Mayo v. Rouselle Corp.Mayo v. Rouselle Corp.
“In support of said certificate, the following facts are shown tо the Court:
1. Style of the Case.
The style of the case is Auther L. Mayo and Janie Mayo v. Rouselle Corporation; Service Machine Company; Pearl Equipment Company; et al., Civil Aсtion No. 78-G-0967-S, United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
2. Statement of the Facts.
On August 3, 1974, plaintiff Auther L. Mayo was an employee of National Cabinet Company, employed at its plant in the city of Springville, St. Clair County, Alabama. While about his duties as an employee of National Cabinet Company, plaintiff Auther L. Mayo was operating a machine generally described as a `punch press’ when one of his hands became caught in the moving parts of the `punch press’ and he suffered various personal injuriеs. The `punch press’ in question had been manufactured by defendants Rouselle Corporation and Service Machine Company, and these defendants sold the `рunch press’ to defendant Pearl Equipment Company for distribution. Defendant Pearl Equipment Company sold the `punch press’ in question to National Cabinet Corporation and delivered same to National Cabinet Corporation on August 8, 1968. As previously stated, it was not until August 3, 1974, that plaintiff Auther L. Mayo was injured while operating the `punch press’ during the normal course of his employment at National Cabinet Company.
Plaintiff Auther L. Mayo and plaintiff‘s wife, Janie Mayo, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Tenth Judiciаl Circuit of Alabama, on August 2, 1978, claiming that the manufacture and sale of the `punch press’ was governed by the Code of Alabama, Title 7 (a), Section 2-010 [sic], et seq., and that pursuant to those code sections certаin implied warranties were made to plaintiff Auther L. Mayo by the defendants, that the `punch press’ was of merchantable quality and fit for the particular use as a `рunch press,’ and that the defendants breached their warranties made to the plaintiff, thereby proximately
The defendants contend that Code of Alabama, Section
3. Questions to be certified.
CERTIFIED QUESTION NUMBER 1
Whether or not Code of Alabama, Section
CERTIFIED QUESTION NUMBER 2
Whether or not Code of Alabama, Section
Code 1975, §
(1) An аction for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breаch occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party‘s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered; however, a cause of action for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall accrue when the injury occurs.
* * * * * *
The last clause of the above quoted statute was added by thе legislature prior to its adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, and is unique among states adopting the Code.
This section, as to breaches of warranty сoncerning nonconsumer goods, follows the basic contract law rule that the statute of limitations begins to run when delivery is made. 63 Am.Jur.2d § 221, at 219.
The machine was tendered fоr delivery on August 8, 1968; the plaintiff had until August 8, 1972, to bring suit for breach of implied warranty against the defendants. Any suit filed after this date would be barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff contends that § 13 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 compels a finding that Code 1975, §
Clearly then, the Code provision is nоt violative of § 13 of the Alabama Constitution.
Plaintiff‘s cause of action accrued after the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code. Therefore, the plaintiff did not have a vested right.
The second question certified to this Court is whether §
A legislative classification is not prohibited per se. Its validity depends upon its being reasonably related to a legitimate object of the legislation. Plant v. Reid, 294 Ala. 155, 313 So.2d 518 (1975).
Such a statutory discrimination between classes is held to be relevant to a permissible legislative purpose if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); State v. Pure Oil Co., 256 Ala. 534, 55 So.2d 843 (1951).
There are ample facts which would justify our finding that the lеgislature was within its constitutional limits in enacting §
The Uniform Commercial Code makes numerous classifications between consumer and commercial goods, with such distinction not limited to that found in §
This Court, furthermore, has expressly upheld as constitutional, in Sellers v. Edwards, 289 Ala. 2, 265 So.2d 438 (1972), a medical malpractice statute under which a claim must be brought within four years after the act of malpractice.
“A state is not prohibited upon constitutional grounds from making classifications of persons and objects, or from рassing laws which apply only to persons within a designated class. Classification is an inherent power of the Legislature but it must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. In order to justify interference by the courts with the wide discretion which the Legislature has in such matters, it should appear that the interests of those generally affected by the act, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference.”
289 Ala. at 6, 265 So.2d at 440.
We find §
QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
All the Just