OPINION
{1} In this case, we decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the managing member of a limited liability land development company (the LLC) did not breach his fiduciary duty to the other members of the LLC. In doing so, we must decide which party should bear the burden of proof in such a case and whether the burden of proof issue was adequately raised below. We also address whether the trial court abused its discretion in (1) allowing the testimony of a witness who was not on Defendant’s pretrial witness list and (2) determining that Defendant was the prevailing party for purposes of assessing costs. Finding no abuse of discretion with regard to any of these issues, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} In 1997, Plaintiffs Jerry and Sally Mayeux purchased a lot from Defendant Jim Winder located in one of Defendant’s subdivisions. (While Winder and his wife were both named defendants, we refer to them as “Defendant,” since all the relevant actions in the case were taken by Mr. Winder.) Because Plaintiffs liked Defendant’s style of subdividing, they told him that they would be interested in investing in similar projects. In 1998, the parties purchased some land located in Lincoln and Torrance counties and created a limited liability company, which they called Corona Ranch LLC. Plaintiffs and Defendant and his wife were the only members of the LLC. Under the parties’ operating agreement, Defendant was to be the sole managing member of the LLC, and he was authorized to exercise “general supervision, direction and control” over the LLC. The operating agreement also contained a mandatory buyout provision, in which the parties agreed that if Plaintiffs wanted to withdraw from the LLC, Defendant would be required to buy them out. The agreement contained a formula for calculating the purchase price under the mandatory buyout provision.
{3} In addition to Corona Ranch, Defendant was involved in several other land development LLCs. He marketed all of his properties, including the Corona Ranch properties, under one trade name, “Heritage Ranch.” Although the parties dispute the level of involvement, Plaintiff Sally Mayeux was involved in bookkeeping for the Corona Ranch LLC. Facts surrounding Sally Mayeux’s involvement in the LLC’s financial affairs, and the trial court’s eventual findings regarding this issue, will be discussed more fully below.
{4} Plaintiffs claim that sometime in 2002, they began to suspect that Defendant was using funds from the Corona Ranch LLC to pay for expenses generated by his other land development projects. At this time, they informed Defendant that they wanted to exercise their rights under the buyout provision. Plaintiffs claimed that their interest in the LLC was worth $1,500,792. Defendant replied that he would buy them out at a price of $205,000. Plaintiffs rejected Defendant’s offer and filed suit.
{5} Plaintiffs’ original complaint claimed breach of contract based on Defendant’s failure to comply with the terms of the buyout provision and fraud based on a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with misappropriation of funds. The complaint also requested an accounting and damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add a claim for conversion. At trial, Plaintiffs’ primary contention seems to have been that Defendant’s improper usage of funds had devalued the worth of the company. Plaintiffs specifically allege that Defendant (1) paid his life insurance premiums with LLC funds when there was no benefit to the LLC; (2) paid for advertising for his other Heritage Ranch properties with LLC funds; (3) watered his cattle improperly, causing the nearby village of Corona to refuse to renew an agreement under which water was provided to the Corona Ranch subdivision; (4) paid the water bill for the subdivision with LLC funds, charged the residents fees for water, and then did not reimburse the LLC; (5) hired other people to manage the LLC and paid them with LLC funds, even though the parties had agreed that he would perform all the management duties himself with no extra compensation; (6) claimed that a zoning restriction precluded him from subdividing as planned when in fact there was no such zoning restriction; and (7) failed to keep proper records of expenditures.
{6} After approximately a year and a half of litigation, Defendant moved to amend his answer to include counterclaims seeking recovery based on Plaintiffs’ management of the LLC’s capital accounts. It appears that the trial court never formally ruled on the motion to amend, but the court’s findings and conclusions show that the counterclaims were litigated and that Plaintiffs prevailed on them.
