Tbe accused was charged under an indictment containing two counts; onе for embezzlement, and tbe other for larceny from a storehouse. Tbе sufficiency of tbe count for embezzlement, upon which be was convicted, is objected to, upon tbe ground that it does not describe with requisite сertainty tbe property which was tbe alleged subject of tbe offense, and that tbe value of each article is not stated. It is unnecessary to inquire what would have been tbe judgment of tbe common law upon this question, fоr we regard it settled by tbe Code, section 3503 of which makes tbe forms of indictmеnts appended to it controlling precedents, having tbe force- оf law. — Noles v. The State,
Upon the authority of Rex v. Johnson, 3. M. & S. 539, and Johnson v. The State,
Where two distinct felonies are chai’ged in different counts, it is not a matter of legal right рertaining to the accused, that the State should be compelled to elect for which one of the offenses it will prosecute; nor will the court compel such election, where the two counts are joinеd, in good faith, for the purpose of meeting a single offense. It is a prаctice sanctioned by common custom, and by the law, to charge а felony in different ways, in different counts of the indictment, so as to provide for the different phases which the evidence may present upon the trial; and where such is the bona-fide purpose of the joinder of counts, the court never exercises its power of quashing the indictment, or compelling an election.— Baker v. The State, 4 Arkansas, 56; Kane v. The People,
The bill оf exceptions discloses that the court confined the State, in the intrоduction of evidence, to a single transaction, and directed the jury to consider only the charge of embezzlement. In the action of the court in these particulars, there was certainly nothing prejudicial to the prisoner, or of which he can be heard to complain.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, and the sentence pronounced by it must be carried into execution.