42 Ga. App. 666 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1931
Lead Opinion
1. Where the manufacturer of an article, such as a piece of machinery, rvhich is built and assembled at the factory and is sold and placed on the market to be used in substantially the condition it is in when it leaves the factory, knows of and conceals a latent defect in its construction, which would render the machine dangerous to persons not in privity of contract with the manufacturer but who use the machine
2. Where it appeared from the evidence that the machine, alleged to have caused the plaintiff’s injury, was a washing machine with a wringer attached, both of which were operated by electricity, and where the wringer could be operated separately from the rest of the machine, by reason of a lever which operated against a spring on the inside of the machinery at the place where the lever was attached, and the lever, by reason of the spring, was kept in position when set by the operator, and where the alleged defect consisted in the omission of the insertion of this spring in the machine, thus leaving the lever insecure when set, and bringing about a condition whereby the vibration of the machine when set in motion, with the wringer shut off by the lever, caused the insecure lever to move and throw the wringer into operation, and where the operator’s hand, which was resting on the wringer, was caught in the roller and mashed, and where there was evidence to authorize the inference that the defect which caused the injury existed when the machine left the factory, and that the machine was inspected at the factory by the manufacturer before it was put upon the market, the inference was authorized that the manufacturer, before putting the machine upon the market, knew of the defect; and where the evidence authorized the inference that the dealer to whom the manufacturer sold the machine, and who in turn sold it to the plaintiff, had no knowledge of the defective condition of the machine, the inference was authorized that the act of the manufacturer in placing the machine upon the market with knowledge of the defective condition was negligence of the manufacturer, proximately causing the plaintiff’s injury.
3. The evidence authorized the verdict found for the plaintiff, and no error appears.
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
The evidence did not demand the inference that the dealer did in fact know of the defect; and, granting that the evidence conclusive^ established that the dealer was negligent in failing to discover the same, it was still a jury question as to whether this negligence or the negligence of the manufacturer constituted the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Hence, there is no merit in the exception to the charge upon the ground that the court should have told the jury, as a matter of law, that the negligence of the dealer in failing to discover the defects should be treated as an intervening agency, breaking the causal connection between the negligence of the manufacturer and the -injury complained of.
There is no exception upon the ground that the court failed to submit this question as an issue of fact for determination by the jury, or that the jury were not instructed that knowledge of the defects by the dealer would constitute the proximate cause of the injury.
Rehearing denied.