2 App. D.C. 461 | D.C. | 1894
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The will in the case of Richardson v. Penicks, 1 App. D. C., 261, is a very different one from this, and taking its provisions as a whole, the court concluded that the testator’s intention therein to create an estate in fee in the remainderman was sufficiently plain to authorize that construction.
The statutes generally of the States which have amended or changed the rule of the English law as it prevailed in England until the act of 1 Victoria, differ widely in their terms. Hence the cases arising under them must be considered with that in view. Some of these declare that the will must be held to convey all the real estate belonging to the testator at the time of his decease, unless it shall clearly appear by his will that he intended otherwise. Other statutes are more like the act of Congress mentioned, and some go so far as to require that the intention to pass after-acquired real estate must “clearly and manifestly appear,” or be “ clear and specific,” and the like. The construction given this class of statutes, however, has been about the same, and of a very liberal nature. All agree that the intention need not be declared in express words, and that it will be sufficient if it can be reasonably made out in the will taken as a whole. Wait v. Belding, 24 Pick., 129; Brimmer v. Sohier, 1 Cush., 118; Miss. Soc. v. Mead, 131 Ill., 338; Briggs v. Briggs, 69 Iowa, 617; Pruden v. Pruden, 14 Ohio St., 253; Paine v. Forsaith, 84 Me., 66.
In some, if not all, of these cases it will be found that the wills themselves plainly showed the testator meant his after-acquired real estate to pass. In the Illinois case the court said the “ conclusion is irresistible,” and in that from Maine it was said “ the whole will pulsates with the intention.”
We can find no such intention in the words of this will. It is very short, but not too short for the testatrix to make a specific devise of the only real estate which she then owned and of all her “belongings.” There is mo residuary devise or bequest of all her property, or of what she might have left, and the like, as was the case in the wills construed in the majority of the cases above cited.
Nor do we think that the suggestion of the second clause, to the effect that Mrs. Snyder may give the other sisters one' hundred dollars “ if she feels' like making a present,” is sufficient to show the intention of the testatrix to give to Mrs. Snyder all the residue of her estate of every kind then had or afterwards acquired. This suggestion is perfectly consistent with the bequest of all her “ belongings,” which, construed to embrace all her personal property and effects, amounted in value, as appears from the answer of Mrs. Snyder, to about nine hundred dollars.
In accordance with the foregoing views, the decree appealed from must be reversed, with costs to the appellant, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion ; and it is so ordered.