67 Ga. 134 | Ga. | 1881
Matthewson & Butler filed their bill for injunction, relief, etc., in Richmond superior court against Michael McDonald, administrator upon the estate of James McDonald,of Richmond county,a non-resident intestate of this state, Walter J. McArthur, of Montgomery county, and John W. Griffin, of Dodge county, in which by the bill, answer, and ■ evidence submitted on the hearing for an injunction, etc., the following history of the case is made to appear:
In the year 1818 the state of Georgia granted to McDonald, Pope & Co., of Richmond county, Georgia-, about 178 or 180 lots of land, each containing 202J acres, all lying in what was then Wilkinson county. It nowhere appears ' who composed the firm of McDonald,Pope & Co. It appears .that Pope removed from Richmond county to Jackson county, Florida, about 1820, and married there in 1823. That at the time of his marriage he had in his possession all of the original plats and grants to the lots aforesaid, and so held them till he died in 1837 in Florida. His widow had heard him say he was one of the firm of Me-
McLaughlin & Co’s, deed was recorded in Laurens county, in Pulaski and Telfair counties in 1866, and they
With full knowledge of all these facts, McArthur & Griffin, a firm doing a lumber and real estate business at Eastman, in Dodge county, and composed of respondents, W. T. McArthur, of Montgomery county, and John W. Griffin, of Dodge county, conceiving that they had discovered a flaw in the title conveyed by the Popes, sent John W. Griffin, in 1879,to Augusta to work up the case. He went first to Mr. John McDonald, a cotton merchant, and a member of an old family in Augusta, but finding he would have nothing to do with it, he hunted further and finally found Michsel McDonald, an Irishman, who came to Augusta in 1857 as a barrel maker, and who is now about 47 years old. After questioning him, and' being told that he had several brothers, one named James* none of whom he ever saw but once, and that was in New York, and that he only saw them then for about ten minutes, and had never even heard of them since, Griffin informed him that he had struck the right man, and invited him to go with him to the hotel where he (Griffin) was stopping. When there, Griffin told McDonald that he knew where there was some land belonging to his brother James, and offered him $400.00 for his interest. Upon condition that it was all right and would get him into no
In October, 1880, Griffin came to Augusta and tried to •get McDonald to swear to returns, as administrator, so as to be discharged. But as the returns were false, McDonald refused, and Griffin said as he was security on the bond he would make them himself. McArthur & Griffin do not pretend to dispute the circumstances under which the administration was procured, or the amount paid McDonald, but nevertheless swear they acted in good faith, and believed they were buying a good title to a one-half interest in the Pope lands. They rely upon complainants’ inability, as they claim, to establish any title, and they produced many affidavits showing that some of the lots had never been occupied, and that some were held by persons who claim to hold adversely to complainants. Some of these affidavits are made by persons who actually hold under complainants’ vendees, and McArthur & Griffin are themselves in possession of some of the lots which they purchased from the complainants’ vendees. Since the opening of the Macon and Brunswick Railroad, passing directly through these lands, they have greatly appreciated in value for lumber and turpentine purposes, as well as for farming lands, and are reasonably worth from $200 to $400 per lot., Said lands are becoming daily more valuable, and the increase is not calculable in dollars. Complainants have been greatly damaged by the trespasses committed, and constantly continued by McArthur & Griffin, and by reason of the cloud cast upon the title by the record of the before-mentioned administrator’s deeds, have been, and are still delayed and hindered in the sale, use and enjoyment of the property. Griffin stated to Harrell, one of McLaughlin & Co’s vendees, that he (Griffin) knew
Complainants therefore filed their bill in Richmond county, praying that the administration in Montgomery county by Michael McDonald be set aside, and declared void for fraud; that his deeds be likewise declared fraud, ulent, and be delivered up to be canceled as a cloud upon their title, and that he be required to account and pay over to complainants all moneys received by him from the sale of their lands. That McArthur & Griffin be restrained from further leasing and trespassing upon complainants’ lands, and that they account and pay for the damage already done, and be required to deliver up said deeds to be canceled, as fraudulent, and as clouds upon complainants’ title and also to protect themselves, because of threatened suits against complainants upon their warranty deeds to lands already sold, because of the alleged McDonald title set up by McArthur & Griffin, and for general relief. The value of the half interest which McDonald pretended to sell in 1879 was reasonably w"orth $20,000.00, and yet McArthur and Griffin bought it for $400. It nowhere appears that the administrator has sold or disposed of the property in Montgomery county, about five lots in the eleventh district.
