12 A.2d 261 | Md. | 1940
Lead Opinion
These four cases, argued together, present questions *105 of constitutionality, and in the alternative, of the proper construction and application of section 183 of article 56 of the Code, as enacted by the Acts of 1939, chapter 744, requiring payment of personal taxes of residents of Baltimore City as a prerequisite to registration of motor vehicles, and the issue of registration markers for them. The first three appeals are from decisions that the statute is unconstitutional because of a deficient title, and from the consequent awards of writs of mandamus to compel registration and issue of markers applied for, without exaction of taxes demanded; and the fourth appeal is from a declaratory judgment upholding the constitutionality of the statute, determining that the taxes become due and owing from and after January 1st of the year for which they are levied, and requiring the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to refuse registration for the year 1940 unless the taxes for that year have been previously paid.
Motor vehicles in Maryland are licensed from March 31st of one calendar year to March 31st of the next; and registration and the issue of number plates for each vehicle owned on that date must be procured on or before then, for continued operation without interruption. And the system for imposition and collection of taxes on personal property in Baltimore City provides for an assessment to owners on October 1st, and an ordinance making the levy in the following November. "The taxes levied under said ordinance in the month of November in each year shall be the taxes to be collected for the fiscal year next ensuing after the said month of November, and shall be due and may be paid to the City Collector on or after the first day of January next ensuing. The taxes included in said levy on real estate or chattels real and on all forms of personal property * * * shall be in arrears on the first day of July next ensuing the date of their levy, and the taxes on all forms of property after they become in arrears as aforesaid shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum." Baltimore City Charter, sec. 51. And see Code (1935 *106 Suppl.), art. 81, sec. 48. A discount of one per cent. is allowed on payments made in January and for later payments in diminishing percentages, until one-quarter of one per cent. is allowed for payments in May, and collection may be enforced after July 1st.
The Act of 1939, chapter 744, is intended to supersede statutes of similar requirements. By section 183 of article 56 of the Code, as it stood before 1939, under the Acts of 1927, chapter 707, and 1929, chapter 407, the Commissioner was directed to refuse to issue any plate or marker, certificate of registration or title, "unless all taxes due and in arrears on the motor vehicle * * * have been paid provided each motor vehicle is separately assessed apart from the assessment of any other motor vehicle or kind or class of assessable property and provided the tax to be levied on such motor vehicle is permitted except in Baltimore City to be paid separate and apart from the payment of all other taxes." It was made mandatory upon County Commissioners to provide for separate assessments and separate tax bills. Sections with similar requirements were numbered as section 184, applying to Queen Anne's County, 184A, to Anne Arundel County, 184B, to nineteen cities or towns in various parts of the state, and 184C, to cities and towns in Allegany County. In all these sections the payments required to be made as prerequisities to registration were those of taxes "due and in arrears." The statute of 1939, chapter 744, by its terms repeals and re-enacts section 183 with amendments, and repeals without re-enacting sections 184 to 184C, but enacting in the place of all of them a new section 184. The phraseology of the new section 183 is changed in only one respect, namely, taxes "due and owing" are required to be paid, instead of taxes "due and in arrears;" and the same change is made in the new section 184. The date of effectiveness of the statute is necessarily brought forward.
The first question argued, and the only one raised in the last appeal of the four, is whether the two expressions, "due and owing," and "due and in arrears," are to be *107 given the same meaning, so that the taxes required to be paid before registration are still those which have become due and in arrears on July 1st, and an applicant for the registration in March would still be entitled to it if he had paid his taxes for the previous year, or whether "due and owing" is the equivalent of due and payable under the Charter and the Code, and marks a change in the law. The judges below agreed that the adoption of "due and owing" in the amended sections made such a change; that taxes for the current calendar year are due and owing from and after January 1st, and by the terms of the statute must now be paid before registration for 1940. And this court agrees.
