1. The defendant contends, and cites some outside authorities in support of its contentions, that the maintenance of streets is and was at common law a governmentаl function of a municipality; that a city’s liability for negligence in failing to repair or rеmove defects or obstructions in its streets is imposed by a statute (Code, § 69-303) which is in derogation of the common law; and that such statutory liability cannot be extended to cover injuries caused by the negligence of the city’s employees engaged in making street repairs or improvements when such negligence does not result in a defective condition of the street.
*723
However, the law is well settled in this State “that a municipаl corporation is bound to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel in the ordinary modes, by night as well as by day; and if it fail to do so, it is liable for damages for injuries sustained in consequence of such failure.”
Brown
v.
Mayor &c. of Milledgeville,
20
Ga. App.
392 (1) (
It has also been held that a municipal corporation’s function of keeping its streets in safe condition for travel is ministerial, and that the city is liable for its negligence in performing improperly or in failing to perform such duties.
Mayor &c. of Savannah
v.
Jones,
149
Ga.
139 (
It is further contended by the defendant that the repair or *724 improvement of thе street as alleged in the present case was for the protection of health by filling a place where water stood in the street, and was therefore done in the exercise of a governmental function. However, it is alleged that the holе had been brought about by the defendant’s scraping and grading of the' street on the samе day, when the old fill was removed and had to be replaced. It does not apрear that water ever stood in the hole or low place, or became stagnant and a menace to health. The truck which struck the plaintiff’s daughter was being used in the performance of a ministerial function by the defendant, and therefore thе alleged grounds of the defendant’s liability in this respect are sufficient.
2. It is also argued that the petition fails to show any negligence on the part of the defendant city or its servants. It is alleged in the petition that the plaintiff’s daughter was in plain view of Poolе, the driver of the truck, and of Lubeck, who motioned Poole to come ahead and make a left turn into Delaware Avenue, and that there was nothing to prevent thеm from seeing her as she went diagonally across the intersection. Whether, in the exеrcise of ordinary care, the defendant’s employees should have seen thе plaintiff’s daughter and stopped the truck before striking her was a question to be submitted tо a jury. Such questions of negligence and proximate cause are ordinarily for a jury, except in plain and undisputable eases. The petition shows that the plaintiff's daughter was proceeding from the truck driver’s right across the intersection in front of him, but it does not appear that he could not have seen her, or that Lubeck could nоt have seen her, and so it is for a jury to say whether they should have seen her, had they been in the exercise of ordinary care.
3. The petition set out a cause of action, and it was not error to overrule the general demurrer thereto.
Judgment affirmed.