101 F. 821 | 8th Cir. | 1900
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The sufficiency of the first count of the indictment, under which the accused was .convicted, was challenged in the trial court by a motion in arrest of judgment, which is the first question to be noticed. The objections to the count were that .it did not sufficiently describe the
Another contention that should be noticed at the outset is the claim that there was no substantial evidence tending to establish the guilt of the accused, and that the court should have directed an acquittal. The bill of exceptions, however, contains testimony to the following effect: The accused was assistant postmaster at the post office at Salt Lake. City, Utah, from May 1, 1895, to about January 14, 1897, C. R. Barratt being the postmaster during that'period. He- had also served as assistant postmaster during the term of office of the previous postmaster, A. H. Nash; that is to say, from December 1, 1892, to May 1, 1895. During the administration of C. R. Barratt as postmaster, the money which was received at the post office by the several employés from the sale of stamps, stamped envelopes, etc., was, as a rule, turned over each night to the accused, and placed in his charge. He, as well as the postmaster, had a key to the inner vault of the safe, in which the moneys of the office and postage stamps and stamped envelopes were kept, and when any of such supplies were needed for sale by other employés they were obtained generally by application to the accused. When postal moneys were deposited in bank, the deposit was made up, and deposit tickets were usually prepared by the accused, and he very frequently made the deposits in person. In short, the testimony shows that the accused, in his capacity as assistant postmaster, had as full access to all the funds of the office as the postmaster himself, and that such funds and stamps were in the joint custody of both of such officers. Of the two officers, however, the accused seems to have exercised a more constant and active
Numerous errors are assigned because of the admission or exclusion of evidence. In a number of instances exceptions appear to have been taken, and error is assigned because of the exclusion of evidence which was offered by the accused, although the record shows that, after the exception-was saved, the evidence was in fact admitted. This leads us to infer that the bill of exceptions is not in all respects reliable, and that, owing to a want of proper care in its preparation, it does not correctly state the rulings that were made upon the introduction of testimony. Complaint is made specially that the witness Rebentisch heretofore mentioned was not permitted, on his cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel, to answer the following question: “There had been shortages in the department which had been corrected, had there not?” This question appears to have been propounded before the witness had concluded his answer to a previous interrogatory, and, as the record shows that after the question was asked, and the objection thereto sustained, the witness continued his answer to the former interrogatory, we might very well conclude that the objection to this question was sustained by the trial court, and properly sustained, because the question was deemed out of place and premature. But,
It has also been suggested that an error was committed, prejudicial to the accused, in permitting O. L. Nichols, the government inspector, to testify in rebuttal that he did not at any time in the fall of the year 1896 go to the post office in Salt Lake City late at night for the purpose of cashing a slip or order for $40, or any other sum. The reasons which appear to have prompted the offer of this testimony in rebuttal were the following: The government, in making out its case in chief, proved by a witness named Williams that on one occasion in the fall of the year 1896, about 2 o’clock in the morning, the accused had been seen to go to the inner vault in the post office, after it had been closed for the night, and open it. The accused explained this incident on the trial by saying that he did go to the inner vault of the safe on the occasion in question, but that he went there to get $40 to cash a slip or order for Capt. Nichols. In rebuttal the government called both .Williams and Nichols. By the former it was shown that on the occasion of his going to the vault the accused had then said to Williams, contrary to his testimony on the trial, that he went there to get some shares of mining stock for Capt. Nichols, while by the latter it showed, as before stated, that he had never solicited the accused to cash a slip for him. We perceive no error in the admission of this testimony, and are of opinion that the testimony of both witnesses was properly received in rebuttal.
Complaint is made of the admission in evidence of certain quarterly reports which were made by Barratt as postmaster of the Salt Lake City post office, showing the condition of that office. These reports were objected to by the defendant below on the ground that they were hearsay evidence, so far as he was concerned, the same having been signed by the postmaster. It was shown, however, that these reports were in the handwriting of the accused in so far as they reported the amount of stamps and money with which the office was chargeable, and that they had evidently been prepared by him. Section 889 of the Revised Statutes makes such reports admissible in evidence in the courts of the United States in civil and criminal prosecutions when they are duly certified, as these
There are no other errors respecting the admission and exclusion "of proof which are so assigned or of enough importance to deserve special notice.
It is finally suggested, although the point is not specially argued, in the brief, that the trial court erred in refusing to give the following instruction: • “If the jury finds that the defendant ceased to be assistant postmaster on the 9th of January, 1897, then this defendant would not be liable for any loss or shortage that might be found to exist on the 14th of January, 1897, unless it is affirmatively shown by the prosecution that the shortage did exist while this defendant was assistant postmaster.” This instruction was doubtless asked in view of some testimony which tended to show that the accused ceased to be assistant postmaster on January 9, 1897. While there was a little testimony to this effect, yet there was other testimony that he continued to act as assistant postmaster until his arrest, on January 14, 1897, and if he had in fact severed his con-nection with the post office before the latter date the fact does not seem to have been known to any of the ernployés of the office. The truth would seem to be that he may have been absent from the post office between January 9 and 14, 1897, a little more than usual, owing to sickness in his family, or some other cause, but the evidence would not justify the conclusion that he severed his connection with the office until his arrest. Much less would it justify the conclusion that the deficit occurred between January 9 and 14, 1897. But, even if there had been sufficient evidence on which to base the instruction, we think that the instruction, if given, might have operated to the prejudice of the defendant by leading the jury to infer •that, if the shortage existed on January 9, 1897, that fact alone would warrant a conviction. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on a theory which was-more favorable to the accused, telling them, in substance, that while an unexplained deficit of money in the hands of a trusted agent is strong proof of embezzlement, yet as in the case which they had to determine there was evidence which tended to show that the postmaster and the assistant postmaster had joint possession of the funds of the office, and equal access thereto, they could not say that the mere existence of a deficit threw on the accused the burden of explaining it, or as establishing his guilt of the crime of embezzlement, if the deficit was unexplained, provided they found that the postmaster and the assistant postmaster did have such joint possession and equal access to the funds of the office. The charge in other respects required the jury to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that while the accused was acting in the capacity of assistant postmaster he did convert the money which had disappeared, or a part of the money, to his own use, with the intent to deprive the United States thereof permanently. They were further instructed that, if the proof did not satisfy