The argument to the contrary is, principally, that while, as the Charter has expressly enacted, the taxes are due from and after January 1st, they cannot be considered as owing until interest begins to run, and they are enforceable under the law, that is, on July 1st. In other words, it is that the taxes are not owing until payment is required rather than optional. The word "due" alone seems to the court to import a present obligation here. "Statutes generally fix the time when taxes become due and also the time when they become delinquent."Cooley, Taxation, sec. 1246. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the words "due and owing" in the Bankruptcy Act rendered taxes assessed prior to an adjudication entitled to a preference, although they were not collectible until after the adjudication. New Jersey v. Anderson,
An owner of property in the city on October 1st holds it from that time subject to the exaction of a proportionate contribution to the expenses of government during the next calendar year. "The liability for taxes is an incident to property, and essential to the support of the government." Bonaparte v. State,
Liens for taxes on real property date from the time of levy. Code, art. 81, sec. 56. The provision that when, after assessment of it, personal property is removed at any time before collection of the tax on it, the collector may pursue it, assumes a liability for the taxes from the time of assessment. Code, art. 81, sec. 69. And the periods of limitations on collection of county and city taxes date from the levy, or the time the taxes become due. Code Supp. art. 81, secs. 93 and 151. All these provisions seem to suppose an obligation from and after the levy, or the time when, as the Charter section declares, the taxes on all kinds of property are due and may be paid. And the same conception seems to find expression in section 48 of article 81 of the Code, enacted in 1929, chapter 226, and 1931, chapter 500, providing that state taxes, generally payable on and after the first day of January of the year for which they are levied, shall, in counties or cities which have elected to take the first *110 day of January as the date of finality in assessments, "be due and payable on and after the first day of April of such calendar year, and shall be overdue and in arrears on the first day of the succeeding October," after which they shall bear interest until paid. If not paid when "due and payable," then on the specified date they become overdue. And an overdue payment ordinarily means one on an obligation previously accrued.
In the last of the four cases appealed, that of Elgin,Commissioner, v. Mayor City Council, the trial court, as stated, held the expression "due and owing" to refer to January 1st as the date of the obligation, and that payment must be made on or before March 31st, 1940, of taxes for that year; and as this court concurs in that conclusion the judgment must be affirmed.
The limit of time for the payment having thus been advanced by the provisions of the new section 183, and a similar change having been made by the new section 184, does the title of the enactment, which does not specifically mention the change, comply with the constitutional requirement that "every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title." Const. art. 3, sec. 29. The title is: "An Act to repeal and re-enact with amendments Section 183 of Article 56 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1935 Supplement), title `Licenses,' sub-title `Motor Vehicles,' sub-heading `Fees for Registration of Motor Vehicles,' to repeal Sections 184 to 184C of said Article, Section 184B having been amended by Chapters 85 and 102 of the Acts of 1936 (Special Session) and Chapters 159, 217 and 378 of the Acts of 1937, and to enact in lieu thereof a new section to be known as Section 184, for the purpose of eliminating duplicate provisions and consolidating the laws providing for the payment of taxes levied upon motor vehicles in Baltimore City and the several Counties and in certain incorporated towns of the State before markers, certificates of registration, or titles for motor *111 vehicles may be issued, and including certain other incorporated towns within the provisions of said sections."
The inquiry must be confined to the sufficiency of this title for enactment of section 183, from which the suits arise, for if it should be sufficient for enactment of that section, it could not be objected to in these suits, even if it should be insufficient for the remaining section, 184. Worcester CountyCommrs. v. School Commissioners,
It is, in the first place, questionable whether the latter part of the title refers to section 183; and if it does, and that section, too, is to be considered amended to produce conformity with section 184, for the sake of a harmonious system within the state, the amendment made seems to this court a detail of the process of which the title gives a sufficient description, according to previous decisions of the court. Ruehl v. State,
The Constitution requires only that the subject of the statute be described in its title, not that every change under that subject be described. The title now in question does announce that the enactment deals with motor vehicle licenses, and with the laws providing for the payment of taxes on motor vehicles before markers, certificates of registration or titles for them may be issued, and that duplicate provisions are to be eliminated, and *112
the laws consolidated, and announces that this is to be done with amendments of the previous laws. Such a broad statement, in the opinion of the court, is sufficient to give warning of such a change as that by the adoption of a new uniform date for the payment of the taxes. It does not appear so restrictive of the whole title and misleading in that respect as to justify holding that the practical purpose of the Constitution is evaded. Brownev. Baltimore,
Two further objections on constitutional grounds are made. It was found by the court below that it had been the practice of city officials in recent years to assess taxes on motor vehicles owned by individuals separate and apart from those on their other personal property, and receive payment of the taxes on them separately, and it is objected that this is not done with respect to taxes of corporations, and that there is a resulting discrimination against the individual owners because to them alone section 183 applies. But apart from any other answers, it is sufficient to point out that legislative permission to receive the separate payments from any owners is expressly denied to Baltimore City, and the objection to it, when made, could not be leveled against the statute. The law forbids the practice complained of, and the objection is against a mistaken, unauthorized, official practice. The objection is not well founded.