{7} In July 2004, the trial court conducted a three-day bench trial, hearing extensive testimony and admitting numerous exhibits. Plaintiffs testified on their own behalf and put on testimony from numerous fact witnesses. Defendant testified and put on testimony from his accountant and an expert accountant. Defendant testified that based on advice from his accountant, he now valued Plaintiffs’ interest in the LLC at $306,666, rather than the approximately $200,000 that he had initially offered. The trial court also allowed Defendant to call Ken Binkley, a partner in the advertising agency employed by Defendant. Plaintiffs objected to Binkley’s testimony on the ground that he was not on Defendant’s pretrial witness list. Finding no prejudice to Plaintiffs, the trial court allowed the testimony.
{8} After trial, the court issued a memorandum decision. It noted that “[t]he gravamen of the suit is that [Defendant] breached his fiduciary responsibility as Manager of Corona Ranch LLC by self[-]dealing.” The court stated:
Having heard the testimony of the parties and their witnesses I am satisfied that [Defendant] did not breach his fiduciary duty to the [Plaintiffs] nor did he breach his contract with them. I am satisfied that there has been no fraud. I am satisfied that the various expenses were reasonably allocated between the various entities and under consistently applied methods.... I find that [Defendant] performed his job as Manager of Corona Ranch LLC in good faith and in the best interest of the Company.
The court denied Defendant’s counterclaims, stating, “I do not make a credit for a negative capital account as I was not satisfied with the proof of that amount.”
{9} The court awarded Plaintiffs $306,666 for their interest in the LLC, the amount Defendant acknowledged at trial to be owing. The court clarified its decision by adopting many of Defendant’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. We address the substance of some of the court’s findings and conclusions in our discussion below. Subsequently, the court entered a Judgment and Final Decree, which adopted the memorandum decision and awarded Defendant costs as the prevailing party.
DISCUSSION
1. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
{10} On appeal, Plaintiffs have abandoned their other claims and argue only that they are entitled to damages based on Defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty. Their primary contention seems to be that the trial court applied the wrong standard to their breach of fiduciary duty claim by (1) putting the burden on Plaintiff to show a breach of fiduciary duty rather than requiring Defendant to demonstrate the propriety of his conduct, (2) requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) failing to apply the high standard appropriate to fiduciary duty claims and instead applying the lower standard appropriate to breach of contract claims. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court generally abused its discretion in finding, on the evidence presented, that Defendant did not breach his fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs’ theory for this argument seems to be that Defendant’s failure to keep detailed, written records was enough by itself to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
{11} Plaintiffs’ appellate briefing sets forth the facts in a light favorable to Plaintiffs. For example, Plaintiffs contend that they “proved” several different instances of self-dealing at trial. They also argue that “[t]here was substantial evidence in the case at bar that [Defendant] placed his own interests above those of Corona Ranch LLC and the [Plaintiffs] as minority, non-managing members in using Corona Ranch LLC assets and monies to benefit his private ranching operation and other land development LLCs in which [Plaintiffs] had no interest.” We note that when we review a trial court’s factual findings, the presence of evidence supporting the result opposite from that reached by the trial court is not relevant. See Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc.,
{12} Despite these statements regarding the strength of their own evidence, Plaintiffs do not appear to actually argue that the trial court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Nor do Plaintiffs identify any of the trial court’s findings to which they take exception. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA (“A contention that a verdict, judgment or finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence shall be deemed waived unless the argument has identified with particularity the fact or facts which are not supported by substantial evidence.”).
{13} Under these circumstances, we need not conduct a thorough review for substantial evidence. However, we note that Defendant testified at trial as to the propriety of the expenditures and other actions challenged by Plaintiffs. It was up to the trial court to determine whether Defendant was a credible witness and we will not second-guess the trial court’s judgment in that regard. Nor are Plaintiffs aided by their citation to Lawson v. Rogers,
{14} We now turn to Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in applying the wrong legal standards to their breach of fiduciary duty claim. We review this question de novo. See State v. Torres, 1999— NMSC-010, ¶ 28,
{15} Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred when it put the burden on them to prove that Defendant breached his fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he burden of proving fair dealing should have been shifted to [Defendant] to prove fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence, which he failed to prove.” We answer this contention both procedurally and on the merits.
