Lead Opinion
This appeal arises from an action by Laura Lane Maia, following the death by suicide of her daughter, Sydney Sanders, against the mayor and city council of the City of Richmond Hill (collectively, the “City”) and Douglas Sahlberg, in his individual and official capacities, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful death,
A party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). On appeal from the grant [or denial] of summary judgment, we construe the evidence most favorably towards the non-moving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and possible inferences. The party opposing summary judgment is not required to produce evidence demanding judgment for it, but is only required to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Our review of the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Omondi,
Viewed in a light most favorable to Maia as the nonmoving party, the evidence shows that on February 14, 2011, Maia’s then 14-year-old daughter, Sydney Sanders, attempted suicide by cutting her neck and stabbing her chest and abdomen. Sahlberg and Dana Strickland, officers with the Richmond Hill Police Department (‘RHPD”), responded to the hospital to investigate. Strickland photographed Sanders’s injuries.
Sanders remained hospitalized until February 23, 2011. While Sanders was in the hospital, news of her suicide attempt spread at her high school. According to Sanders’s boyfriend, H. H., “everybody knew after a couple days what happened.” On the day Sanders was released from the hospital, she met with friends and told them that they had one opportunity to ask her about the incident, but that she did not want to discuss it after that. Sanders disclosed to her friends that she had cut herself in her neck, abdomen, and chest.
On or about February 26, 2011, Sahlberg’s daughter, K. S., who attended school with Sanders, expressed concern to her father about why someone like Sanders would attempt to commit suicide. As the conversation progressed, he became concerned that his daughter did
One of Sanders’s classmates deposed that on either February 28 or March 1, 2011, K. S. showed her a photograph of the injury to Sanders’s breast and a photograph of the injury to Sanders’s abdomen, and that at least two other classmates were present when the photographs were shown. A second classmate of Sanders averred that K. S. “pulled out her phone and showed [her and another girl] a picture of [Sanders’s] cut on her [breast].” After her return to school the week of February 28, 2011, Sanders learned that K. S. had been showing photographs of her injuries. After Sanders found out that the photographs had been displayed at school, Maia saw that Sanders was “mortified” and “screaming and yelling and gasping for breath and crying[.]”
On April 1, 2011, Strickland learned that Sahlberg had shown the photographs of Sanders’s injuries to K. S., and that K. S. had told others about the photographs. Strickland informed Sahlberg that he had violated RHPD policy in disclosing the photographs. That policy, entitled “Duty to Refrain from Disclosing any Information Relating to Police Activities,” provided that “[d]iscussion of the operations and official business of the department . . . which is of a confidential nature without the permission of a supervisor is prohibited.” Sahlberg acknowledged his violation, and Strickland counseled him to “reflect on how disseminating confidential information can affect the victims and this department.” Sahlberg was disciplined for the infraction.
On the afternoon of April 5, 2011, RHPD officers responded to a report of a suspicious person at Sanders’s home. Police discovered that H. H. was in the house with Sanders, who had stayed home from school that day. Maia received word of the incident and returned home, where she declined the officers’ request to press charges against H. H. Maia then took Sanders to her high school to meet with H. H. and his mother, who was the assistant principal.
According to Maia, during the ride to the school, Sanders expressed, “[w]hat more can they do to me[?] Great. The police have been at the house and now what are they going to do and say[?]” Sanders also told Maia on that day that she was upset about how the police had talked
At the meeting at Sanders’s school, Maia and H. H.’s mother decided that Sanders and H. H. should not see each other outside of school. Maia then took Sanders to see Sanders’s coach and mentor, Angie Hummeldorf. Sanders stated in front of the two adults that “she didn’t want to be here anymore,” and wished her suicide attempt had been successful, after which Maia stepped out of the room, and Hummeldorf and Sanders discussed why Sanders felt that way. Hummeldorf testified that, after she asked Sanders why she would want to take her life, Sanders “just kind of went on a rampage.” Sanders informed Hummeldorf of several frustrations, which included the photographs and that “those pictures are going around.” During the conversation, Sanders also said that her mother was disappointed in her, that girls were gossiping about her, and she mentioned her problems with her sister and H. H. After the discussion, Hummeldorf told Maia that Sanders “wasn’t doing so good” and should not be left alone.
