This was an application by Perry and others, as chairman and members of the board of police commissioners of the City of Americus and as citizens and taxpayers of that city, on behalf of themselves and'other citizens and taxpayers, to enjoin the Mayor and Council of the City of Americus and Felder and others, the mayor, aldermen, and marshal of that city, from carrying into effect certain ordinances adopted by the mayor and council, which if valid had the effect of abolishing the board of police commissioners and the office of chief of police. The mayor and council and the mayor and marshal individually, by demurrer and answer, showed for cause various reasons against the granting of the injunction. Three of the members of the council, being a minority of that body, filed an answer which in substance set forth that they were opposed to the action of the council as set forth in the ordinances referred to in the petition, that they had never indorsed or acquiesced therein, and were not responsible for any attempt to put the same into execution. At the hearing the injunction prayed for was granted, and this judgment is assigned as error.
It is contended that this section of the city charter is void, for the reason that it contains matter different from what is expressed in the title of the act. We do not think the section is subject to this objection. The general purpose of the act as indicated in the title is to prescribe the conditions upon which the people of the City of Americus may be allowed, within the limits of that municipality, to exercise the powers of government. It is in effect, though not
The fact that municipal corporations, prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1877, were given the right and were exercising the right to control their own affairs through officers chosen by them would not prevent the General Assembly from taking away this right; there being nothing in the constitution which imperatively requires it to be construed as guaranteeing that this right of local self-government for municipal corporations shall exist absolutely in all cases. The right of the people of a municipal corporation to control its affairs is not an inherent right residing in the people, but is a right dependent for its existence upon legislative will, and how far they shall be given this right is a matter addressed solely to legislative discretion. See, in this connection, Diamond v. Cain, 21 La. Ann. 309; State v. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375; Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376. We are aware that other courts of respectable standing have taken an entirely different view of this matter, and in some instances have held that the right of local self-government is an inherent right in the people of a municipality, and that the legislature can not, in the absence of express authority in the constitution, take away or impair this right in any material or substantial respect. See City of Evansville v.
Judge Dillon, in his work on Municipal Corporations (4th ed. § 58), says: “The administration of justice, the preservation of the public peace, and the like, are essentially matters of public concern.” And in section 60 the author says: “And it has been several times determined that the legislature may, unless specially restricted in the constitution, take from, a municipal corporation its charter powers respecting the police and their appointment, and by
Judgment affirmed.