McBride v. BLACKTOPMcBride v. BLACKTOP
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Coyne
Lead Opinion
OPINION
COYNE, Justice.This appeal raises the question whether supplementary workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to
Wesley McBride suffered a work-related injury to his right foot and leg on June 19, 1969. His employer, Leon Joyce Blacktop, and its insurer, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., admitted liability for employee’s claim and paid temporary total disability benefits during periods of total disability from that time until November 8, 1984, when they filed a notice to discontinue after having paid 350 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the maximum required by the workers’ compensation law in effect at the time of employee’s injury,
The compensation judge found it was not disputed that the employee was still disabled but denied the employee’s claim for supplementary benefits, reasoning that an employee must be currently receiving benefits under
The question we must determine is whether an employee who continues to be totally disabled is entitled to supplementary workers’ compensation benefits under
176.132 SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS.
Subdivision 1. Eligible recipients, (a) An employee who has suffered personal injury prior to the effective date of clause (b) for which benefits are payable undersection 176.101 and who has been totally disabled for more than 104 weeks shall be eligible for supplementary benefits as prescribed in this section after 104 weeks have elapsed and for the remainder of the total disablement. Regardless of the number of weeks of total disability, no totally disabled person is ineligible for supplementary benefits after four years have elapsed since the first date of the total disability, except as provided by clause (b), provided that all periods of disability are caused by the same injury.
While repeatedly assuring us that the statute is “clear and unambiguous,” the parties and amici representing different constituencies propose diametrically opposed constructions. The employee argues that any employee who has sustained a compensable injury and who has been totally disabled for 104 weeks is eligible for supplementary benefits as long as the employee is totally disabled, regardless of his eligibility for basic workers’ compensation. Employee contends that subdivision 3 of
In the beginning the Workers’ Compensation Act provided that in the event of a work-related injury producing temporary total disability, compensation — subject to maximum and minimum amounts — should be paid during the period of disability, but “not beyond three hundred weeks.” Act of April 24, 1913, ch. 467, § 13, 1913 Minn. Laws 675, 678-79. By 1971, when
Supplementary benefits are not a direct part of the individual employer’s total workers’ compensation liability to a particular employee. Wilken v. International Harvester Co., 363 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Minn.1985). Under
To construe
[The Special Compensation Fund] does not stand in the employer’s position either by virtue of privity of contract or otherwise. [It] is not the employer’s in-demnitor for compensation paid, nor does [it] insure employer against compensation claims. [It] affords no protection to any individual employer. [It] represents all employers within the act as a general class.
Orth v. Shiely Petter Crushed Stone Co., 253 Minn. 142, 149-50, 91 N.W.2d 463, 469 (1958).
*259Heretofore an employee who had been paid temporary total disability benefits for 350 weeks and who still was unable to work because of the injury applied for permanent total disability benefits. It must be recognized that if disability benefits have been paid for 350 weeks, the injury must have occurred more than six and one-half years earlier and the employee’s condition must certainly have stabilized. At that point, if the inability to get work is the result of the residual impairment, the straightforward approach is to find the employee permanently totally disabled, subject to reopening the case if the employee later secures steady employment. 2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation § 57.12(d) (1987).
If eligibility for temporary total disability benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act is not a prerequisite to the payment of supplementary benefits, so that supplementary benefits replace temporary total disability benefits when the employee’s entitlement is exhausted, the employee has no incentive to seek permanent total disability benefits. Thus is liability for permanent total disability benefits shifted from the employer to the Special Compensation Fund. Not only is the employer relieved of the duty to pay permanent total disability benefits but the employer also escapes the additional obligatory contribution to the Special Compensation Fund of 20% of permanent total disability compensation payable to the employee. It seems extraordinarily unlikely that the legislature intended to present employer and the employer’s insurer a windfall at the expense of the Special Compensation Fund.
Moreover, when the legislature established the amount of supplementary benefits, it made specific provision for supplementary payments to eligible recipients who are receiving no compensation or reduced compensation because of statutorily prescribed set-offs or because the employee or dependent had already received the maximum amount payable for permanent total disability.
Neither are we persuaded that the thrust of
Finally, as the parties remind us, although
Reversed.
Notes
. It is not disputed that the employee suffers an ongoing total disability. Nor is it disputed that he makes no claim at this time of permanent total disability although he may make claim for permanent total disability benefits at some future time. The nature of his disability is not at issue here, only the continuance of supplementary benefits where the employee is not currently entitled to basic benefits under
. The law governing the employee’s basic temporary total disability benefits is the 1967 version of
. Subdivision 3 of
Subd. 3. Payment. The payment of supplementary benefits shall be the responsibility of the employer or insurer currently paying total disability benefits, or any other payer of such benefits. When the eligible individual is not currently receiving benefits because the total paid has reached the maximum prescribed by law the employer and insurer shall, nevertheless, pay the supplementary benefits that are prescribed by law. The employer or insurer paying the supplementary benefit shall have the right of full reimbursement from the special compensation fund for the amount of such benefits paid.
.
. The 350 week limitation on temporary partial disability, as opposed to temporary total disability, was not eliminated until two years later, in 1977. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 342, § 12, 1977 Minn.Laws 697, 703.
. Although the provisions of
. Under
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I find the majority opinion to be a technical and strained rewriting of the statute. A plain reading of the statute indicates that an employee who has suffered personal injury for which benefits are payable under
I would affirm the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join the dissent of Justice YETKA.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Yetka and for these additional reasons:
(1) Under the majority holding an employee would be required to seek permanent total disability benefits prematurely.
(2) The intent of the legislature to provide supplementary benefits for a totally disabled employee “for the remainder of the total disablement” cannot be defeated by a narrow reading of “injury * * * for which benefits are payable.” Section 176.-132, subdivisions 2 and 3, indicates there are employees not currently receiving benefits who are nevertheless eligible for supplementary benefits. Subdivision 1(a) cannot be read as requiring current eligibility for basic benefits to establish eligibility for supplementary benefits if the employee, as here, suffers an ongoing total disability. If the legislature intended “present entitlement” to be a condition precedent to supplemental benefits, it could have modified the words “are payable” to “are currently payable” or “are currently being paid.” It did not, and therefore no limitation exists.
(3)The issue in this case is one that should be properly addressed by the legislature as it grapples with revisions of the workers’ compensation laws.