Maia and Sanders then drove to Maia’s workplace, after which Maia dropped Sanders off at Sanders’s friends’ house at approximately 4:00 p.m. Another friend picked Sanders up between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. The two talked for about 30 to 45 minutes, after which the friend dropped Sanders off at Sanders’s house. After her friend left, at 7:49 p.m. Sanders spoke with Maia, who was still at work, on the phone. Maia was not concerned that Sanders was then about to harm herself. When Maia returned home at approximately 8:45 p.m. she discovered that Sanders had committed suicide by hanging.
1. As a threshold issue with respect to the liability of the City and of Sahlberg, in his official capacity, we consider the appellants’ contention that the ante litem notice was deficient other than for the claim for wrongful death, and that the City and Sahlberg, in his official capacity, were consequently entitled to summary judgment on Maia’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and Sanders’s pre-death pain and suffering (also known as a survival claim).
Ante litem notice, as contemplated under OCGA § 36-33-5, is a prerequisite to filing suit against a municipality. The ante litem notice requirement also applies to claims against municipal employees in their official capacity. See Conley v. Dawson,
Within six months of the happening of the event upon which a claim against a municipal corporation is predicated, the person, firm, or corporation having the claim shall present the claim in writing to the governing authority of the municipal corporation for adjustment, stating the time, place, and extent of the injury, as nearly as practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury. No action shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal corporation until the cause of action therein has first been presented to the governing authority for adjustment.
Substantial compliance with the statutory provisions is all that is required. See Owens v. City of Greenville,
The information supplied [in any given ante litem notice] will be deemed sufficient if it puts a municipality on notice of the general character of the complaint, and, in a general way, of the time, place, and extent of the injury. The act recognizes, by the use of the words “as nearly as practicable,” that absolute exactness need not be had.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 562 (4). And, “[t]o comply substantially, the notice must contain sufficient information so that the City can investigate the injuries alleged and determine if the claim should be settled without litigation.” (Citations omitted.) City of Moultrie v. Price,
The notice at issue, which identified Maia as the surviving parent, provided that, “[p]ursuant to [OCGA] § 36-33-5” it was “the requisite pre-suit ante litem notice of the claim for damages pertaining to the death” of Sanders. The notice asserted that Strickland and Sahlberg photographed Sanders’s injuries on February 14, 2011, that
The ante litem notice put the City on notice of a claim by Maia, as Sanders’s surviving parent, for wrongful death, and the appellants do not contest that the notice was sufficient to that extent. The notice, however, does not reference any claims on behalf of Sanders’s estate or identify Maia as the administratrix of Sanders’s estate, and does not present for adjustment claims by the estate for Sanders’s predeath pain and suffering or for invasion of Sanders’s privacy. See Jones v. City of Austell,
As for Maia’s individual claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “the statute requires the notice to state the ‘extent of the injury,’ which we have defined as ‘the nature, character, and particulars of the injury.’ ” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Davis v. City of Forsyth,
“To recover damages in a tort action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s negligence was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the injury.” (Punctuation omitted.) Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Coleman,
Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by other causes, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred. What amounts to proximate cause is undeniably a jury question and is always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Zwiren v. Thompson,
[qjuestions of negligence and proximate cause are peculiarly questions for the jury except in clear, plain, palpable and undisputed cases. Only in the rare case where there is an admission of liability or an indisputable fact situation that clearly establishes liability, should summary judgment be granted.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom,
The appellants maintain that Sahlberg’s breach of duty can nevertheless not be a proximate cause of Sanders’s injury, and, consequently, no recovery may be had, because her suicide was an unforeseen intervening cause of her death as a matter of law. We have held that, “where injuries resulting from the negligence of a third person produce a state of mind in the injured person which leads to [her] suicide, the person guilty of the negligence is not civilly responsible for the suicide.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Appling v. Jones,
Notwithstanding this general rule, in assessing claims of negligence against medical professionals and institutions arising out of the suicide of a patient or former patient, we have not characterized the act of suicide as a per se intervening or superseding act that must preclude liability, if an intervening act at all. See, e.g., Purcell v. Breese,
