51 Barb. 19 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1868
Lead Opinion
The facts established in this case are few, and .in themselves are not the subject of dispute. On the 2d December, 1784, the common council, imbued with emotions of gratitude for the distinguished services of General Washington, voted an address to him, together with the freedom of the city, in a gold box. At a s'ubser quent meeting of the common council, held on the 2d May, 1785, the mayor produced and read a letter from General Washington replying to the address of the corporation, which was addressed to the “ Honble. The Mayor, Recorder, Aldermen and Commonalty of the city of New
The learned justice who tried the cause, charged the jury, “If there was any way in which the common council could deprive themselves of their interest in the letter and pass it to him, you will ascertain whether it is so, and you will determine whether, when he became possessed of it, he became so possessed lawfully or unlawfully.”
The justice further charged, “Did the deceased, John Allan receive this paper as owner of it, when he did receive it, or did he not? If.he received it as owner, and was owner of it at the time, of course this suit is defended; or if he obtained it improperly, and with the intent to convert it to his own use wrongfully, then this suit is. defended, because the conversion took place more than thirty years ago, and the action should have been commenced within six years of that time to enable the plaintiffs to recover. If, on the other hand, you believe he acquired it honestly, by loan or otherwise, without acquiring an absolute property in it, at the time he received it, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.”
We are unable to discover any error in these, the substantial portions of the justice’s charge, and the questions involved having been fairly submitted to the jury, and they having found averdict.for the plaintiffs, we must conclude that in so finding they determined that Allan did acquire
The rule of general application, that the possession of personal property implies ownership against the world, must be regarded as exceptional in certain cases.
• In the present action the letter was a particular and peculiar species of property. Its style, address and responsive character to a legislative act, should of itself be regarded as having imparted notice to all, that from the moment of its reception and sending it became the property of the corporation to whom it was addressed.
Unlike other personal property, which ordinarily possesses but little, if any, distinctive mark which might place individuals upon inquiry, this letter, so written, in such terms, and so addressed, held Allan to constantly recurring notice of its ownership by the corporation.
His possession was wholly unexplained, and the jury have charitably found that he had become possessed of it, but without title by any alienation- from .the corporation who were originally and rightfully its possessors and owners.
Ho notice is shown to have been at any time given to the corporation of the possession by Allan. Had such notice been shown, the statute of limitations by appropriate lapse of time might have had application.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Dissenting Opinion
From lapse of time, Washington’s letter, the subject of this action, .has become valu
The evidence is, that at a meeting of the common council, on the 2d of May, 1785, the mayor produced the letter; that the letter was transcribed into the minutes of the common council, and ordered to be published, with the address to which the letter was an answer. This was all the evidence to show property in, or possession of, the letter. The presumption from the evidence is, that the letter and address were sent to the printer to be published, and that they were published, and the further presumption is that, having been transcribed into the minutes, and published, no importance was attached to the preservation of the original letter by the city authorities, and that it never came back from the printer.
Upon the evidence which has been stated, the plaintiffs rested their case, to recover the possession of the letter from the defendants, the auctioneers, in whose possession the letter was found, in 1864, nearly eighty years after the transaction as to the letter in 1785.
I doubt, under the circumstances, whether the evidence was sufficient to show property in the plaintiffs. At all events I doubt whether the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption, that the defendants, the auctioneers, were lawfully in possession, and as owners, or as agents of the party for whom they sold the letter as owner, viewing the letter as property.
But it'is not necessary to put our decision of this case on the ground of any defect or deficiency in the proofs of the plaintiffs, or upon th e, prima facie evidence of ownership from the bare possession, at the time the plaintiffs made the demand of the letter. The evidence on the part of
It was a presumption of law, I think, from this undisputed evidence of long interrupted adverse possession, not only that John Allan was the owner at the time of his death, but also that the letter came into his possession lawfully and as owner. Uo doubt the plaintiffs might have rebutted this presumption by showing that John Allan got possession unlawfully, by a larceny, trespass, fraud or wrongful conversion ; but if this could be shown, and had been shown, the statute of limitations would have been a bar to the action. I assume, too, that the plaintiffs might have rebutted the legal presumption, by showing that John Allan’s possession commenced as a permissive possession ; that the letter had been lent to him, or put in his hands to keep for the plaintiffs; but there was no such rebutting evidence.
There was nothing, then, to submit to a jury. It is plain that the judge, by submitting the case to the jury as he did, deprived the defendants of the benefit of the legal presumption that John Allan was the owner at the time of his death, and that Ms right and title commenced as owner:
If the letter is property, it must be treated as property; and the plaintiffs must prosecute their action, under and subject to the legal presumptions arising from long continued, uninterrupted adverse possession, founded on principles of public policy, to quiet possession, and to prevent
Geo. G. Barnard, Ingraham and Sutherland, Justices.]
I think the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event of the action.
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in affirming the judgment upon the ground that the evidence as to title to the letter was of that character which called for a finding by the jury thereon; and such finding in favor of the plaintiffs is conclusive between the parties.
