54 A. 106 | Md. | 1903
Lead Opinion
On June 18th, 1901, the plaintiffs, dealers in coal, entered into a written agreement with the defendant to supply certain departments of the City Government, including the School Board, with coal up to April 15th, 1902, to be delivered at such times, and in such manner as provided in specifications forming part of the agreement. This contract has been complied with by both parties except as to the coal required for the School Board. The approximate quantity required for the School Board, as stated in the blue print attached to the specifications, was 6290 tons, of which two-thirds was to be delivered during July and August, and one-third as needed; but the School Board reserved the right to order less than the estimated quantity, if less was needed.
The plaintiffs made the first delivery July 16th, 1901, and *547 continued to make deliveries up to August 29th, 1901, aggregating 2101 tons, when they refused to make further deliveries, alleging that the defendant had broken the contract by failing to make payment as provided, and had thereby discharged the plaintiffs from further liability under the contract, and this suit was brought October 28th, 1901, to recover for the coal delivered amounting to $11,062.35. The defendant admitted the correctness of the statement of coal delivered, and that it was indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of $5,326.42, but filed a plea of set off alleging that the plaintiffs had broken the contract by refusing to make further deliveries, and that they were indebted to defendant in the sum of $5,735.93 "for actual damage caused by the failure of the plaintiffs to fulfill and carry out said contract, as shown by the statement attached to this plea, and prayed to be taken as a part thereof." Issues were properly joined on the pleadings, and the case went to trial before JUDGE DENNIS sitting as a jury. The amount admitted to be due was paid before the actual trial, and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs for $6,175.46, being the full amount claimed after deducting the payment made. The only exception taken was to the rulings upon the prayers, and the only question thus presented is whether the defendant is entitled to the set off claimed.
The provisions of the contract material to the consideration of the case are as follows:
Payments. "Payments will be made once a month by each department for all the coal delivered to that department by the contractor during the previous month, and will be made on the basis of what the coal shows on analysis." Provision is made for taking samples of coal for analysis from each shipment made to any department during the month. "At the end of the month all the samples thus accumulated will be thoronghly mixed, and a quart preserving jar will be filled with the mixture, labelled and sent to the City Chemist. The City Chemist will, at the end of each month, thoroughly mix the contents of all these jars, and from that mixture take three quart jars for analysis, and will send to each department the *548 result of his analysis of any one of these three jars, and the department will then adjust the contractors bill, adding or deducting a given percentage of gain or loss upon given percentages of ash shown in the coal."
Rejections. "If the analysis shows that the shipments of coal made by any contractor during the month, do not come within the specifications, * * * then when the next shipment made by the contractor, of the same class of coal is received, an analysis will be made of a sample of this coal at once, and if that analysis shows that the coal does not come within the specifications, that shipment will be rejected, and must be removed at once at the contractor's expense."
Water Engineer to interpret contract. "The contractors agree that the Water Engineer is to interpret the terms and conditions of this agreement, and the specifications accompanying; and in event of any dispute as to the meaning of any of the provisions and clauses of same, the decision of the Water Engineer is to be final."
The testimony in the case may be summarized thus:
Lewis W. Schaub, one of the plaintiffs, testified that after the first month's delivery, he took a statement to Mr. Owens, Supervisor of School Buildings, who had the matter in charge, and who went over the bill with him and corrected it; that he told Mr. Owens he would like to have the money, as the contract was taken at a low figure, and they needed the money, and that Mr. Owens told him they should have it as soon as possible. That they continued delivering through August, and that during that month he went to Mr. Owens more than once, and told him they must have the money, as their shippers had made an agreement with them according to their own specifications with the defendant, and if they did not pay the shippers accordingly, they would not ship any more coal. That they went again to urge payment, and were told the analysis had not been sent in, and that he replied, "you have to look out for that yourself; we have only to deliver the coal." That they went again in September and were told there was nothing for them, and that he then went to see the shippers who replied, *549 "we can't put up with that we must have money;" whereupon on September 3rd, they sent to the School Board the letter of that date set out in the evidence, stating that both Mr. Owens and Mr. McGill had told them they were unable to pay them — because no analysis had been received from the City Chemist, and that they would not be paid until such analysis was received, also stating that they had called on Prof. Lehman, the City Chemist, in reference to the matter, and that he told them that with an extra force, he could not furnish the analysis required by the School Board by Christmas; that it was apparent the defendant was unable to keep its part of the agreement, and having failed to do so, they must refuse to ship it any more coal. This witness