*1 one another conflicted with mendations liable water to hold Suchor
insufficient basements, appellants’ where
seepage recommenda- analytical for the basis builders, and to the available
tions was had no control over developer
where the Without houses built.
the nature developer furnished lots that
question, the of dwell- for the construction
were suitable duty its to the That satisfied houses. Bauer, su-
purchasers under Anderson v.
pra. concerning question of fact Su- specifications
chor’s erroneous construction developer’s duty application to the
has no in this purchasers case.
of care to
Therefore, no exists as to mate issue prevail is entitled to
rial fact and Suchor respect appel
as a matter law with negligence
lants’ claims. summary judgment is affirmed. McARTOR, (Defendant), Appellant
Ed Wyoming,
The STATE of (Plaintiff).
Appellee
No. 84-22.
Supreme Wyoming. Court
9,May
Richard Park, G. Miller and David B. Casper, appellant. for McClintock, Atty. Gen., A.G. Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., W. John Ren- Johnson, neisen and Allen C. Sr. Asst. At- Gen., tys. appellee. THOMAS, C.J., ROSE,
Before ROO- NEY, CARDINE, BROWN and JJ. ROONEY, Justice.
Appellant conviction, appeals from a af- court, taking ter a trial to the indecent § liberties with a minor in 14- violation Appellant originally W.S.1977. charged with several counts of indecent liberties, alleged acts, based on more recent charges except all either were dis- missed, appellant guilty was found not count, upon appellant at trial. That was found sentenced to less than one nor more years, than two con- sixteen-year-old girl, cerned an act with a 1977; in June of she testified that she and appellant engaged sexual in- consensual tercourse.
Appellant appeal. raises two issues on First, appellant contends that there was support finding insufficient evidence to that the incident occurred in Natrona Coun- Second, ty. contends trial court in determining erred could be and convicted § (a) because: “child” as 14-3-105 § used 14-3-105 sixteen; (b) should criminal statutes strictly any ambiguity construed and (c) appellant; resolved favor of the impliedly repealed by 14-3-105 has been 6-2-304, W.S.1977; (d) 6-2-304 is two, the more statute of the immodest, indecent liberties way immoral or to a more must general statute knowingly to child or subject. such the same specific statute on encourage any such child to cause or affirm. We child com- cause or another him or her immoral inde- mit with BACKGROUND STATUTORY cent act. *3 background of the of the A review provi- shall violate the “Any who is in order inasmuch as the two statutes deemed of this section shall be sions statutory alleged inconsist issues involve felony upon conviction guilty of a encies; law pertinent inasmuch as any sum less shall be fined thereof the time of the in effect at that which was ($100.00) nor one hundred dollars than ago, years occurred several incident which thousand dollars more than legisla 1977; as in June of and inasmuch ($1,000.00) imprisoned peniten- or legis of history is often determinative tive (10) years, byor tiary not exceed ten to Stovall, Wyo., lative intent. State imprisonment.” fine and both such (1982); Wyo., P.2d 543 Padilla § 14-28, W.S.1957, and It codified as was (1979); Town Clearmont v. of § 8, 220, by Session Laws of Ch. enacted Commission, Wyo., 357 Highway State Act). (Child Wyoming, The Protection specific reference to present statute omits W.S.1977, 14-3-105, now ef- Section guardians or custodians and it parents, 1, 1979, January since fect in effect modifying child. omits the word “such” reads: 7, immediately preceding sec Section Act, taking made it a
“Any person knowingly
immod-
tion of the Child Protection
solicit,
est,
procure
or otherwise know
or indecent liberties
crime to
immoral
ingly
“any
age
female under
knowingly causing or en-
any
or
child
engage
illicit sexual
eighteen
of
any
couraging
child to cause or encour-
Accordingly,
the words
intercourse.”1
age
any
to commit with him
another child
§
“any
a “female
such child”
8 describe
guilty of
or
act is
immoral
indecent
years.”
eighteen
age
under the
of
upon
shall
felony, and
conviction
be fined
rule
construction is that “such”
accepted
of
one hundred dollars
less
imme
refers to the character of
($100.00) nor
one thousand
more than
contrary
precedes
legis
it unless a
diately
($1,000.00)
imprisoned in
dollars
Elementary
intent
is evidenced.
lative
(10)
penitentiary not more than ten
2, 3,
Campbell
and 10
School Districts
of
years, or both.”