{16} First, as a matter of procedure, we question whether Plaintiffs fairly invoked a ruling on the question of burden of proof. See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc.,
{17} Thus, if the trial court did not fully appreciate Plaintiffs’ burden of proof argument, it may be fairly said that Plaintiffs had no one to blame but themselves. Nevertheless, because we are to exercise our discretion to entertain issues on their merits, we will proceed to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ stated breach of fiduciary duty issues. See Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc.,
{18} In support of their argument that a defendant in a breach of fiduciary duty case should bear the burden of showing fair dealing, Plaintiffs cite to two out-of-jurisdiction cases. See Oakhill Assocs. v. D'Amato,
{19} We tend to agree with Plaintiffs, that in some instances, the burden should be on the fiduciary to show proper dealings. For example, in a case involving a transaction that creates a facial presumption of self-dealing, such burden shifting might be appropriate. Many of the eases stating Plaintiffs’ preferred rule involve such transactions. Oakhill Associates,
{20} Hum v. Ulrich,
{21} Here, most of the expenditures challenged by Plaintiffs were not presumptively suspect as were the transactions in Oakhill Associates and Hum. Plaintiffs’ argument was essentially that Defendant made a series of relatively small expenditures from Corona Ranch LLC funds that benefitted his other companies. For example, some of Plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact, all of which the trial court rejected, included the following:
38. Corona Ranch LLC purchased a Ford Explorer with Corona Ranch money and titled the vehicle in the Defendant’s name and paid $500 to Defendant Katrina Winder’s sister.
46. From 1999 to December 2002 [Defendant] paid from Corona Ranch LLC funds the sum of $300 to Hatch Mercantile ....
50. From 1999 to December 2002 [Defendant] paid from the Company funds the sum of $4,161.00 to Cheryl Vana as labor. ...
52. From 1999 to December 2002 [Defendant] paid from Corona Ranch LLC funds the sum of $1,179.35 in office supplies and $4,415.13 in postage....
Many of Plaintiffs’ other proposed findings involved transfers of funds from Corona Ranch LLC to other companies owned in whole or part by Defendant.
{22} Unlike the transactions in Oakhill Associates and Hum, we cannot say that most of these expenditures are presumptively unfair or even suspect. Many of them, such as the expenditures for postage, office supplies, labor, and the vehicle, are presumptively legitimate. As for the amounts paid to Defendant’s other businesses, they come closer to creating a presumption of impropriety, but there are also legitimate explanations for those expenditures. At trial, Defendant testified at length regarding his financial management of the various companies. Defendant explained that he would often make an expenditure that benefitted several of his companies, drawing the necessary funding from one of the companies, and then writing reimbursement cheeks to that company from the other companies. The trial court must have believed this testimony because it specifically held that “I am satisfied that the various expenses were reasonably allocated between the various entities and under consistently applied methods.”
{23} Thus, to the extent that most of Plaintiffs’ complaints concern matters on which they retained the burden of proof, we hold that no error occurred. See Nat’l Plan Adm’rs, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Ins. Co.,
{24} We also deem it noteworthy that Plaintiff Sally Mayeux was involved in the record keeping for the LLC. The parties heavily dispute the degree of her involvement and the duties she performed. For example, Defendant asserts that she “assumed and was assigned all bookkeeping [and accounting] responsibilities” for the company, that she “received all bank statements and cancelled checks ... directly from the company bank,” and that she “prepared and delivered financial statements and reports” to an accountant. Plaintiffs minimize Ms. Mayeux’s role, stating that she merely “enter[ed] numbers from check registers kept by [Defendant] into a computer bookkeeping program.”
{25} The trial court found the following facts:
63. Sally Mayeux generated, kept and maintained the financial books and records of Corona Ranch, LLC, and performed the responsibilities of bookkeeper for Corona Ranch, LLC between 1999 and mid-2002.
64. Sally Mayeux is formerly a licensed certified public accountant with education and experience to qualify her as the bookkeeper and accountant for Corona Ranch, LLC.
72. Between 1999 and mid-2002, Sally Mayeux received all cancelled checks and bank statements from the Corona Ranch, LLC operating account....