further testified that he told Mr. Quick, the Water Engineer, that they had trouble about the payment and needed money, and that he said they would do the best they could, but could not say he asked Mr. Quick whether they had to wait for payment until an analysis was made; also that his brother, Francis J. Schaub, was with him when he talked with Mr. Quick, and that his brother did most of the talking at that time. Francis J. Schaub testifying for the plaintiffs, said he was a member of the bar, and attorney for the plaintiffs, and confirmed Lewis W. Schaub in detail. He said the plaintiffs understood that defendant had the month of August to make the analysis for July, and they so told Mr. Owens, when they presented the July bill, but asked him to hurry Prof. Lehman up, and he said he would; also that he went to see Prof. Lehman who said he would do the best he could, but that the way the School Board wanted the analysis he could not get them through by Christmas even with six assistants; also that he had seen Mr. Quick and asked him if he could not hurry it up, and he said he had nothing to do with it; that after the letter of September 3rd, there was a meeting at the Mayor's office when Mr. Quick and Mr. Owens were present, and Mayor Hayes, and an effort was made to arrange for delivering the residue of the coal under the contract, and he agreed to this for the plaintiffs if defendant would take the coal by the manifest weight, and Mayor Hayes thought *550 this was reasonable, but Mr. Owens thought this would not be just to the other dealers, and no agreement was reached. He also said that Mr. Owens phoned him after this interview to ship the coal, and he went to see Gov. Whyte about it, and Gov. Whyte said, "get an order in writing before delivering any more coal. If you ship that coal on Mr. Owens say so it will get you in trouble;" that Mr. Owens at his request, on the 7th of September, phoned him the analysis, but said nothing about payment, and that if he had, they would have been glad to accept it.
Prof. Lehman who also testified for the plaintiffs, confirmed the testimony of the two Schaubs. He says that he furnished no analysis to the School Board until September 6th; that he was called sometime in September to the Mayor's office, by the Mayor himself, to explain why there was delay in the coal analysis, and subsequently on the same day, received instructions how to furnish the analysis to the School Board, and they were then furnished to Mr. Owens on September 6th, but before that, he was not informed that analysis in detail were not required, and understood that a separate analysis was required from every school; that before receiving the instructions in September he did tell the plaintiffs he could not furnish the analysis with the force at his command, before Christmas, but after receiving Mr. Owens' instructions on the day of the meeting at the Mayor's office he could easily furnish them in the required time of one month; that he was not furnished with a copy of this contract until after September 6th, and only received a lot of samples without any directions as to how they were to be treated, and that he wrote Mr. Schaub August 2d 1901, no analysis would be made until all the coal from one district was furnished, and then it would be for all the business of that district. He said on cross-examination that he was never directed to analyze the July coal without waiting for the August coal, though the plaintiffs told him they were depending upon the analysis for their payment, and were anxious to have the analysis made before August 31st, as they feared trouble with their shippers if they did not *551 receive payment from the School Board. Robert L. Windsor, a clerk for Lynah Read, from whom plaintiffs purchased their coal, testified for plaintiffs, that the specifications furnished by the defendant with the contract in this case were shown to Lynah Read, and were the basis of their contract with plaintiffs as to payments; that is, all coal was to be settled for in the month succeeding that in which it was shipped. This closed plaintiff's case, and Benjamin B. Owens was the first witness for defendant.
His testimony did not materially contradict any of the plaintiff's testimony. He admitted that about August 1st the plaintiffs brought in the bill for July deliveries which was adjusted, and he told them that as soon as he got the analysis the bill would be paid; that they continued delivering through August, and frequently urged payment for July, and his reply always was that as soon as the analysis was received, payment would be made; that after August 29th, they stopped deliveries without telling why, and that they had not yet told why, though he admitted receipt from the School Board of plaintiffs' letter of September 3rd. He also said that the plaintiffs had only delivered about 2,000 out of 6,000 tons, though the contract required the delivery of two-thirds during July and August, but he admitted the correctness of plaintiff's statement, that as no coal was ordered until July 16th, they were given until September 16th to furnish the two-thirds, as an offset to the two weeks in July. He also admitted that he gave no instructions to Prof. Lehman as to the method of analysis prior to the meeting in the Mayor's office, and added that he had never since given any such instructions, and that Prof. Lehman was mistaken in his testimony on this point. He also proved the purchase of coal from other parties for the School Board after plaintiffs ceased delivering, and that the increased cost was the amount claimed by way of a set off.
Alfred M. Quick for defendant then testified that he was the Water Engineer, that the plaintiffs did complain to him of inconvenience to them by the delay in the analysis, but that they did not apply to him for any interpretation of the contract. *552 Upon this testimony the prayers were offered which will be set out by the Reporter in the statement of the case.