A still further objection made on constitutional grounds is that the requirement of payment of the taxes on all personal property of former owners, including those on the vehicles, deprives the present owners of their property without due process of law. This objection is answered to an extent by the discussion in Grossfeld v. Baughman,
On the first of the four appeals, in the case of Mayor and City Council v. Perrin, the only question has been that of the constitutional sufficiency of the title of the *114 statute, if the change in the law discussed has been made; and as the conclusion of this court, differing from that of the court below, is that the title should be held sufficient, the order for the writ of mandamus in that case must be reversed.
The appeals in the cases of the Talbott Motor Company, and Redmond have raised questions of construction and application of the statute if constitutional.
The Talbott Motor Company, on December 13th, 1939, bought a motor vehicle from a Dr. John N. Clift, of Baltimore City, after the car had been assessed to Dr. Clift for taxation for the year 1940. An application for a new certificate of title was refused by the Commissioner because Dr. Clift had not paid the tax on the car for 1940, and had not paid taxes on his other personal property, such as household furniture, for the year 1939. Dr. Clift had paid the tax on the car for 1939, without paying his other personal taxes, as the car had been assessed separately. A writ of mandamus was issued to compel the new registration notwithstanding these facts. Although the statute denies to the city permission to receive the separate payment, the whole expressed object of the law is that taxes on motor vehicles shall be paid, and if actually paid on the one item, there would seem to be no reason for holding them unpaid to that extent. Therefore, we conclude that a second payment of taxes on the car for 1939 could not be required. But the taxes for 1940 must be shown to have been paid, or must now be paid, as a condition to the registration, even though included in the taxes on all Dr. Clift's personal property. The hardship on the present applicant should have been guarded against at the time of the purchase from Dr. Clift. Because of the failure to show payment of the 1940 taxes then, the court concludes that the order for the writ of mandamus to the Commissioner was erroneously issued in this second case, and must be reversed.
Redmond and wife, appellees on the third appeal, after January 1st, 1940, purchased a car from a dealer who, in turn, had purchased it from a taxable individual owner *115 in the city before that date, but after October 1st, when the assessment was made up. The car had been separately assessed to the former individual owner, and he had paid the taxes on it for the year 1940, and earlier years, but had not paid his taxes on his household furniture for 1939 or 1940; and a new registration was refused Redmond and wife because of that first owner's failure to pay those other taxes. What has been said in the case of the Talbott Motor Company's appeal answers the question raised. The whole expressed object of the statute, the payment of the taxes on the car, rightly or wrongly, had been accomplished, and there would be no justification for requiring payment of the former owner's taxes on his other personal property now. The writ of mandamus was therefore properly issued in this case, and the order for it must be affirmed.
No. 34 — Order in Mayor City Council v. Perrin reversed,with costs.
No. 35 — Order in Same v. Talbott Motor Co. reversed, withcosts.
No. 36 — Order in Same v. Redmond affirmed, with costs.
No. 37 — Judgment in Elgin v. Mayor and City Council affirmed,with costs.
Dissenting Opinion
Measured by its effect on the parties to the record, the decision of these cases is of little importance. Measured by the principles involved it is quite important. That the Baltimore City automobile owner must pay taxes on all his assessable property which are payable, but not in arrears, before he can lawfully operate his automobile on the public highways of the state, may be inconvenient to him but is not of vital importance, since he must in any event pay them some time. But whether he is to be deprived of the protection of the Constitution of the State is important, not only to him, but to all other citizens of the state, for if it does not protect him, then it protects nobody and is nothing more than a rhetorical admonition. So the question here is not so much how these cases are to be decided as what is to be done with the Constitution.
The particular question is presented by an attack on the validity of chapter 744 of the Acts of 1939, as construed by the administrative officials of Baltimore City. As the law stood prior to that act, an automobile owner residing in Baltimore City could neither sell nor operate *120 it in this state until he had paid all taxes owed by him which were due "and in arrears." An automobile owner residing in any other part of the State could sell his car and operate it if there were no taxes due and in arrears on the particular automobile.