As Sahlberg was not a medical professional, nor was Sanders in his custody or care, we agree with the appellants that the cases in which the defendants stood in such a relationship to the deceased are distinguishable to that extent. Nevertheless, Sahlberg did owe a specific duty not to disclose Sanders’s confidential information. His duty to protect the public, and particularly Sanders, can be contrasted to the breach of duty in Appling, which concerned the defendant’s negligence in colliding with an automobile driven by the plaintiff’s son. See Appling v. Jones,
The City further argues that as there is no evidence that Sahlberg gave copies of the photographs to his daughter, but only allowed her to view them, K. S.’s “theft” of the photographs was an intervening act not foreseeable or triggered by Sahlberg’s disclosure. As a rule,
there can be no proximate cause where there has intervened between the act of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, an independent act or omission of someone other than the defendant, which was not foreseeable by defendant, was not triggered by defendant’s act, and which was sufficient of itself to cause the injury.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) La Quinta Inns v. Leech,
3. As to Sahlberg in his individual capacity, the appellants contend, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment as to Maia’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because there is no evidence that Sahlberg’s allegedly tortious conduct was directed toward Maia.
In a claim concerning negligent conduct, a recovery for emotional distress is allowed only where there is some impact on the plaintiff, and that impact must be a physical injury. On the other hand, where the conduct is malicious, wilful or wanton, recovery can be had without the necessity of an impact—*565 [E]ven malicious, wilful or wanton conduct will not warrant a recovery for the infliction of emotional distress [, however,] if the conduct was not directed toward the plaintiff.
(Citations omitted.) Ryckeley v. Callaway,
Instead of pointing to evidence that Sahlberg’s conduct was directed toward her, Maia contends that the appellants are not entitled to summary judgment on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because there is evidence that she suffered a nonphysical injury to her person and incurred pecuniary losses, citing Oliver v. McDade,
Because there is no evidence that the allegedly tortious conduct was directed toward Maia, the trial court erred in denying the
4. As to Sahlberg in his individual capacity, the appellants further contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment on Maia’s claim, for invasion of privacy.
(a) the disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure;
(h) the facts disclosed to the public must be private, secluded*567 or secret facts and not public ones; and (c) the matter made public must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities under the circumstances.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. Walker,
The appellants maintain, among other things, that there is a lack of evidence sufficient to show a public disclosure in that Sahlberg only showed the photographs to his daughter. Maia responds that there is no “mandatory authority” that publication to a single individual cannot meet the public disclosure requirement, and that public disclosure remains an issue of fact that should be resolved by a jury.
Neither party has cited, and we are unaware of, any controlling Georgia authority as to what constitutes a “public disclosure” of a private fact. However, as explained in the comments to the Restatement of Torts 2d, “to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons” is not sufficient to constitute a public disclosure. Restatement of Torts 2d, § 652D (comment a).
5. Lastly, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to the City and Sahlberg, in his official capacity, as to Maia’s claims for punitive damages. We agree, and Maia concedes that the trial court erred in this respect. See City of Columbus v. Myszka,
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Notes
Maia pursued her claims individually, as Sanders’s parent and natural guardian, and as administratrix of Sanders’s estate.
Strickland denied photographing Sanders’s chest injuries.
Under Georgia law, Maia was entitled, as the representative of Sanders’s estate, to seek damages for Sanders’s pre-death pain and suffering as a survival claim. See Carroll Fulmer Logistics Corp. v. Hines,
Public agents are immune from liability for their discretionary acts unless they are done with malice or intent to injure: The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption. Under Georgia law, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) City of Atlanta v. Shavers,
As to physicians, “the duty is that inherent in the doctor-patient relationship, which, if breached by failure to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care, with that failure being the proximate cause of the injury, will result in liability.” (Citations omitted.) Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute,
In light of the inadequacy of the ante litem notice of Maia’s survival claim, as we held in Division 1, supra, only Sahlberg in his individual capacity can be held liable on the survival claim.
