168 Mass. 107 | Mass. | 1897
1. The court rightly refused to give the first instruction which was requested. Bringing about a marriage with a view to the pecuniary benefits that may flow therefrom, either during the life or after the death of the one who has the most property, is no ground of invalidating a marriage, unless fraud or force is used. Nor is every kind of fraud available for this purpose. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 605. Foss v. Foss, 12 Allen, 26. Crehore v. Crehore, 97 Mass. 330. After marriage, a husband or a wife may lawfully use persuasions to induce the other to make a favorable will, and such persuasions may even be proper. Parfitt v. Lawless, 2 P. & D. 462, 470. The relations between the parties are then greatly changed; and a husband and wife lawfully married and living happily together are bound to all conjugal duties towards each other, and none the less because illicit relations may have existed between them before marriage. In the present case, there was no evidence whatever that any deception was practised on the testator to induce him to enter into the marriage. The validity of the marriage was unquestioned and unquestionable, so far as the evidence showed. Even if the woman had been the testator’s mistress to the time of the marriage, and had brought about the marriage for the purpose of unduly influencing him to make a will in her favor, or in accordance with her desire, as assumed in the request for instructions, there were other important facts to be considered, and the court might well decline to single out those
2. The bill of exceptions states that the circumstantial evidence therein set forth, with other evidence of a similar kind, was the only evidence relied on to show that Mrs. Tyler used undue influence upon the testator to induce the making of the will or codicil. The court might properly state that there was no direct evidence. By express provision of statute, Pub. Sts. c. 153, § 5, the court may state the testimony; and if there is no direct testimony upon a point in issue, the court may so state to the jury.
3. There was no error in the way of stating to the jury what
4. The final request for instructions was rightly refused, and the instructions given were proper. In common untechnical speech, one may have delusions which do not imply or show unsoundness of mind. The request for instructions might have been understood to mean delusions of that kind. It was right, therefore, to limit the instructions to insane delusions, such as would go to show unsoundness of mind. Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376, 392. 1 Redf. Wills, 71, note, 86. The further criticism upon the instructions as given is without weight.
JExceftions overruled.