Boundary
Board
County
District
of
25,
Chapter
part
It
as
of
Ses-
was enacted
P.2d 237
Campbell County,
Wyoming,
of
1978.
same
sion Laws
(D.C.
(1969);
Tidball,
In
“It shall be unlawful for
“under
parent,
engage
in illicit sexual
including but not
limited to
8 was not
guardian
knowingly to
or sexual intrusion.” Section
or custodian
take
Preceding
prohibited
in three
sections of the Act
other
of nineteen
and under
section
morals,
designate
jeopardizing
a child
health or wel-
did not
actions
The Act
sections.
eighteen
age.
in one
under the
fare
children
other
Chapter
70 the
or included
indecent liberties statute in
then amended
effect at
thus,
(§
and,
enacted in 1957with
remained as
time of the incident
W.S.
referring
1957);
“any
child”
to a “female
such
as
inasmuch
the offense was other
years.”
eighteen
under the
sufficiently
wise
to identify
described
alleged
violated;
to have been
statute in effect at
The sexual assault
inasmuch as
was misled
his
of this incident was
the time
enacted in
prejudice.
70 of
Chapter
1977 as
the Session
“ * * *
1977,
Wyoming,
with an effective
Laws of
The indictment or information
May
previous
date of
1977—the month
state
each count the
official
incident
to that in
this
occurred.
It
rule,
customary
citation
originally
6-63.5 in
codified
W.S.
regulation or
provision
of law
it read:
alleged
which the defendant is
therein
“An actor who is at least four
have
Error in the
violated.
citation
its
*4
older than the victim and who inflicts
imperfec-
omission or
other defect or
penetration
sexual
sexual
intrusion on
tion
does
to prejudice any
which
not tend
(16)
of sixteen
victim
the
right
upon
substantial
of the defendant
is
in
of sexual assault
the
or to
merits
mislead the
defendant
degree.”
fourth
his prejudice
grounds
be
not
for
penalty
imprisonment
dismissal
The
was fixed at
in
of the indictment or informa-
county jail
(1)
tion
for not more than one
or for a reversal of a conviction.
* * * ”
year or,
9(a),
previously
convicted of a similar
Rule
W.R.Cr.P.
crime,
(1)
not
one
at
less than
nor more
Wagstaff,
See United
v.
F.2d
States
572
(5) years.
than five
Sexual intrusion and
(10th Cir.1978),
270
v.
Sonnier
United
were defined to include States,
(4th Cir.1963).
Inc.
Cubin,
group of
in a
Wyo.,
(1) person age years, eighteen years under the sixteen age Is a “child” a age Second, or one under the of 18 by majority. stated the statute majority opinion concludes? years as the per- does not restrict itself to females but (2) ap- Does the indecent liberties statute anyone age tains to under the of sixteen involving ply to sex crimes sexual intru- years. Applying the in statute effect at in penetration sion or event? incident, 14-2-111, supra, the time of this to the determination of child under AOF CHILD AGE apparent the indecent liberties it is The indecent liberties statute does not age that a child is one under the of sixteen is a child. If a child is one tell us who so, years. being That should not age years, under the of sixteen charged have been with violation of the could not have been with violation indecent liberties statute as it existed at of the indecent liberties statute because the girl the time of this incident since the in- age girl here was over the of sixteen. This age years. was over the volved majority opinion, by referring court in the to what it claims to be the statute immedi SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE APPLIES ately preceding, “any construes the words insists, majority opinion neverthe- in such child” found the indecent liberties less, per- that the indecent liberties statute statute to mean a under the female involving tains to sexual intercourse fe- eighteen years. The court is mistaken in eighteen years. males under the To to, the statute it refers for the statute so construe the statute means that consen- preceded which the indecent liberties stat boy eigh- sual sexual intercourse ute and which in effect on the between date this § 14-2-111, girl day shy incident occurred was teen and a W.S. provided: immoral, being eighteen years immodest, for, boy and indecent “Anyone procures for, and that the who solicits knowingly encourages guilty felony anyone of a result (16) engage imprisonment sixteen years. for ten illicit sexual or sexual intru- This construction of the indecent liberties sion as defined in W.S. 6-63.1 6-4- [§ clearly contrary leg- statute is to what the felony, upon of a con- 301] adopting islature intended in child abuse punished by imprison- viction shall be and sexual assault statutes. At the time ment for a term not to exceed five the indecent liberties statute was reenacted years.” added.) (Emphasis