The City and Sahlberg, in his official capacity, were entitled to summary judgment on this claim for the reasons set forth in Division 1, supra.
See also Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy,
See also Coon v. The Medical Center,
Smith v. Stewart,
The City and Sahlberg, in his official capacity, were entitled to summary judgment on this claim for the reasons set forth in Division 1, supra.
“Invasion of privacy’ encompasses four torts under a common name and include “(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v. American Heritage Products,
Georgia courts have cited to the Restatement of Torts as persuasive authority in the context of claims for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. & Telegraph Co.,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially.
This case should not turn on whether the suicide victim killed herself in a rage, frenzy, or due to an uncontrolled impulse, or on whether the defendants had a special relationship with her. It should instead turn on a straightforward application of the tort concept of foreseeability. Applying that concept, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant police officer had reason to know that Sydney was particularly susceptible to suicide, and that her subsequent suicide was a foreseeable result of his sharing confidential information. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to the defendants on Maia’s wrongful death claim.
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 2 that the trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s wrongful death claims, I cannot agree with all that is said, and thus concur specially in that division. I concur fully in the analysis and conclusions in Divisions 1, 3, 4, and 5.
To analyze the legal principles in this case, both the majority and the dissent apply the framework articulated in Appling v. Jones,
After establishing the holding that suicide absolves the tortfeasor absent evidence that the victim killed herself in a rage, frenzy, or due to an uncontrolled impulse, our appellate courts have created exceptions to this holding, as ably described by the majority and dissent. Some of those exceptions involve defendants who have a special relationship to the injured party, such as psychiatrists;
But this case does not turn on whether the suicide was “voluntary” or not, or on whether a special relationship existed between the victim and the police officer, but rather on a straightforward application of the tort concept of foreseeability. Foreseeability informed the analysis in Stevens v. Steadman,
Other courts have distinguished the holding set forth in Appling on foreseeability grounds, i.e., Sneider v. Hyatt Corp., 390 FSupp. 976, 980-981 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Further, while no Georgia appellate cases specifically distinguish Appling in the manner of the two federal cases cited above, that may be because in many cases, the parties or this Court do not address the issue of suicide through the framework of special relationships or whether the deceased acted in a rage, frenzy, or due to an uncontrolled impulse; rather, in those cases the suicide issue is reviewed using general concepts of foreseeability and qualified immunity. See, e.g., Hill v. Jackson,
Regardless of the validity of Appling’s holding and its exceptions,
After Sydney’s self-inflicted wounds were sutured and bandaged at the emergency room, Maia took her to Georgia Regional Hospital, where she spent nine days. She was discharged with the diagnosis of “adjustment disorder with depressed mood,” and returned to high school exactly two weeks after her February 14 suicide attempt. The cuts on her neck were almost completely healed; her sister was “shocked” at how minimal the scars were, considering how bad the wounds looked when first inflicted. Her clothing covered the injuries to her breast and stomach, and she often wore a hoodie with her hair down, “always trying to wear stuff to cover up the scar on her neck.” One friend said she “just put a smile on every day.” Her sister said “she kept her business quiet” and “made it look like she was ok,” and she apparently did her best to make her family and fellow students forget about her suicide attempt. Both her sister and mother testified that Sydney cared a lot about what people thought of her and wanted to get along with everyone.