That law was found in section 183 of article 56 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1935 Supplement), title "Licenses," sub-title "Motor Vehicles," sub-heading "Fees for Registration of Motor Vehicles," sections 184 to 184C of said article, section 184B having been amended by chapters 85 and 102 of the Acts of 1936 (Special Session) and chapters 159, 217 and 378 of the Acts of 1937. The purpose of chapter 744, as set forth in its title, was "to repeal and re-enact with amendments Section 183 of Article 56 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1935 Supplement), title `Licenses,' sub-title `Motor Vehicles,' sub-heading, `Fees for Registration of Motor Vehicles,' to repeal Sections 184 to 184C of said Article, Section 184B having been amended by Chapters 85 and 102 of the Acts of 1936 (Special Session) and Chapters 159, 217 and 378 of the Acts of 1937, and to enact in lieu thereof a new section to be known as Section 184, for the purpose of eliminating duplicate provisions and consolidating the laws providing for the payment of taxes levied upon motor vehicles in Baltimore City and the several Counties and in certain incorporated towns of the State before markers, certificates of registration, or titles for motor vehicles may be issued, and including certain other incorporated towns within the provisions of said sections." Section 183, article 56, Code, as amended by chapter 407 of the Acts of 1929, read: "The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is hereby authorized and directed to refuse to issue or transfer any plate or marker, certificate of registration or title for any motor vehicle unless all taxes due and in arrears on the motor vehicle described in the certificate of registration or title so to be issued or transferred have been paid provided each motor vehicle is separately assessed apart from the assessment on any other motor vehicle or kind or class of assessable *121 property and provided the tax to be levied on such motor vehicle is permitted except in Baltimore City to be paid separate and apart from the payment of all other taxes. And it shall be mandatory upon the County Commissioners to provide for separate assessments and separate tax bills. * * *" Chapter 744 of the Acts of 1939 substituted for the words "due and in arrears," appearing in the first sentence of section 183, article 56, Code 1935, the words "due and owing," and for the last sentence of that section it substituted the following: "This section shall apply only in the case of taxes becoming due and owing in the year 1939 and thereafter."
Section 184, article 56, Code (1935), applicable only to Queen Anne's County, directed that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles should issue no plate, marker nor certificate of registration or transfer of any motor vehicle unless "he is satisfied that all taxes due and in arrears thereon have been paid." Section 184C extended the provisions of 183 to incorporated towns in Allegany County. Section 184B, as finally amended by chapter 378 of the Acts of 1937, directed the Commissioner to refuse to issue such markers or certificates "for any motor vehicles owned by a resident of the City of Hagerstown, Funkstown, Hancock, Betterton, Chestertown, Rock Hall, Oakland, Brunswick, City of Frederick, Emmitsburg, Elkton, Federalsburg, Galena, Mountain Lake Park, Cambridge, East New Market, Easton, Oxford or St. Michaels, unless he is satisfied that all municipal taxes due and in arrears on the motor vehicles described in the certificate of registration or title so to be issued or transferred, have been paid, provided each motor vehicle is separately assessed apart from the assessment on any other motor vehicle or kind or class of assessable property, and provided the tax to be levied on such motor vehicle is permitted to be paid separate and apart from the payment of all other taxes, and provided this section shall apply only in case of taxes becoming due and in arrears under the levy of 1937 and thereafter." Section 184, article 56, Code, as amended by chapter 744, Acts of 1939, extended the list of municipalities *122 to which the acts should apply as follows: "Brentwood, Hampstead, Betterton, Chestertown, Rock Hall, Oakland, Brunswick, City of Frederick, Emmitsburg, East New Market, Easton, Oxford, St. Michaels, Elkton, Mountain Lake Park, Federalsburg or Galena, or by a resident of any incorporated town or city in Allegany, Carroll, Dorchester, Prince George's or Washington Counties," and then added this new matter: "Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed to prohibit a registered motor vehicle dealer from transferring, assigning or reassigning an assignment of title to any motor vehicle legally repossessed, or taken in trade by said dealer as a partial payment on the purchase of another motor vehicle and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall execute all such applications for transfer, assignment or reassignment of assignment of titles made by a registered motor vehicle dealer provided said dealer has given to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles proper notice of the receipt of said vehicles as required by Section 180 of this Article when said applications are submitted upon proper forms furnished by the Commissioner."
The "purpose" of chapter 744, Acts of 1939, declared in its title, was the elimination of "duplicate provisions and consolidating the laws providing for the payment of taxes" levied "upon motor vehicles" in Baltimore City, the counties of the State, and in certain incorporated towns of the State.