74. Between 1999 and mid-2002, Sally Mayeux prepared monthly financial reports for Corona Ranch, LLC including a general ledger, income statement, balance sheet, bank reconciliation, and other financial reports.
The trial court also entered the following conclusion of law:
101. By receiving monthly checks and bank statements, and preparing the financial statements, [Plaintiffs] waived, and are now estopped, from asserting any challenge to the expenses incurred, paid and allocated by [Defendant] as Manager of Corona Ranch, LLC.
{26} Plaintiffs’ awareness of and involvement in the financial affairs of the company further support our conclusion that it was fair for Plaintiffs to bear the burden of showing that Defendant’s facially legitimate expenditures were improper. In Dufoe v. Dufoe, No. 99-0463,
{26} In sum, we hold that in a case such as the present one where (1) a plaintiff challenges expenditures that do not themselves create a presumption of self-dealing and (2) the plaintiff is involved in the financial affairs of the partnership or LLC such that he or she has access to the entity’s records, the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty remains on the plaintiff. To the extent that one or two categories of expenses do raise a possible inference of self-dealing, there is nothing in the record clearly showing that the trial court did not properly apply the burden and standard of proof. Specifically, the trial court’s findings with regard to the presumptively legitimate expenses placed the burden of proof on Plaintiffs and explicitly ruled that Defendant’s evidence preponderated. With regard to other expenses, the trial court did not place the burden of proof on Plaintiffs, did not use the preponderance of the evidence standard, and instead affirmatively found that Defendant’s expenditures were properly accounted for. Under these circumstances, and in view of our concerns expressed above that Plaintiffs may not have presented their case in such a way that the trial court would have clearly understood what they were arguing, Plaintiffs have not convinced us that the record in this case shows such clear error as to call for a reversal. See Gonzales v. Lopez,
{28} Next, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court applied the wrong substantive standard to their breach of fiduciary duty claim. Plaintiffs claim that rather than applying the high standard applicable to fiduciary duty claims, the court relied either on the lower standard applicable to contract claims or on the standard articulated in the parties’ operating agreement, which is in good faith in the best interests of Corona Ranch LLC, and with such care including reasonable inquiry, using ordinary prudence, as a person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.
{29} As a general matter, we agree with Plaintiffs that a fiduciary relationship imposes a duty on the fiduciary that is greater than the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all contractual relationships. See Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C.,
{30} We do not agree that these statements indicate that the trial court was unaware of the higher standard applicable to fiduciary relationships. Because the parties’ agreement required Defendant to act “in good faith and in the best interests of the company,” and because Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, it is not surprising that the trial court would enter findings of fact using the language appropriate to those claims. Because none of the findings of which Plaintiffs complain actually mention fiduciary duty, we assume that those findings relate to Plaintiffs’ contract claims, rather than their breach of fiduciary duty claim. See Rojo,
{31} We also note that in its memorandum decision, the trial court specifically stated, “I am satisfied that [Defendant] did not breach his fiduciary duty to [Plaintiffs] nor did he breach his contract with them.” This mention of both theories of recovery further indicates that the court was aware of the difference between the two theories and did not improperly conflate them. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not apply the wrong legal standard to Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim.
{32} Finally, in a variation of what appears to be their substantial evidence argument, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion in finding no breach of fiduciary duty on the facts of this case and Plaintiffs ask us to award damages. We will only overturn a decision under the abuse of discretion standard where “the court’s ruling exceeds the bounds of all reason” or is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Edens v. Edens,
{33} In this case, the trial court heard three days of testimony. Defendant testified for several hours, and a brief overview of his testimony indicates that he explained to the court the contested expenditures. The trial court specifically found that “the various expenses were reasonably allocated between the various entities and under consistently applied methods.” Plaintiffs disagree with this finding, but they do not explicitly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it. Thus, as stated above, we need not review the evidence that was before the trial court to see whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. However, we are certain that Defendant’s testimony alone would have been a sufficient basis on which the trial court could have decided that there was no breach of fiduciary duty. See Sanchez,
2. TESTIMONY OF AN UNDISCLOSED WITNESS
{34} Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Ken Binkley, a partner in the advertising firm used by Defendant, to testify even though he was not on Defendant’s pretrial witness list. We do not find an abuse of discretion unless “the court’s ruling exceeds the bounds of all reason” or is “arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable.” Edens,
{35} Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not properly preserve their objection on this point. In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must “appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.” Woolwine,
[ATTORNEY]: Your honor, he wasn’t identified — advertising has been an issue from day one. It’s not something that he has just recently found out. I just grabbed my deposition of Mr. Binkley and it was just nothing more than trying to get copies of the invoices is what it was.