legislature compre- enacted a prior It is true that to the revision of the hensive sexual assault statute which set preceding enactment of 14-2- specificity forth with the instances in which 111, W.S.1977,supra, age specified intercourse was to be a crime eighteen years. I would conclude that it Wyoming. state of The sexual assault legislature intent of the to reduce provided statutes as follows: age specified years. to sixteen That “(a) Any pene- actor who inflicts sexual result would inbe accord with “ tration * * * or sexual intrusion on a victim general rule, in the construc- commits a sexual assault in the first revisions, codes, compilations, tion of degree if: provision plain that when a and unam- “(i) The actor causes submission of the biguous the court cannot refer to the * * * through physical victim force or original purpose of ascer- 6-63.2, forcible confinement.” Section taining meaning.” its 73 Am.Jur.2d Stat- W.S.1957. utes “(a) Any pene- majority opinion actor who inflicts sexual incorrect on two First, “any counts. the statute defines tration sexual intrusion on a victim such child” as a under commits de- sexual assault the second *9 if, gree judgment girl circumstances not consti- of wise than a about the degree: assault in age. tuted sexual the first legislature same The has established years age
sixteen as the of consent and the age upon effect criminality of the “(vi) in position The authori- actor legislature, act. That is the function of the ty position over the victim and uses this court give and this must effect to the stat- cause the to authority to victim sub- pertaining utes to sexual assault —which I 6-63.3, mit.” Section W.S.1957. clear pronounce- see as and unambiguous “An actor is at least four ments. older than the victim and who inflicts penetration sexual on sexual intrusion The indecent liberties statute and the a victim under the of sixteen sexual assault statute both deal with sex years in of sexual assault crimes. It was that they contended were 6-63.5, degree.” fourth Section W.S. conflict, clearly specific in that general, specific and that the repealer general statute effected a of the opinion The majority of the that states Rose, in statute. Justice Ketcham the sexual assault W.S. State, Wyo., (§ (1980), 6-63.5), P.2d specific is not more than analyzing question this in his dissenting indecent liberties statute because the opinion, stated: victim under the sexual statute assault give “has the to ability a consent will “I that repeal-by-implicationanalysis feel be valid if the actor no more than four an appropriate way is not to resolve the years older the victim than invalid [but fourth-degree-sexu- conflict between the opinion goes five The on to older].” statute al-assault and the indecent-liber- state, inconsistency is not “[t]his ties statute.” rational.” majority The this holds that case it was The being rationale behind consideration legislature intent of the that either given par- differential between the repealer work a other. I am Code, ties is best stated the Model Penal agreement holding in full with that and am (1955), Tentative Draft No. pages 253- conflict; convinced do not statutes 254: they deal different areas the broad statutory “The rationale of rape vic- spectrum of sex crimes and can stand to- immaturity. timization of It nec- seems gether. therefore, essary, recognize im- penetration 6-63.1, Sexual is defined mature males victims themselves be W.S.1957, supra, as “sexual intercourse.” of adolescence rather engaged § 6-63.5, age of The consent under W.S. * * * exploitation experience. of others’ 1957, supra, age. is sixteen way The most convenient effect argument There can be no serious require to the victimization rationale is to sexual that the assault statute is a a substantial differential in favor of ** deals with sexual existing the male. *. Certainly, force, consent, either as result of statutory provisions under involving a female under the twelve rape applied label is experimen- years. or under the It by girl just boy just tation under and a formerly specifically deals with what over 16 harsh seem and unreasonable.” rape. Capwell referred to as In subject is a difficult one with which (1984), we said: deal. disagreement There is wide over making rape crime was ought what the consent “A statute first be. * * * adopted Wyoming in 1899 ages difference in does and make a should [and] difference, otherwise we would sentenc- remained effect until when the prison sixteen-year-old comprehensive boys legislature who are undertook a * * * knowledgeable, capable no more mature or of the sub- revision statutes [and] *10 law, general for the the the the ‘sexual assault’ inconsistent with term stituted ** control, special ‘rape’ provisions of the act will