The contention of the plaintiffs is that the monthly payments provided for, were meant and understood by the parties to be of the essence of the contract, and, the defendant having failed to fulfill this stipulation, that the plaintiff had a right to put an end to the contract. The contention of the defendant is, that the analysis of the City Chemist is an absolute condition precedent to payment, and that the failure of the chemist to make the analysis within the time limited for payment, enlarged the time for payment; and also that the question whether the city was in default by reason of non-payment by September 1st, for the July deliveries, was a question to be submitted to and determined by the City Engineer; and consequently that the plaintiffs had no right to put an end to the contract, and defendant was entitled to set off damages arising from its breach.
We are of opinion that the contention of the plaintiffs is correct, and that neither position of the defendant can be maintained. We cannot distinguish this case from that ofMcGrath v. Gegner,
In the case before us, a careful examination of the contract, we think will leave no question as to the intention of the parties, and their conduct will confirm the construction placed upon the contract. It is not reasonable to suppose that the plaintiffs would enter into a contract, the fulfillment of which on their part, would require the use of so large an amount of money without some corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to reimburse them during the progress of the fulfillment. In order to provide for payments to be made by them, it was essential that they should know when they could demand payments to be made to them, and accordingly, the proof shows that they bound themselves to pay their shippers, Lynah Read, in the same manner that the city was bound to them. It is thus made clear that they attached importance and value to this stipulation for time of payment, as observed in Bowes v.Shand, 2 Appeal cases, 455.
Again, we think it is plain that the parties contemplated anearly monthly analysis, in order to prevent the hardship upon the plaintiffs of full delivery for a succeeding month, with the possibility of its rejection and consequent removal at their expense, for it is expressly provided that if the analysis for any month shows that the coal does not conform to the specifications, *554
that when the next shipment is received, an analysis will be made at once, and if that analysis shows the coal does not conform to the specifications, that shipment will be rejected and must be removed at the contractor's expense. For these, and other reasons of like character, we do not think the analysis can be regarded as an absolute condition precedent to payment, and we find nothing in the cases of Gill and McMahon v. Vogeler,
It follows from what we have said, that the plaintiffs' first prayer which embraces and clearly states all the facts necessary to warrant a verdict in their favor upon the principle announced and adopted in McGrath v. Gegner, was correctly granted, and that the defendants' first and fourth prayers, which required the liability of defendant to be submitted to the Water Engineer, were properly rejected.
Defendants' second prayer was properly rejected, because it declared analysis of the coal to be a condition precedent to payment, and also because it made plaintiffs right to recover depend upon the finding that the analysis was delayed for the purpose of delaying payment, whereas the failure to make analysis within the prescribed time was sufficient, without regard to the reason of the failure.
In like manner, defendants' third prayer was properly rejected, because the contract in prescribing a specific period for making analysis, excludes any question of due diligence. *555
The fifth prayer of defendant was defective in submitting to the Court sitting as a jury the question whether the defendants failure to perform its contract, if found as a fact, was sufficient in law to justify the plaintiffs in rescinding the contract on their part.
Finding no error in the rulings of the learned Judge, the judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed with costs above and below.
(Decided February 11th, 1903.)
Dissenting Opinion
I respectfully dissent from the views of the majority of the Court upon a vital point in this case, and will briefly state my reasons therefor. The facts and the evidence in the case are sufficiently stated in the majority opinion to make it unnecessary to do more here than to refer to such part of the evidence as will make intelligible the grounds of my dissent. The pleadings in the case put in issue the right of the appellant to recoup from the claim of the appellees, in suit, damages sustained by the appellant by reason of the refusal of the appellees to carry out the contract which the appellees offered in evidence as the basis of suit.
The only ruling of the Court below which the record brings up for review is that upon the prayers submitted by the respective parties. The prayer which was offered by the appellees and granted by the Court asserted the proposition that if the Court (which was sitting as a jury) should find that this contract was entered into between the parties to the suit, and the other facts therein set out and should then further find that "the City Chemist did not make the analysis of the coal furnished to the School Board during the month of July, 1901, until September 6th, 1901, its verdict must be for the plaintiffs (appellees) for the amount of coal bills for the months of July and August yet remaining due and unpaid to the plaintiffs by the defendant, together with interest in the discretion of the Court on the amount so found to be due and unpaid from October 1st, 1901." *556
The nature of the evidence offered by the appellees under the pleadings and this instruction based thereon, in effect make this case a suit upon the contract by the appellees in which they are not confined to a recovery of such damages as they might be able to show they had sustained from a breach of the contract without fault on their part; but are enabled to treat the contract as not existing, as respects the appellant and its rights thereunder; and to secure to themselves all the fruits thereof, as far as it had been performed, without requiring them to show that they had performed or were ready, able and willing to perform the contract in its several requirements on their part. This ignores important evidence in the case affecting the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. The gravamen of the instruction granted at the instance of the appellees and the ground upon which they based their rescission of the contract consisted in the failure of the appellant to pay "for the coal by them furnished" to the appellant for account of the School Board "during the month of July, 1901, at any time in the month of August, 1901, and up to and until September 3rd, 1901."
