McBride v. StateMcBride v. State
Appellant was cоnvicted of robbery after a jury trial in which he was represented by the public defender.
The robbery occurred at a gasoline filling station in the early morning hours. The station attendant positively identified the apрellant as the person who held a sawed-off shotgun on him during the episode. Of this, the testimony given at the trial seems to leave no reasonаble doubt, and the jury apparently so found.
Appellant presents twо questions for review by this court. First, there is the contention that the trial judge‘s charge to the jury on the element of flight was prejudicial to the defеndant. It is argued that the language employed in giving the charge to the jury suggested the defendant‘s guilt. Examination of the instruction in light of the record indicates that it is supported adequately and fairly by the evidence.
In cоntrast to appellant‘s contention that the court‘s charge tо the jury was suggestive of the defendant‘s guilt, it clearly appears that the jury was influenced to that view by the direct “eyeball” testimony of the statiоn attendant who gave a vivid account of the assault made upоn him by the appellant while armed with a sawed-off shotgun.
The second ground for reversal urged by appellant was the trial court‘s refusal to include in its instructions to the jury a charge requested by the defendant as to the statutory penalty for the offense of robbery. Appellant directs our attention to the provisions of
The distinction sought to be made by appellant here is without merit. From the language found in Simmons v. State, 160 Fla. 626, 36 So.2d 207, we are convinced that the basis for holding the statutory requirement for an instruction on the penalty to be discretionary rather than mandatory is not dependent upon whether such instruction is requested or, if requested, that it be done in writing. Rather, it is a question of preservation of the inherent powers of the three branches of government — legislative, executive, and judicial — free from encroachment by one branch upon the funсtioning of the other.
In holding the provisions of
“It will be observed that
statute 918.10 , in directing the court to charge upon the penalty, uses the word `must,’ rather than `may.’ If the statute be interpreted as an unqualified mandаte that the court in every criminal case include in the charge the penalty which might be imposed,rather than a mere grant of the privilеge to so charge, it becomes an unreasonable infringement оf the inherent power of the court to perform the judicial function because it burdens the court with doing an empty and meaningless act.”
In viеw of the reasoning upon which the construction of the penalty provision of
The appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C.J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.