Mayflower Corp. v. DavisMayflower Corp. v. Davis
The employer/carrier (E/C) appeal an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) ordering the E/C to pay Claimant benefits based on an average weekly wage (AWW) calculated according to the premium basis upon which Claimant paid workers’ compensation insurance premiums instead of
Claimant was injured while on duty with Mayflower Corporation on January 26, 1987. The E/C accepted this injury as compensable and began рaying Claimant benefits. On May 14, 1993, Claimant filed a claim seeking, among other things, a determination of the AWW. At the trial, the parties settled all issues except for the amount of AWW.
In the early 1980s, Claimant‘s husband began driving a truck for Mayflower as an independent contractor. A couple of years lаter, Claimant became qualified to drive and began driving with her husband as a team. The evidence established, and the JCC found, that Claimant and her husband operated as partners, and that she was paid from his earnings at Mayflower. Under this arrangement, Mayflower neither knew how much Claimant received nor had any control over it. Claimant and her husband never discussed how much Claimant would be paid. When Mr. Davis received a check from Mayflower, he simply deposited it into their joint account from which both of them withdrew funds as needed.
Mayflower‘s arrangement with Mr. Davis provided that he would receive 56% of the line haul, the amount Mayflower charges its customers for transporting their goods. Each month, Mr. Davis received a statement from Mayflower indicating the amount of line haul or other income he was to receive as well as any draw he had taken for monthly expenses and any deductions for insurance or other charges. The hauling income was then reported on Form 1099, which the Davis’ used to calculate their income tax. Since the Davis’ drove their own truck, which they were purchasing under a lease agreement, they were responsible for making payments on the truck and for paying all their other expenses, including fuel, maintenance and repairs, uniforms, workers’ compensation charges, bank charges, meals and lodging out of their income. Thus, even though the Davis’ hauling income for 1986 was $114,466.05, their adjusted gross income after expenses was only $11,939.20.
Mayflower required that Claimant be covered by workers’ compensation insurance, and Mr. Davis’ contract specifically required that he pay workers’ compensation premiums through Mayflower. Mayflower set the premium basis on their policies and dеducted the premiums from its drivers’ income. Each Mayflower driver was charged the
A hearing was held in this cause on October 19, 1993 before Judge William D. Douglas to resolve the issue of the correct method for calculating the AWW. Claimant contended that her correct AWW was $429.51 because she and Mr. Davis had contracted with Mayflower for that amount in their workers’ compensation insurance policy. The E/C, however, argued that Claimant‘s AWW should have been calculated according to
The E/C argue on appeal that the premium basis listed in the workers’ compensation policy did not constitute a stipulated AWW and that Claimant‘s AWW should have been based upon
Obviously, methods other than that set forth in
Here, the JCC was free to use a method other than that delineated in
In a dispute over the correct AWW, claimant argued that he was entitled to benefits based оn an AWW of $512 per week, which
We affirm the JCC‘s order awarding Claimant benefits based on an AWW of $429.51. Like the claimant in Fleitas, the claimant here is also an independent truck driver who would not be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits but for the contract providing for coverage. Claimant‘s contract with Mayflower, which was evidenced by the workers’ compensation policy and the Davis’ course of dealing with Mayflower, and the payment of a specific premium that remained unchanged over a period of years, was properly construed by the JCC as entitling Claimant to a specific amount of benefits that bore a rational relationship to the wages she would actually earn in her employment.
Appellants argue that the rate in the workers’ compensation policy may not be used to calculate Claimant‘s AWW because the Fleitas court required that the contractual terms be sрecifically stated in order to use the policy to determine the AWW. This narrow reading of Fleitas is not warranted by the court‘s discussion. The court merely said that Juan Lopez Fleitas had specifically agreed to an AWW of $240; it did not enunciate a requirement in all cases that the agreement be specifiсally spelled out in the policy. 598 So.2d at 254. The intention of the parties governs the construction of contracts. Hughes v. Professional Ins. Corp., 140 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). Where a contract is ambiguous or its meaning is doubtful, the circumstances surrounding the parties may be considered in ascertaining the parties’ intentions. Tampa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Aeon, Inc., 403 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Further, the interpretation the parties give to a contract may be the best indication of their intentions. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 131 So.2d 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Courts have also looked to the conduct of the parties throughout their course of dealings to determine their intentions and the meaning of the agreement. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So.2d 404, 407 (Fla. 1974); Mesch v. Berry, 528 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Finally, any ambiguity should be construed against the рarty that drafted the written contract provision. Aeon, Inc., 403 So.2d at 1004.