The contract provided that payments should be "made once a month by each department for all coal delivered to that department by the contractor during the previous month," and should "be made on the basis of what the coal" showed "on analysis." The provision for an analysis of the coal was an important one to the city — not so much in fixing the exact price of coal delivered, but in protecting the city against having supplied to it coal of inferior quality. The city of course could only act through its agents and no agent would have been justified in making payment for coal delivered until furnished with the analysis stipulated for in the contract. The appellees of course knew this or must be held to have known it. It was the duty of the city, however, to have the analysis in every case furnished within reasonable time and so that payments could be made for coal in accordance with the stipulation in the contract in that regard. Now, as to the analysis of the coal here in question the testimony shows that the City *557 Chemist in answer to a letter addressed to him by the appellees wrote them on the second of August, 1901, "it will be sometime before the coal delivered to the schools will be ready. There will only be one analysis for each district from each shipper, and the samples which I now have will be kept until all the coal to the schools is delivered, when I shall mix the samples and furnish the School Board with the analysis. I will consider it a favor if you will kindly let me know when all the coal which you are delivering to the several schools under your contract, has been delivered."
The chemist, as a witness, testified that he had had a misconception as to how the analysis for this coal was to be made but that during August he learned from the proper city officials how it was to be made; that he had "a number" of visits from the appellees or one of them during August to inquire about the analysis and there was no complaint "about any delay" on his part "in furnishing the analysis;" that he understood, and thought it was understood "by all hands concerned" that "only one analysis should be made for the summer of 1901," (referring of course to the analysis of the coal for the School Board); that he had an analysis ready by September 6th, 1901; and that it took three or four days to make it as he had a good many analyses from the other departments, and they had to take their turn. A brother of the appellees, an attorney, who represented them in their dealings with the city, as shown by his own and other evidence, testified as follows: "The July payment under the contract which he had with the Mayor and City Council under date June, 1901, we did not consider due until the first of September following." There is other testimony that might be adverted to in this connection; but what has been noticed is sufficient, with the further fact that after the letter of the 2nd of August, 1901, the appellees went on delivering coal under the contract, to show that they waived such right as they may have had to rescind the contract because of the analysis not being furnished in August. They treated the contract as still in force, holding the appellant bound by all the terms thereof and apparently *558
intending on their part to continue its performance, without any notice of an intention to rescind or any act indicating such intention until September 3rd, 1901. The present suit was brought, and the recovery, here sought, was based, on the assumption of the contract being a subsisting one up to that date. The appellant was entitled to have these facts submitted to the trying tribunal and to the legal effect to flow from them if they should be found. Bollman v. Burt,
On the 3rd of September, 1901, upon the theory of a waiver by the appellees of an analysis of coal during August, there were two reasons why the appellees were not entitled to rescind the contract. To entitle them to call upon the appellant for performance on its part on the penalty of a rescission of the contract, in case of a neglect of strict performance, it was incumbent on them to show that they had fully complied with the agreement on their part, Waggaman v. Nutt,
When on the 3rd of September, 1901, the appellees attempted to rescind the contract instead of having delivered two-thirds of the coal as required they had by their own showing delivered less than one-third. How could they complain of the absence of an analysis upon which payment for the coal *559
was to be based when they had failed to deliver the coal of which the contract contemplated the analysis was to be made? There is no excuse attempted to be shown for non-performance of the contract on their part by the appellees other than that having reference to the absence of an analysis of the July delivery of coal which has already been considered. But even if there had been performance by the appellees of the stipulation of the contract as to the quantity of coal to be delivered there would still have been no sufficient legal justification for a rescinding of the contract on the third of September, 1901. No definite, fixed day was prescribed in the contract on or before which the analysis should be made ready. The obligation imposed in this regard therefore upon the appellant was to have it ready in a reasonable time subject of course to the provision in the contract as to making payments for coal. What is a reasonable time is a question of law for the Court. 2 Parson's on Cont.,
661; Ragan v. Gaither, 11 Gill John, 472; Burroughs v.Langley,
The proof in the case shows that an analysis of the coal in question was ready within one week from the end of August and the appellees were so notified. From what appears in evidence, this was not an unreasonable delay of the analysis of the quantity of coal that was to be made the subject of analysis. The instructions granted by the trial Court at the instance of the appellees, in ignoring the facts and considerations pertaining to a waiver of analysis of coal delivered in July and to the right of the appellees to rescind the contract on the 3rd of September, 1901, shut out the defense of the appellant raised by its third plea and which there was evidence tending to support. In this, in my judgment, there was error. I agree with the majority opinion as to the rulings made upon the prayers proposed by the appellant.
(Filed February 11th, 1903.) *560