It was by virtue of these five lots, lying in Montgomery county, that jurisdiction for administration was claimed in that county. The bulk of the property lies in Dodge county, where McArthur & Griffin do business. Harrell and the other vendors of G. H. McLaughlin & Co., also reside in Dodge county.
(i.) Because the superior court of Richmond county has no jurisdiction to vacate a judgment rendered by the court of ordinary of Montgomery county, or to, enjoin a legal proceeding therein.
(2.) Because the superior court of Richmond county has no jurisdiction of respondents McArthur & Griffin, one & resident of Montgomery and the other of Dodge county, who are the only respondents against whom substantial relief is prayed.
(3.) Because complainants have an adequate remedy at law.
(4.) Because there is no equity in complainants’ bill.
(5.) Because Richmond superior court has no jurisdiction of respondents on the subject matter of the suit, as the lands do not lie in said county, and this suit is in respect to the title of said lands.
(6.) Because the superior court of Richmond county has no jurisdiction of Michael McDonald as administrator, as such administration is in Montgomery county, Georgia.
On hearing said bill, on the demurrer, answers and evidence, the court overruled the demurrer and ordered the injunction to issue. To which ruling and judgment respondents, McArthur & Griffin, excepted and assigned the same as error.
The bill alleges, that these'lots of land were in 1818 granted by the state to McDonald, Pope & Co. ; that Pope retained these grants during his life, claiming said lands up to his death in Florida in 1837. That he was one of the firm of McDonald, Pope & Co. After his’death intestate, his heirs at law, consisting of his widow and children, then in life and all of age, by power of attorney duly re
The bill further alleges that on the 10th July, 1863, Harrell and his co-vendees sold by warranty deed, in good faith and for full consideration, 115 lots of this land to McLaughlin & Co. (one of whom is a complainant). Since said sale complainants have sold to various persons some of said lots in dispute, who went into possession, and are still in possession, and complainants have been controlling balance of said lots, and paying taxes thereon since their purchase to the present. As the demurrer admits these allegations to be true, we do not see why the complainants have not shown prima facie at least such a title or interest in these lands as entitles them to a standing in court. ,A prima facie title is all that is necessary, at least until a better outstanding title is shown. In a suit for an injunction complainants, on showing they have prima facie even an interest in the property, may maintain their bill. In 53 Ga., 454 and 685, this court said “that a plaintiff" in ejectment might recover, though he may himself show no title to the jury against one who acquires possession subsequently by a trespass without any lawful right whatever.” It is not necessary even in ejectment suits that plaintiff should have the entire title, much less in equity. An undivided interest will support title. 3 Wall., and an equitable title is sufficient to maintain or defeat an action. 39. Ga., 91; 31 lb., 278 ; 30 lb., 553, 652; 29 lb., 171, 485 ; 27 lb., 372; 26 lb., 132. A title which is. apparently good is sufficient against a mere wrong-doer or trespasser. 3 Wait, 13-20; 15 La., 76. We do not mean to be understood as holding that the complainants have established by their evidence a good title,.but we think the allegations in the bill, show they have prima facie such an interest in the property as entitles them'to a hearing.
It has been further ruled that a bill to cancel a deed and to set aside the same, is not such a suit respecting titles to land as requires it to be' brought in the county where the land lies.
We are of opinion, therefore, that there is substantial relief prayed in this bill against M. McDonald, of Richmond county, and that the court for this cause, in Rich, mond county, has jurisdiction over all the respondents-20 Ga., 645 ; 21 Ib., 454; 34 Ib., 53 ; 37 Ib., 346 ; 61 Ib., 121.
These authorities cited, we think, are decisive as to the the grounds of demurrer to this bill, and we see no error in the judgment of the court overruling the same.
Taking the bill, answers and voluminous evidence submitted on the hearing of this injunction — recognizing the fact as we do under the law of this case, that it is one pr.oper for the jurisdiction of a court of equity, that it is pending in a proper jurisdiction, and in passing upon the questions of fact that may be conflicting, the chancellor is entitled to a discretion in his judgment that we should not disturb, unless abused — and we may well let the judgment pronounced by the court below as to granting this injunction remain until the final hearing of this cause before the tribunal appointed to pass upon the facts when therein presented.
Let the judgment below be afifirmed.