City, Mo. v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc.,
In the Court’s estimation, the correct view is that espoused in
A. Levet Properties Partnership v. Bank One. N.A.
Nos. Civ. A. 03-1708, 03-1373,
Here, the difference between MCC’s current position
vis-a-vis
the property and its position if it successfully evicts Office Depot is significant. Office Depot currently pays no rent, as a result of the rent-abatement provision in the lease. If MCC were able to evict Office Depot and release the property, however, it likely could collect substantial rent. Indeed, absent the rent-abatement provision, Office Depot would be paying monthly rent greater than $10,000; the value of the leasehold, therefore, is substantial. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Office Depot has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that MCC’s claims “could, that is might, legally satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.”
James Neff,
At oral argument, MCC asserted that its ability to re-lease the property is unknown, particularly in the current real-estate market. But “the mere fact that there are certain contingencies and uncertainties does not necessarily defeat the jurisdiction of this court in computing the value ... that plaintiff is seeking.”
Stengrim v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
Civ. No. 04-3192,
A strong prudential reason also supports the Court’s conclusion. If, before MCC had commenced its eviction action, Office Depot had sued MCC seeking a declaration that it was not in breach of the lease, the Court would have been obligated to assess the amount in controversy based on the value of the object of the litigation- — •
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied here. 4
II. Summary versus plenary
In its earlier Order, the Court
sua sponte
questioned whether the nature of this eviction proceeding deprives it of subject-matter jurisdiction. Several courts have concluded that they lack jurisdiction over eviction actions because “there is no authorization for summary adjudication of rent and possession actions contained within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or authorized by any other statute governing federal court procedures.”
CPG Fin. I, L.L.C. v. Shopro, Inc.,
No. 06-3015,
Key to these cases was the limited nature of eviction proceedings under the laws of the states in which they arose. For instance, the Missouri statutes at issue in
CPG
did not require the filing of a formal pleading to institute the action; did not provide for discovery or a trial by jury; and required the matter to be handled on an expedited basis.
At oral argument, MCC asserted that federal courts are ill-equipped to handle the expedited nature of summary eviction proceedings. But that contention is merit-less; the Court is the master of its own calendar and can set this matter for trial quickly. At any rate, “the presence of different or more expeditious procedures in state court is not a reason to deny the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at 535-36.
The Court is cognizant that, in some circumstances, exceptions to federal diversity jurisdiction have been recognized even though the parties are citizens of different states and the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied. For example, the Supreme Court has long recognized both a probate exception and a domestic-relations exception to diversity jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall,
III. Abstention
The final issue for resolution, also raised by the Court
sua sponte,
concerns abstention. It has been noted that “the landlord-tenant relationship is fundamentally a matter of state law.”
Hearn v. Lin,
No. 01-CV-8208,
First, abstention “is the exception, not the rule,”
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. MCC’s Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 4) is DENIED; 6 and
2. This matter is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Keyes for an expedited pretrial conference. Although the discovery period and trial date are left to Judge Keyes’s discretion, each should be set bearing in mind the expeditious nature of this matter. 7
Notes
. The lease actually was between City Center Associates Limited Partnership (“City Center”) and Office Depot, but City Center subsequently assigned its interest in the property to MCC. For ease of reference, the Court refers to the lessor/Plaintiff as MCC throughout this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
. The Court also questioned whether Office Depot had established that the parties are citizens of different states, but that issue has been resolved. (See Mem. in Opp’n at 19.)
. For the same reason, the Court declines to follow
Koochiching County v. Erickson,
Civ. No. 04-3477,
. Some courts, as well as counsel for MCC, have expressed concern over the burden that would be imposed on the federal-court system if defendants were permitted to remove eviction actions.
See, e.g., BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc.,
No. 98 C 358,
. The Court also notes that MCC did not raise abstention in moving to remand; the issue only arose sua sponte.
. It goes without saying that MCC’s request for attorneys’ fees due to Office Depot’s "improper” removal also is denied.
.The parties are also strongly encouraged to discuss resolving this matter short of trial, either with or without Judge Keyes’s assistance.