What the Act actually does is not only to consolidate these laws but to make radical and definite changes in them. For instance, in section 183, by substituting "due and owing" for "in arrears," it prevents an automobile owner residing in Baltimore City from operating his automobile on the public highways of the state unless he pays his taxes six months earlier than he was required under the repealed law to pay them, and again, it exempts second hand dealers from the application of the statute, while under the old law there was no such exemption. *123
Article III, section 29, Maryland Constitution, provides that "every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title; and no law, or section of law, shall be revived or amended by reference to its title or section only * * *."
Few provisions of the State Constitution have given rise to as many quiddities, hair splitting logic, casuistry, and dialectics as this one. On the one hand there is the natural disinclination to override the legislative will by striking down a law passed to meet some real or supposed public need or exigency, and on the other the difficulty of going through, around, or over some constitutional provision which stands in the way without appearing to disturb it. So not unnaturally, notwithstanding the clarity of the constitutional provision, the cases construing and applying it are not all clear and not all consistent.
The purpose of the provision against the amendment of an act by reference to its title or section only was stated in Davis v.State,
In Whitman v. State,
If any principle or rule for the interpretation and construction of that constitutional provision can be said to be established by the cases cited and other cases not cited dealing with it, it is that the title to a statute must not mislead or deceive. Every case which has dealt with the question supports and approves that principle, although its application has at times been forced and artificial.
Turning now to the title of the act in issue here, it states that the act repeals and re-enacts with amendments certain definitely specified statutes, and repeals other definitely specified statutes, and enacts in lieu thereof a new section of the Code, and after that enumeration it states that the purpose of those enactments is to *129 eliminate duplicate provisions and consolidate the laws for the payment of taxes "upon motor vehicles" throughout the state and in certain incorporated towns of the state.
But when the statute itself is examined it is found that instead of consolidating existing laws relating to taxes on motor vehicles, it creates a new method of collecting taxes on all assessable property in Baltimore City, (2) it creates a new exemption (section 184) in favor of second hand dealers, (3) it increases the number of municipal units to which the old law applied, (4) it advances by six months the time within which an automobile owner living in Baltimore City must pay all his taxes before operating his automobile on a public highway.
To consolidate is to bring together, harmonize, and synthesize things that are already in existence, and has no relation to the creation of new and different things. Duplication means the production of identical reproductions of the same thing, not the production of things which differ.
When therefore the act made new law different from the old law, it went beyond the purpose stated in its title, and was affirmatively misleading and deceptive. That it did make new law is scarcely open to question. The old law provided that registration and title certificates might issue if taxes were payable but unpaid, if they were not in arrears, the new law provides that such certificates may not be issued if taxes are payable but unpaid, even though they are not in arrears; the old law provided that such certificates should not issue unless automobile owners residing in certain specified municipalities had paid their municipal taxes on the automobile which were unpaid and in arrears, the new law provides that such certificates shall not be issued unless residents of those municipalities and of other and different municipalities have paid taxes on the automobile whether in arrears or not; the old law applied within its scope to all alike, the new law exempts from its application in certain cases dealers in second *130 hand automobiles. So that, under the pretense of consolidating existing statutes as stated in its title, the act creates a new body of law radically different from the old law, and, if the constitutional provision still has vitality, the act is bad and should be set aside.
But apart from that there is another objection to the statute, that it deprives the citizens of Baltimore City of the equal protection of the law, and deprives them of their property without due process of law.
Under the provisions of the statute an automobile owner residing in the counties is entitled to a certificate of registration of title if he has paid the taxes due and payable on the automobile, but a resident of Baltimore City is not entitled to such a certificate unless he has paid all taxes due and payable upon all of his assessable personal property (Grossfeldv. Baughman,
Under the statute an automobile owner residing in the county outside of a municipality may obtain a registration certificate if he pays the state and county taxes on the automobile only, if he resides in one of the municipalities named in section 184 he may obtain such certificate by paying the state, county, and municipal tax on the automobile only, if he lives in Baltimore City to obtain such a certificate he must not only pay the state and municipal tax on the automobile, but on all his assessable personal property as well.
