Twenty years ago the storied Rock Island Line, losing about $40 million annually, abandoned its railroad operations as part of a bankruptcy under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R.,
One of Chicago Pacific’s assets when the bankruptcy wrapped up was the Iowa Transfer Railway, which owned a railyard in Rock Island, Illinois, near the Sylvan Slough, a tributary of the Mississippi River. Four months out of bankruptcy, Chicago Pacific sold the Iowa Transfer to Heartland Rail Corporation, which leased the yard and other operating assets to Iowa Interstate Railroad. Iowa Interstate has operated that business ever since. In 1993 the Coast Guard concluded that petroleum is leaking from the railyard into the Sylvan Slough. Heartland and Iowa Interstate are cleaning up the premises and adjacent land, an expensive endeavor. Two of their neighbors, Navistar International Transportation Corp. and the Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway, blame Heartland and Iowa Interstate for pollution. They have sued under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-52, in the Central District of Illinois, demanding that Heartland and Iowa Interstate contribute toward their own cleanup costs. Heartland, Iowa Interstate, Navis-tar, and Burlington Northern all believe that much of the oil seeped into the land while the Rock Island Line was operating the yard. All four have added Maytag (as Chicago Pacific’s successor) as a third-party defendant in the Central District action, seeking contribution under Illinois law, 740 ILCS 100/2, and perhaps federal law as well (though both the complaint and the parties’ briefs in this court are silent on the legal theory underlying the demand for contribution from Maytag).
Maytag asked the Northern District of Illinois, where the Rock Island bankruptcy had been administered, to enjoin prosecution of the claim for contribution. It offered two theories: first that a request for recovery on account of pollutants deposited before 1984 is a claim in bankruptcy barred by the injunction issued when the bankruptcy was closed, and second that because the Rock Island was “liquidated” rather than “reorganized” Maytag did not inherit any of the Rock Island’s debts. See
In re Erie Lackawanna Ry.,
Disregarding our conclusion in
In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R.,
the Rock Island abandoned and liquidated its rail business more than three years prior to the consummation order. The only assets it retained were non-rail related, and which were used to create [Chicago Pacific] in an effort to maximize the ability to satisfy the claims of the Rock Island’s creditors.... Therefore, we ... [hold] that the Rock Island was liquidated, eliminating any entity which might be sued, regardless of when the claim arose.
The underpinning of this passage, and of the district court’s conclusion, is that abandonment of the rail business is the same thing as corporate liquidation. But that is untenable. Corporations change lines of business frequently without liquidating. If Maytag tomorrow were to abjure the washing-machine business to concentrate on refrigerators and microwave ovens, it would not have “liquidated” and would remain liable for debts (including deferred environmental liabilities) associated with its whole line of appliances.
Just so with the Rock Island. During bankruptcy the Rock Island quit the railroad business but retained substantial assets. The corporate entity was renamed “Chicago Pacific Corporation” at the close of the bankruptcy, and Chicago Pacific avowedly was a continuation of the original firm, rather than (say) the buyer or distributee of the Rock Island’s assets. How else could Chicago Pacific have retained the Rock Island’s substantial operating loss carryforwards? Tax attributes cannot be sold or given away; only the company that generated the losses may use them. When the bankruptcy wrapped up, accumulated tax losses were a major asset of the estate. It would have been *591 folly to throw them away, as a liquidation would have done. And there is substantial reason to doubt that § 77 of the old Bankruptcy Act even allowed liquidations; certainly they could not be accomplished under that name. See Julie A. Veach, On Considering the Public Interest in Bankruptcy: Looking to the Railroads for Answers, 72 Ind. L.J. 1211, 1221 (1997).
Liquidation in or out of bankruptcy means the end of a corporation’s existence. Liquidation may occur without closing down a line of business: a firm may sell its assets as a going concern, then distribute the proceeds to its creditors (and, if a surplus remains, to its equity holders) and dissolve. See Douglas G. Baird,
The Elements of Bankruptcy
15-16, 255-56 (rev. ed.1993). Likewise abandonment may occur without liquidation. Many a firm in bankruptcy has a positive cash flow from current operations but is unable to meet its debts — perhaps because it has made promises to creditors that prove excessive in retrospect, perhaps because one line of business has gone sour. Such debtors withdraw from the losing line of business (by selling it
en bloc,
selling it piecemeal, or abandoning it utterly) and restructure their debt, emerging with bright prospects in their remaining endeavors. That classic reorganization is exactly what Rock Island the corporation did, retaining its profitable activities and transmuting into Chicago Pacific Corporation (and then Maytag), even though the Rock Island
Line
is defunct. See
In re Penn Central Transportation Co.,
On remand the district court must consider whether Maytag, as the continuation of the Rock Island, is entitled to protection under the injunction issued in 1984. It is difficult to see why the injunction matters to either Heartland or Iowa Interstate; their recovery depends on the terms of the sale, which occurred after the end of the bankruptcy. Lines of business may be spun off with or without the possibility of deferred liability for cleanup expenses. See
PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Notes
We refer to cercla in this opinion with diffidence, because the plaintiffs in the Central District action are being coy about their legal theory. Cercla is the normal basis for contribution in environmental-cleanup cases, but the Central District complaint does not mention it, relying instead on the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which like cercla contains a contribution provision. 33 U.S.C. § 2709. But contribution under the Oil Pollution Act is available only from a person liable under some other provision of the Oil Pollution Act or another statute. If the other statute turns out to be cercla, then § 2709 adds nothing. If instead the plaintiffs argue that Maytag is liable under the Oil Pollution Act itself, then they must establish that Maytag is a “responsible party” under § 2701(32)(B), a definition that appears to be more restrictive than cerc-la’s. To simplify exposition, we assume that the demand for contribution ultimately will depend on cercla — but without locking the litigants into that statute or resolving any issue about the potential scope of recovery under the Oil Pollution Act or any other federal environmental statute, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. Ch. 82.