Given these rules of construction, the JCC did not err in finding that Claimant and Mayflower intended that any benefits received by the insured under this policy be based upon the premium basis contracted for, which represented the policyholders’ estimated earnings. The parties’ course of dealing supports this interpretation. As mentioned earlier, the carrier never audited Claimant‘s earnings or refunded any premium to the Davis‘. If the carrier had intended to pay benefits based on the policyholders’ actual earnings, it would havе sought to ascertain the value of those earnings and adjusted the premiums accordingly. Instead, both parties opted for an easier route, agreeing on a projected earnings level at the time they entered into the contract and continuing to apply that figure throughout the life of the contract.
This Court has previously affirmed AWW determinations stipulated to by both parties after an industrial accident. Williams v. Kraft, Inc., 585 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); I.A.T.S.E. v. Nesselroad, 534 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). And, the Supreme Court has upheld a pre-accident stipulation as to the value of meals. Bienvenido v. Fontainebleau Hotel, 128 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1961). An agreed upon AWW should also be allowed in this instance, especially in light of the fact that the actual earnings of an independent truck driver are difficult to calculate. Since parties can stipulate to an AWW after an
Appellants also argue that the estimated earnings listed in the contract do not bear a rational relationship to Claimant‘s actual earnings, as required by Fleitas. While it is clear that the Fleitas court only аllowed the contract rate to be used in cases where it bears a rational relationship to the claimant‘s actual wages, in the present case there are no specific numbers available from which to determine, with any degree of mathematical certаinty, whether Claimant‘s actual earnings bear a rational relationship to the contract amount. The E/C assert that the contract rate is 3.74 times Claimant‘s actual wage, which is one half the amount reported on the Davis’ 1986 income tax return, or $5,969.60. However, there is nothing to support the E/C‘s contention that this constitutes Claimant‘s actual wage for purposes of making this comparison. Claimant‘s specific situation must be analyzed to determine her actual wage. For instance, business expenses for a self-employed person may be handled differently depеnding on the business involved. Happle Solar Contractors v. Happle, 547 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Florida Timber Prods. v. Williams, 459 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (depreciation of equipment constitutes an expense); Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Goetzman, 430 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (rental value of equipment should be deducted from wage). Thus, an accurate determination may not be made without a full analysis of the situation. Although the E/C urge that the use of the tax return is proper, this court has held that “tax returns are not conclusive on this issue.” Alterman, 430 So.2d at 487. It is also improper for a JCC to determine the AWW by deducting business expenses from claimant‘s earnings for the year and then dividing it by the number of weeks in a year. Apholz v. North American Van Lines, 427 So.2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Despite the uncertainty involved, we do not think it is necessary to remand for a determination of Claimant‘s actual wages. In Fleitas, the contract ratе was 2.13 times the claimant‘s actual wages and there, the JCC required only that the contract rate be reasonably related to the value of the service provided, which test Claimant clearly meets here, where the $44,669 annual figure utilized by the JCC was the estimated wages of Mayflower‘s drivers as determined by Mayflower itself.
Finally, although the E/C argue that because Claimant did not work during most of the preceding thirteen week period, the JCC erred by finding that her AWW was 50% of the premium basis, we find Claimant‘s testimony that she was in partnership with her husband, with no evidence to the contrary, provides competent substantial evidence to support the JCC‘s finding. The general rule is that partners split profits equally unless otherwise agreed. Yarborough v. Kilbee, 307 So.2d 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Further, there is no other clear evidence to the contrary. We accept Claimant‘s uncontroverted testimony that she and Mr. Davis merely deposited the money from Mayflower into their joint account and withdrew it when needed. Lastly, unless this Court requires the JCC to figure the AWW according to
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the JCC‘s order.
ERVIN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.