The public highways of the state are the property of the State (Elliott on Roads and Streets, secs. 25, 511), maintained by public funds for the common use of its people. The privilege of using them for the purpose for which they are established and maintained should be available to all alike, upon the same and equal conditions. *131 To permit a resident of Baltimore County to operate an automobile on the public highways if he has paid all taxes due and payable on the automobile only, and to deny that privilege to an inhabitant of Baltimore City unless he has paid all taxes due and payable on all of his assessable personal property, is an arbitrary, irrational, and unjust discrimination, just as it is arbitrary and unreasonable to permit a second hand dealer to transfer title to an automobile on which the taxes are unpaid, but to deny that privilege to a private owner.
Automobile owners and users throughout the state constitute a single indivisible class, and while rules regulating the operation of automobiles and registration fees may properly vary with the speed, power, weight, size and character of different types of motor vehicles, such rules and fees must within the classification and sub-classification be uniform. The rules of the road, rules affecting equipment, and speed, must and do apply equally to all persons operating automobiles within the state, wherever they reside, and upon the same principle the privilege of using the public highways of the state should be available to all upon identical conditions. Kelman v. Ryan,
For these reasons, I am unable to agree with the conclusion that chapter 744 of the Acts of 1939 is a valid enactment. *132
Dissenting Opinion
The writer of this dissent fully concurs in what has been said in the opinion filed for the court by Chief Judge Bond, except in reference to the appeal in the case of James Redmond and wife. In the view here entertained the conclusion of the court that the writ of mandamus should issue in that case seems unsound.
Redmond and his wife bought an automobile of a dealer to whom it had been sold by H, who had the title and was its owner before October 1st, 1939. The automobile had been separately valued and assessed to H, as had his other tangible personal property, which consisted of household furniture. The city rendered H separate bills for the two *116 forms of tangible personal property. H paid all the taxes due and owing upon the valuation and assessment of his automobile for taxation at the rate levied uniformly upon all his tangible personal property, but he did not pay the residue of his taxes, which remained due and owing on account of the valuation and assessment of his other personal property for the years 1939 and 1940. It is because of this default of H that the Motor Vehicle Commissioner refused to issue a new certificate of title to Redmond and wife.
The statutory authority and direction to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to refuse to issue or transfer any plate, marker or certificate of registration of title for any motor vehicle, unless he is satisfied that all taxes due and owing thereon have been paid, originated with chapter 412 of the Acts of 1924, and applied exclusively to the City of Baltimore. It was held inBaltimore v. Fine, 1925,
The custom of rendering separate bills for the amount of taxes based upon the valuation and assessment of motor vehicles, and for the amount of taxes based upon the valuation and assessment of other tangible personal property, cannot nullify the explicit legislation which governs the subject matter. The endorsement on each bill of the notation: "Current and arrears tax bills for tangible personal property must be paid before the department will certify applications for tax or titles," demonstrates that there was no intention to give to the payment of either separate bill any other effect than a payment on account.
Nor, it is submitted, is this exception of the City of Baltimore an unconstitutional provision. The argument that the mentioned differences under the statute between the owner of a motor vehicle in Baltimore City and in a county deprive the owners of motor vehicles in Baltimore City of the equal protection of the law and of their property without due process of law was urged in denial of the constitutionality of the original statute (Acts of 1924, ch. 412), when it applied only to the City of Baltimore. *118
In the unanimous opinion of this court in the appeal ofGrossfeld v. Baughman, 1925,
The substantial effect of the later amendments made with reference to the City of Baltimore and the counties, which are all political units of co-ordinate rank, was to leave the owners of motor vehicles in Baltimore City in the same situation as that created by the terms of the original act, and to bring the owners of motor vehicles in the several counties within the purview of the legislation, to the extent of the pre-payment of the tax due and owing on the assessed value of the particular motor vehicle. Thus, the objections urged on constitutional grounds to the original act are less forceful when directed against the statute now assailed, and the decision in Grossfeld v. Baughman, supra, is of controlling effect on the facts of the record now at bar. *119
As was said in Grossfeld v. Baughman, supra, 148 Md. at page 338, 129 A. at page 373: "On precedent and principle, the provisions of the statute in question are not open to any constitutional objection. The classification of motor vehicles into two great natural divisions is not unreasonable, and the penalties imposed for the failure to pay taxes on the designated class of non-commercial motor vehicles cannot be said to be so arbitrary or unfair as to fall under the condemnation of law. It may well be that the Legislature has a practical condition to deal with in Baltimore City in the collection of taxes on this form of property that could best be met by the enactment of a local statute. But the validity of an enactment does not depend upon its wisdom, and the court will support every law with the presumption of its reasonableness whenever its provisions will permit."