term Carpenter, King Carpenter & Inc. v. penetration to specific. seems Sexual Rape ham, 314, Wyo. §in 6-63.- specific. It is defined me seems ‘ * * * “ intercourse, general rule that “It is the W.S.1957, 1, supra, as sexual standing general the alone I find that where specific. would that seems the same matter as the a nar- would include statute deals with the sexual assault act, it, crime, special and thus conflict with the sexual row area sex intrusion, intercourse, special an ex and that is act will be considered as sexual being it general. ception general statute whether specific opposed as the passed general or after such before unnecessary argument Extended seems special the enactment. Where § 14-3-105, W.S.1977, hold su to also that later, regarded exception it will an be “immodest, making pra, it unlawful take qualification general the prior to or immoral or indecent liberties with one; general later and where the act is child,” general is a statute rather special the statute will be considered as Rooney much specific. Justice conceded as remaining exception to un its terms when, constitutionality considering the general repealed less it is words or of this indecent liberties statute Soren ’ necessary implication.” 2A Sutherland State, 1031, Wyo., 604 P.2d son v. (4th Ed.1973), Statutory p. Construction (1979), Locke, quoted he Rose from v. State, Capwell supra 315.” at 1152. 243, 244, 96 S.Ct. 46 L.Ed.2d U.S. (1975): §§ statutes, Our sexual assault 6-63.1 “ lawyers may 6-63.13, W.S.1957, ‘Even trained find it nec- through spe- supra, deal dictionaries, legal
essary to consult
treat-
cifically
criminality
with
or lack of
the
ises,
they
judicial opinions
before
criminality of sexual intercourse whether
may say
any certainty
with
what some
resulting from force or
It is
consensual.
”
compel
statutes
or forbid.’
statute,
governs
and it
in this
the
case. Section 14-3-105 was reenacted af-
Rooney
proceeded
then
to consult
Justice
adoption
of the
stat-
ter
sexual assault
dictionary
meaning
to determine the
ute,
it
a clear
on the
evidenced
“immoral, immodest, and indecent” liber-
legislature
of the
that
this statute
then, quoting
opinions
He
from
ties.
“
courts,
‘True,
govern
criminality
other sex-
should
stated:
what shall be
involving
penetra-
“immodest,
ual conduct not
sexual
regarded as
inde-
immoral and
tion or sexual intercourse. As we stated
specified
particu-
cent liberties”
with
**
larity
Capwell
supra
quoted:
And he further
1153:
“
vagueness
‘The root of
doctrine
gives
“This
construction
effect
both
”
rough idea of fairness.’
policy
ambiguity
that
con-
statutes and a
cerning
application of
stat-
criminal
construing
determining
In
statutes and
lenity.
utes
resolved in
should be
favor
legislature
respect
intent of
))
# * *
each,
case,
presume
legislature
principles
Applying
enacts
above
to this
“[w]e
legislation
knowledge
with full
of exist
have a
five
we
woman
was within
being
age.
law and
other stat
with reference to
months
seventeen
candidly
testimony
utes and
of the
in her
decisions
courts. Such She
admitted
legislation should,
therefore,
con
be
the sexual intercourse with
in way
strued
her tes-
creates a consisten
consensual. A fair inference from
cy
harmony
existing
five-and-one-half-year
timony
within the
law.
and from the
Ass’n
indi-
Wyoming Railway
delay
reporting
Civic
Mo
the incident would
Fuels,
Wyo.
prosecute
did
tor
that there was a crime. recognize
I that here was a law may
enforcement officer and that there society against on the
a natural bias enforcing
one who is entrusted with our having girl
laws sexual relations with a seventeen,
quite apparently duty. while on
If this law enforcement officer used his submission,
position authority to cause degree
that was the crime of second § 6-63.3, W.S.1957, supra,
assault under penalty twenty
and carries a of one to prison. Appellant was not crime;
charged with this and the record
would seem to indicate that the facts of the support charge,
incident would not not be so.
I would hold that where the incident involves sexual or sex- case,
ual intercourse as in this whether as a consent,
result of force or the sexual as-
sault statute is the statute under which the would,
charge therefore, should I be filed.
reverse remand this case to the trial
court. HOTSHOT,
BOWERS AND WELDING
INC., Marvin Bowers and Charlotte
Bowers, Appellants (Defendants), BROMLEY,
Michael D. Emma L. Brom Dickerson,
ley, Clyde E. Linda H. Dick
erson, Thomas, Appellees and Zenda M. (Plaintiffs).
No. 84-227.
Supreme Wyoming. Court
May
