Appellant challenges an order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute. We affirm.
Appellant was the Chief Executive Officer of a publicly traded Florida corporation. Appellees held some of the corporation’s stock, which was restricted pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities Act of 1933. After holding the stock for one year, ap-pellees requested the corporation to have the restrictive legend lifted so that they might -transfer a certain amount of the stock within the volume limit of Rule 144. When the corporation refused to do so, appellees filed this action for damages and injunctive relief against both the corporation and appellant, individually.
Essentially, appellees alleged that appellant engineered the refusal of their request in violation of the corporation’s and the appellant’s statutory and common law fidu
Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction argued that the complaint did not allege ultimate facts showing that he took any actions in Florida, nor did it allege that he took any action other than in his capacity as a corporate officer. Appellant’s motion was accompanied by his affidavit stating that he was a resident of California, that he never took part in any business or business venture in Florida other than on behalf of the corporation, and that none of the actions alleged in the amended complaint occurred in Florida. The court, without stating the basis of its ruling, denied the motion.
Appellant argues here five grounds for reversal: (1) the “corporate shield doctrine” protects appellant individually; (2) no tort occurred in Florida; (3) no injury occurred in Florida; (4) appellant did not engage in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida; and (5) no breach of a contract occurred in this state. Because we conclude that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over appellant based on the general jurisdiction statute, section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, we affirm the court’s order on that basis and pretermit the remaining grounds argued.
Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (2001), provides:
A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.
“Substantial and not isolated activity” has been found to mean “continuous and systematic general business contact” with Florida. See Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd.,
AFFIRMED.
