153 Ga. 835 | Ga. | 1922
1. That portion of the judgment of the court sustaining certain demurrers, to which there is exception, was not erroneous.
2. The court, over objection, permitted a witness to testify as follows: “ Dr. Mays said he was going to marry. He said he wanted a wife in his old age. I told him that I thought it would be a good thing if he could find a lady who would make him a companion in his old age. He said he reckoned he would get married, but that he ’did not know any one who would marry him except for what he had; he said that he expected to take care of his child, that he was the only one he had, was his only relative in that relation, and he expected to take care of him, that nobody should come between him and his child.” The ground of objection was' that the testimony was “ irrelevant and immaterial, and that it appeared that the declaration was made quite awhile before his marriage” (about a year previous to the marriage). Held, that the admission of this evidence over the objection was error. Hollis v. Sales,
3. The court permitted O. M. Duke to testify that “ Dr. Mays told him that he was going to deed John Billie [the defendant] all liis lands.” The objection made at the time was that the statement was made to the witness as an attorney at law in contemplation of employment, it appearing from the evidence that Mr. Duke was an attorney at law and that Dr. Mays first asked him which was best — a will or a deed, and after getting his opinion on this question the statement above quoted was made. In a note to this ground of the motion the court says: “ The witness further testified, ‘ Dr. Mays did not employ me nor did he say anything about having me as his lawyer. He did not pay me anything for my advice. He said nothing about me preparing any papers or anything for him.’” Held, that in view of the note of the court the admission of this evidence was not error.
4. In the sixth and seventh grounds of the motion for a new trial movant complains that the court erred in permitting several witnesses to testify, in substance, that they knew the general character of the defendant, and that it was good. . The objection made at the time was that such evidence was irrelevant and immaterial, and that “ evidence as to character is not admissible in civil cases like this one.” Held, that the admission of this evidence, in view of the charge made against the defendant, was not error. Civil Code (1910), § 5745; McNabb v. Lockhart, 18 Ga. 495; German American Mutual Life Association v. Farley, 102 Ga. 720 (5), 744 (29 S. E. 615).
5. Movant complains that the court allowed counsel for the plaintiff to read to the jury from the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Shropshire v. State, 81 Ga. 589, 593 (8 S. E. 450). While counsel for the defendant was addressing the jury he commenced to read from said opinion to the jury, when plaintiff’s counsel objected on the ground that it was contrary to law and illegal for counsel to read cases from the reports of the appellate courts to the jury in civil cases. The court overruled the objection, and stated that counsel might read the case as a part of his comment, and not as a rule of law. Held: It has been frequently ruled that on the trial of civil cases decisions of this court, and especially comments upon the facts of cases, should not be read by counsel to the jury. Hudson v. Hudson, 90 Ga. 581 (3), 586 (16 S. E. 349); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Hardin, 114 Ga. 548 (40 S. E. 738). It does not appear that any of the facts of the Shropshire case were read to the jury. This ruling of the trial, court will not require the grant of a new trial. It it better practice, however, for trial courts not to permit counsel to infringe this rule.
6. As there is to be another trial, no ruling is made as to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Judgment reversed.