183 Wis. 382 | Wis. | 1924
The following opinion was filed February 12, 1924:
It appears without controversy under the facts in this case that at least two causes of action existed. Death was not immediate. Had Catherine Mayer survived, she would have had a right of action against the defendants Hipke and Kauth, if the allegations of the complaint were true. If the negligence of defendants Hipke and Kauth caused her death, her husband would be entitled to recover the damages sustained by him.
Sec. 4256, Stats., provides:
“Every such action [for wrongful death] shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person, . . . provided, that if there he no cause of action in favor of the estate of such decedent and the person or persons to whom the whole amount sued for and recovered belongs, as above provided, shall be the husband, widow, or parent or parents of the deceased, suit may at his or her or their option be brought directly in his dr her or their name or names instead of being brought in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person.”
The exception does not apply here for the reason that there is in this case, if the allegations of the complaint are true, a cause of action in favor of the estate of the decedent. Legault v. Malacker, 166 Wis. 58, 163 N. W. 476.
While rules of pleading have in recent years been relaxed from their former strictness, there should be some compliance with the statute requiring a statement of facts constituting a cause of action. No recovery can be had upon two causes of action where but one cause of action is stated or attempted to be stated. It would be very difficult in this case to determine upon which cause of action, if any, the plaintiff recovered, assuming that the complaint be amended to show that he is the special administrator of the estate of Catherine Mayer, deceased. It is certain there could be a recovery upon but one cause of action in any event under the pleadings in this case. In the view that we take of the case we do not find it necessary to further consider this aspect.
We call attention in passing to the form of the verdict as rendered. The jury assessed against the defendant Hipkc damages of $4,000 by reason of his negligence which caused the death of Catherine Mayer, and against Dr. Kauth for identically the same death caused by his negligence, $1,000.
A thorough search of the record fails to disclose any evidence whatever upon which the failure of Dr. Kauth to exercise reasonable care can be predicated. There is no claim that he should have made an earlier diagnosis when called in August, 1920, nor is it claimed that his diagnosis was wrong or that he did not properly advise the removal of the patient to a hospital for observation and treatment. There is no claim whatever that he was in any way negligent in procuring or recommending the services of Dr. Hipke, who, so far. as the record discloses, is an eminent surgeon of high standing and of a long and varied experience, nor is there the slightest evidence to show that he was guilty of any want of care while present in the operating room. He did not then nor at any time hold himself out "as a surgeon, but was there in his capacity as family physician, did what he was told to do, and outside of that had no duties to perform. It is claimed that it was his duty to instruct the nurses to count the sponges and to direct the operation, but there is no evidence to that effect. Assertion, insinuation, argument, and innuendo' cannot supply the place of evidence. When the nurses and physicians were assembled in the operating room of the hospital they were not there to prepare for a lawsuit but were engaged in an atte'mpt to re
We come now to a consideration of the question whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict as to the defendant Hipke. It was held in Paro v. Carter, 177 Wis, 121, 188 N. W. 68, that a surgeon who has left in the patient’s body a foreign substance cannot relieve himself from liability by showing that he followed the approved practice of the profession in his community.
There being no evidence of any failure on the part of Dr. Hipke to exercise due care in any other respect, we come down to' the crux of this case: Is there evidence to sustain a finding that the pack in question was left in the body of
“If this pack should have been placed in the abdominal cavity at the time of the appendical operation, it would be in front of the field of operation in which the removal of the kidney took place. The removal of the kidney would then bring into action the interposition of some tissues, a situation in which the gauze might be placed. That gauze, by the extension of the infection in the field from which the kidney was removed, became the site of the implantation or*393 extension of the infection. It would be likely to discharge the gauze through the point of least resistánce, which might be into the field of operation for the removal of the kidney.”
It is undisputed in this case that at the time of the third operation there was an area of infection in the pleural cavity at a point which had not been disturbed in either the ap-pendical operation or in the operations of August 10, 1920, and August 22, 1921. The process by which infection is thus transferred from one part of the body to another is known as metastasis, and it is undisputed that it may take place in any direction and may affect any part of the body; that it is more likely to be transferred to some point already disturbed, but that this is not necessarily true.
It is claimed that the presence of the pack should have been discovered at the time of the second operation on August 22, 1921. The evidence upon this point as well as argument of counsel rests upon the assumption that it was left there during the kidney operation. There is no evidence to show that it was the duty of Dr. Hipke to explore an unopened abdomen in search of a supposititious foreign body. The testimony is the other way. It appears without dispute that Dr. Hipke at that time made a complete exploration of the field of the 1920 operation and found no pack or other foreign substance, but discovered a pus cavity, which he thought accounted for the continued presence of the discharge. He was also of the opinion, although it was not demonstrated, that the infection of the kidney was of a tubercular nature and that wounds under such circumstances frequently fail to heal or at least healing is long delayed. It is equally clear that it would have been unwise and improper for him to have attempted to explore the abdominal cavity under the circumstances. He had no reason to suspect the presence of a foreign substance in the abdominal cavity. To have made an exploratory incisión would almost certainly have extended the area of infection into the abdominal cavity.
We have carefully reviewed the evidence in this case. We cannot state it in its entirety. We are convinced, however, that no evidence offered and received in the case warrants a finding to a reasonable certainty that the pack in question was left in the body of Catherine Mayer at the time of the operation on August 10, 1920. In the absence of a finding to that effect, based upon proper evidence, there is nothing to charge the defendant Hipke with negligence in any pther respect. In fact, no negligence is claimed which does not depend directly upon the fact that the pack was left in the body of the patient at the time of that operation. Upon the whole evidence, a finding that the pack was left there in 1917 would have just as much support as a finding that it was left there in 1920. We do not need to cite cases to the
In the view we take of the case, other questions raised need not be considered.
By the Court. — Judgment appealed from is reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.
The respondent moved for a rehearing.
In-support of the motion there was a brief by Philip Leh-ner of Princeton, attorney, and P. H. Martin of Green Bay, of counsel.
In opposition thereto there -was a brief by Arthur F. Belits, counsel for appellant Hipke, and Freeman & Ben-dinger, attorneys, and McGovern, Hannan, Devos & Reiss, of counsel, all of Milwaukee.
On April 8, 1924, the mandate was amended to read as follows:
By the Court. — As to the defendant Kauth the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, with directions to dismiss the complaint. As to the defendant Flipke the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.