McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Anderson, Tjoflat, Edmondson, Cox, Birch, Dubina, Black, Carnes, Barkett, Marcus, Wilson, Godbold
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
This case raises the discrete question of the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to claims arising under
I.
The facts of this case are straightforward. In 1993, the United States Department of Justice was investigating Lockheed’s sale of three C-130 aircraft to the Arab Republic of Egypt for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
In the fall of 1993, McAndrew and more than 30 other Lockheed employees were subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury. McAndrew alleges that on the morning he was scheduled to appear before the grand jury, June 21, 1994, he received a phone call from T.A. Graham, Vice President of Business Development at Lockheed (and McAndrew’s immediate supervisor). During the course of the conversation Graham supposedly expressed his dissatisfaction to McAndrew about McAndrew’s appearance before the grand jury, and told him specifically that “the company was very unhappy with [McAndrew’s] decision to testify.” Indeed, the complaint alleges that Graham made clear to McAndrew that “it would not be in his best interest to testify.” McAndrew explained that he had no choice about testifying, that he had been under subpoena since October, 1993, and that he had been ordered by the court to give testimony. McAndrew told Graham, according to the complaint, that McAndrew had to appear and answer truthfully whatever questions were posed to him. Plaintiff alleged that Graham was in Mexico when he called McAndrew and that Graham made it clear by his words that he was not only expressing his own personal sentiments, but was also speaking for Lockheed.
On June 21, 1994, under compulsion of subpoena and a separate court order, McAndrew appeared and testified before the grand jury regarding his knowledge of the sale of aircraft to Egypt. Two days later, McAndrew alleged, he received another call from Graham during which Graham told McAndrew that he, and Defendants A. Goldfarb (Vice President for Administration) and T.F. Powell (Vice President of Human Resources) were discussing what to do about McAndrew. Graham allegedly told McAndrew to take a couple of days off. Thereafter, according to the complaint, on June 28, 1994, Graham fired McAndrew by reading him the following statement: “The company has decided to end our relationship. This is due to your performance in International Marketing.”
The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. In doing so, the court held: first, that McAndrew’s
McAndrew appealed the district court’s rulings dismissing his
II.
The only issue before us1 is whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to and bars a claim arising under
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that acts of corporate agents are attributed to the corporation itself, thereby negating the multiplicity of actors necessary for the formation of a conspiracy. Simply put, under the doctrine, a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves. The doctrine is based on the nature of a conspiracy and the legal conception of a corporation. It is by now axiomatic that a conspiracy requires a meeting of the minds between two or more persons to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. See Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 912 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a civil conspiracy ordinarily requires “an agreement between two or more people to achieve an illegal objective, an overt act in furtherance of that illegal objective, and a resulting injury to the plaintiff”). However, under basic agency principles, the acts of a corporation’s agents are considered to be those of a single legal actor. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981); see also United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 1982). Therefore, just as it is not legally possible for an individual person to conspire with himself, it is not possible for a single legal entity consisting of the corporation and its agents to conspire with itself. See Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 603 (noting that “the multiplicity of actors necessary to conspiracy” is negated when the agents’ acts are attributed to the corporation and the corporation and its agents are viewed as a single legal actor); Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952) (explaining that “[i]t is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation”).
Not surprisingly, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context where it seemed particularly logical to conclude that a single corporation could not conspire with itself to restrain trade in the way imagined by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 As the former Fifth Circuit explained in Nelson Radio, while a single corporation could act in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act4--which prohibits attempts to monopolize--it could not alone form a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade so as to violate Section 1 of the Act. See Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914 (explaining that Section 1 of the Sherman Act “does not purport to cover a conspiracy which consists merely in the fact that the officers of the single defendant corporation did their day to day jobs in formulating and carrying out its managerial policy”). To hold otherwise would render Section 2 of the Act meaningless. See Hartley, 678 F.2d at 971.
In Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit extended the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to
Like a majority of the other circuits,6 we have followed the Seventh Circuit’s extension of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to claims arising under
We have long recognized an exception to the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine for intracorporate criminal conspiracies arising under
The former Fifth Circuit recognized this exception to the [single corporate entity] fiction in criminal conspiracy cases in Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp., 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981) when it stated: “a corporation can be convicted of criminal charges of conspiracy based solely on conspiracy with its own employees.” Id. at 603. We now adopt this exception and hold that it is possible for a corporation to conspire with its own officers, agents and employees in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 .
The First, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all ruled similarly. See United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine “has never been applied to criminal cases” and holding that “a corporation may be liable under
The rationale supporting the idea that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine cannot shield corporate employees and corporations accused of criminal conspiracies is simple enough. As we explained in Hartley, the original purpose of the corporate entity fiction was to expand rather than shrink corporate responsibility by making a corporation answer for the negligent acts of its agents. See Hartley, 678 F.2d at 970 (explaining that “[b]y personifying a corporation, the entity [] [is] forced to answer for its negligent acts and to shoulder financial responsibility for them”); see also Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 603 (noting that “[t]he original purposes of the rule attributing agents’ acts to a corporation were to enable corporations to act, permitting the pooling of resources to achieve social benefits and, in the case of tortious acts, to require a corporation to bear the costs of its business enterprise”). “The fiction was never intended to prohibit the imposition of criminal liability by allowing a corporation or its agents to hide behind the identity of the other.” Hartley, 678 F.2d at 970. As the Fifth Circuit emphasized in Dussouy, in situations where a criminal conspiracy is alleged “the action by an incorporated collection of individuals creates the ‘group danger’ at which conspiracy liability is aimed, and the view of the corporation as a single legal actor becomes a fiction without a purpose.” Id., 660 F.2d at 603.
A claim arising under
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to--(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding ; . . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
An “official proceeding,” as referred to in
The only real question is whether the criminal conspiracy exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is somehow limited to cases in which the underlying criminal conspiracy arises under
As we have explained, the corporate entity fiction was designed to expand corporate liability by holding the corporation liable for the acts of its agents. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine shielding corporate employees and the corporation itself from unlawful conspiracy claims was a product of this fiction. However, the fiction was never intended nor used to
Moreover, application of the criminal conspiracy exception to a
Indeed, even courts that generally apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to
Simply put, we conclude that the criminal conspiracy exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies regardless of whether the criminal conspiracy arises under
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
A minority of circuits have, however, refused to apply the doctrine to certain