A few days after she returned to high school, about four weeks before she committed suicide, Sydney found out that the defendant investigating police officer’s daughter had shown pictures of her wounds to other students, which embarrassed and distressed her. Her mother described Sydney as “mortified” when she first learned of the disclosure, screaming, yelling, crying, and gasping as she told her mother about it. Sydney told her mother that her friends had confronted her about the photos and that other students pointed, laughed, and made comments about her. She was “hysterical” because, as she said, her mother had taught her to respect police officers and she could not believe that “Mr. Doug” would “do that to [her]” instead of protect her. According to her mother, after Sydney found out about the dissemination, the defendant officer’s daughter chased Sydney
In a subsequent meeting with her coach, who pointed out Sydney’s assets, Sydney “started bawling” and listed some of her struggles, which included the dissemination of the pictures of her self-inflicted wounds. When her coach asked why she wanted to die, Sydney “just kind of went on a rampage” about her frustrations, which included gossiping girls “and those pictures going around.” After the meeting ended, Sydney spent time with her mother and friends that afternoon and early evening. That night around seven, she told her mother over the phone that she loved her, posted on her Facebook wall that she loved her best friends, wrote notes in odd places in her room, then went up to the attic of her family’s house and hanged herself.
The dissent says that 14-year-old Sydney was not in a rage, a frenzy, or acting under an uncontrollable impulse because the actions she took just before she killed herself showed she was acting voluntarily, and therefore the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We cannot assume we know Sydney’s state of mind based on her outward actions. But regardless of our assumptions about her mental state, under a straightforward proximate cause and foreseeability analysis, genuine issues of material fact exist. A jury should decide whether Sydney’s suicide absolves the tortfeasor of any liability for her death based on his actions in sharing photographs of Sydney’s self-inflicted wounds with his daughter, Sydney’s classmate, photographs he took incident to his duties as a police officer.
For these reasons, I concur specially in Division 2.
I am hereby authorized to state that Judge McMillian joins in this special concurrence.
See also La Quinta Inns v. Leech,
See, e.g., Peterson v. Reeves,
See, e.g., Tucker v. Pearce,
See, e.g., Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute,
The plaintiffs in Stevens alleged that the defendants’ conduct rose to the level of a criminal conspiracy, and thus went beyond negligence; the plaintiff’s allegation of criminal conduct explains why the Supreme Court determined that the defendants could not have been guilty of the crime of murder.
The court in Sneider denied summary judgment to a hotel in a suit to recover for the wrongful death of a woman who had jumped from the twenty-first floor to the lobby floor, after the hotel employees had received phone calls informing them of the woman’s suicidal tendencies.
Not all of these cases involve special relationships. See Morris,
The notion that, unless suicide is committed in a frenzy, rage, or irresistible impulse, it is “voluntary” and therefore breaks the chain of causation reflects an outdated view of mental health. But the continued validity of Appling’s holding is a discussion for another day.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in Divisions 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent, however, from Division 2 because, as a matter of law, the undisputed evidence shows that Sahlberg’s wrongful conduct was not the proximate cause of Sanders’s death by suicide. Indeed, Maia may not recover for her wrongful-death and survival claims because, under well-established Georgia law, Sanders’s tragic suicide was an unforeseen intervening cause of her death, which absolves Sahlberg and the City from liability for such claims.
As to the first exception, there is no evidence to support a jury finding that Sanders killed herself during a rage or frenzy, or in response to an uncontrollable impulse, such that Sahlberg’s wrongful conduct, which occurred over a month before her death, may be
Sanders then spent time with friends after school, and several hours passed from 4:00 p.m. until 7:49 p.m., when she called her mother shortly before tragically taking her own life. During this phone call, Sanders said something to the effect of “I love you mama, I promise you I’m going to be all right, I’m going to read my Bible, I love you and I will see you when you get home.” According to Maia, nothing that Sanders said during the call alarmed her or caused her to be concerned that Sanders might harm herself. Thus, based on the foregoing evidence, even if Sanders’s behavior during the meeting with her teacher could possibly be characterized as a “rage” or “frenzy,” there is no evidence that Sanders was in a rage or had an uncontrollable impulse several hours later when she took her own life. As a result, the first exception to the general rule regarding liability for suicide does not apply in this case.