[THE COURT]: Well, there has been some fairly extensive testimony concerning the allocations.
[ATTORNEY]: Twelve pages is the extent of my deposition, your honor.
[THE COURT]: I can’t see the prejudice to plaintiffs by allowing this witness to come up, so your permission is granted.
Based on the attorney’s statement, the trial court would have understood that Plaintiffs objected to Binkley’s testimony on the grounds that (1) they would be prejudiced because they were unprepared to question him and (2) there was no legitimate reason for Defendant to have failed to disclose before trial the intention to call him. Under these circumstances, we hold that the objection was properly preserved because Plaintiffs “fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.” See Woolwine,
{36} The trial court has “broad discretion to admit or refuse testimony of witnesses whose identity was not revealed” before trial. Montoya v. Super Save Warehouse Foods,
{37} In Khalsa v. Khalsa,
{38} In Lewis ex rel. Lewis v. Samson,
{39} Here, Plaintiffs have alleged no prejudice besides their “lack of preparation and ability to counter ... Binkley’s testimony with that of another witness so late in the trial.” However, Plaintiffs have not indicated that they requested the opportunity to put on a rebuttal witness. Nor have Plaintiffs shown us that they asked for more time to conduct another deposition or interview of Binkley. See In re Estate of Heeter,
3. AWARD OF COSTS
. {40} Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding costs to Defendant as the prevailing party. Our Rules of Civil Procedure state that the prevailing party shall recover its costs “unless the court otherwise directs.” Rule 1-054(D)(1) NMRA. We have held that the trial court has broad discretion to award costs or to refuse to award them. See In re Adoption of Stailey,
{41} The issue we must determine is whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Defendant was the prevailing party. A prevailing party is defined as “the party who wins the lawsuit — that is, a plaintiff who recovers a judgment or a defendant who avoids an adverse judgment.” Dunleavy v. Miller,
{42} Plaintiffs argue that they are the prevailing party because (1) they recovered a money judgment, (2) Defendant lost on his counterclaims, and (3) the judgment was 50% higher than Defendant’s pretrial offer of settlement. Defendant essentially argues that he is the prevailing party because Plaintiffs lost on the claims for breach of contract, fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion and because the trial court’s accounting awarded Plaintiffs exactly the amount Defendant said their interest was worth at trial, an amount that was nearly $900,000 less than Plaintiffs requested.
{43} Under these facts, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Defendant to be the prevailing party and awarding him costs. We do agree with Plaintiffs that this is a close ease because Defendant lost on his counterclaims and had to pay Plaintiffs more than he offered pretrial. For these reasons, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party. However, where a trial court must exercise discretion in deciding between two possible rulings, either of which would be reasonable, we will not reverse the court’s decision. See Talley v. Talley,
{44} Moreover, we agree that Defendant’s arguments are stronger than Plaintiffs’ on the prevailing party issue. The valuation of Plaintiffs’ interest in the LLC was clearly the heart of the case. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, all the counts in their complaint asserted “alternative legal remedies that [Plaintiffs] claimed entitled them to a higher amount owed for their partnership interest,” although some of their other counts would also have supported their claims for punitive damages. With regard to that partnership interest, the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiffs in the amount of $306,666, the exact amount Defendant agreed was owing at trial, instead of the nearly $1.2 million Plaintiffs claimed. Thus, in light of the above and in light of the fact that it is Plaintiffs who are appealing, it seems fair to say that Defendant won on the “main issue of the ease.” See Hedicke,
CONCLUSION
{45} We affirm the decision of the trial court.
{46} IT IS SO ORDERED.