Nevertheless, the majority likens the facts of this case to prior decisions involving the special relationship between a mental-healthcare provider and his patient in which we have held that whether the defendant’s deficient medical care was the proximate cause of the patient’s suicide was a jury question. But while this Court has previously held that the issue of proximate cause was a jury
To support its position that the second exception (i. e., the “special-relationship exception”) to the general rule precluding liability for suicide applies in this case, the majority relies primarily on Purcell v. Breese
Specifically, in Purcell, the evidence showed that, at the time when the defendant doctor discharged a patient (who later committed suicide) from a hospital, the patient was “at risk for committing suicide and had no intention of obtaining outpatient treatment.”
And in Brandvain, a patient, while he was living in a rehabilitation facility, used a shirt to hang himself after he was caught the previous day in a bathroom with one arm of his sweater around his neck and the other caught in the upper corner of the door.
But here, unlike in the doctor-patient context, Sahlberg was not a mental-healthcare professional with specialized training in treating suicidal individuals, and more significantly, Sanders was not in his custody or under his supervision at the time when she committed suicide.
In sum, I acknowledge that Sahlberg’s flagrant violation of RHPD’s policy regarding confidentiality was undoubtedly wrongful and it may indeed have been a factor in Sanders’s tragic decision to take her own life. Nevertheless, even though questions of proximate cause ordinarily are reserved solely for the jury, Georgia courts have repeatedly held that, as a general matter of law, “suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause of death which absolves the tortfeasor of liability.”
I am authorized to state that Judge Ray and Judge Peterson join in this dissent.
Tucker v. Pearce,
Tucker,
Tucker,
Tucker,
Tucker,
See, e.g., Peterson v. Reeves,
See Tucker,
See supra footnote 27.
Although the special concurrence acknowledges the analytical framework applied in Georgia suicide cases for the past 50 years (i.e., that suicide is generally an unforeseeable intervening cause of death unless either the rage-or-frenzy or special-relationship exception applies), it would nonetheless depart from that well-settled framework and apply “a straightforward application of the tort concept of foreseeability.” Maj. op. at 569. In support of this position, the special concurrence relies on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Stevens v. Steadman,
See Purcell,
Purcell,
Id.
See id. at 475-76 (2).
See Brandvain,
See id. at 111.
See id. at 112 (2).
Id. at 112-13 (2).
Id. at 116 (3) (b) (punctuation omitted).
See id.
Cf. Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner,
See infra footnote 46. Notably, although the majority likens the doctor-patient relationship to the duty of care that a police officer owes to the general public, it does not discuss any of the “prison cases” that specifically address potential liability of police officers for suicide. Regardless, neither line of jurisprudence applies here because, unlike in both the hospital and prison contexts, Sanders was never in Sahlberg’s custody or under his supervision or control.
See Tucker,
See Mikell v. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 33,
Tucker,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion as to Divisions 1,3,4, and 5.1 join Judge Dillard’s dissent as to Division 2, and I agree with all that is said in that dissent that is necessary to its holding.
The special concurrence refuses to follow that binding precedent, and points to a number of our decisions in which we did not explicitly acknowledge or apply the general rule that suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause of death. But in none of those decisions did we reject the general rule, either. And, more importantly, none of those decisions is a decision of our whole court overruling Appling v. Jones and its progeny.
Precedent does not cease to be binding simply because we can find subsequent cases that, for whatever reason, do not apply that precedent. Precedent does not cease to be binding even when we find subsequent decisions of less than the whole court explicitly refusing to follow it. See Dority v. State,
When we wish to reject prior precedent, as the special concurrence proposes, we should say so and employ the appropriate process. When the decisions we wish to change are our own, that process would be consideration by the whole Court. In this case, however, the Supreme Court’s precedent precludes any effort by this Court to change the rule
In Stevens v. Steadman,
I am authorized to state that Judge Ray joins in this dissent.
That said, I disagree with the inclusion in that dissent of footnote 46 and its associated text regarding decisions of the courts of our sister states, because it is irrelevant to the dissent’s holding. Judge Dillard’s dissent demonstrates conclusively that Georgia case law does not
I agree with the special concurrence that the initial foundations of our present rule may have arisen in part from a now-outdated understanding of mental health. Our Supreme Court was explicit in Stevens that its decision was based on its understanding of mental health.