80 Ind. 124 | Ind. | 1881
— In this case, the appellee Robert Greenhill, for
It is then further alleged in the complaint, that the said several claims were for labor performed and goods furnished, at the special request of said Thompson, and that the same were then due and wholly unpaid; that on or about the third day of May, 1881, the said Henry Thompson left the State of Indiana ; that at that time, and long prior thereto, the said Thompson was financially embarrassed, and left the State for the purpose of delaying and defrauding his creditors and the plaintiff, and for the purpose of avoiding the service of process on him; and that, by reason of said Thompson’s having so left the State, it was impossible to secure service' of notice upon him of the pendency of this action, and of this application for the appointment of a receiver; that, prior to and at the time of his departure from the State, the said Thompson was the sole proprietor and manager of the said hotel, and the business, rights and property appurtenant thereto, and the good-will
And the appellee Greenhill further said that all the property in said hotel, belonging to said Thompson, was subject to' levy and sale to pay the debts due the said creditors, but that any such sale would greatly diminish the value of said property, and totally destroy the good-Avill of said hotel; that said property was in great danger of being wasted and destroyed, and might not be sufficient to pay and satisfy the demands of said creditors of said Thompson, if the same should be allowed to remain in the hands and under the control of said Edwin J. May; and that, if the said property and business were properly managed, the claims of said creditors and others, including the pretended claim of said Edwin J. May, could be saved to them and other creditors, if any, of said Thompson.
This complaint was verified by the oath of the appellee Greenhill, and filed in the court below, on the 31st day of May, 1881. Afterward, on June 3d, 1881, a summons was issued on said complaint for the defendants named therein, addressed to the sheriff of Marion county, and commanding him to summon them to appear in said court on the first day of its ensuing August term, and answer said complaint. The sheriff returned this summons, as served on said Edwin J. May, on June 3d, 1881, and that the defendant Henry Thompson was not found in his bailiwick.
On the 4th day of June, 1881, the court sustained the motion of the appellee Greenhill for the appointment of a receiver, as prayed for in his verified complaint. Thereupon, the court ordered in substance, that Albert W. Wishard should be appointed a receiver to take charge of the property named in the complaint, and to perform the duties thereinafter specified; and the appellant, Edwin J. May, was ordered to deliver over to the receiver all and singular the personal property, then in his possession, belonging to, or a part of, and situate in the “ Occidental Hotel,” in the city of Indianapolis, which was in the hotel and belonging to the defendant Henry Thompson, in any manner, on the 1st day of May, 1881, or since, or wheresoever else the same might be, which then or since belonged to Henry Thompson in any
The appellant Edwin J. May objected to the order of the court for the appointment of a receiver, and his objections haying been overruled by the court, he excepted to such ruling and filed his bill of exceptions. The said Edwin J. May has appealed to this court from the order for the appointment of a receiver, and perfected his appeal within ten days from the date of such order. The record fails to show that the defendant Henry Thompson appeared and answered in this action in the circuit court, or that he had any notice, reasonable or otherwise, of the pendency of the action and of the application for the appointment of a receiver, before the court made the order for the appointment of a receiver.
The first three errors assigned by the appellant, Edwin J. May, call in question the order of the court for the appointment of a receiver, to take possession of personal goods and chattels, rights, credits and demands, alleged in the complaint to be the property of the defendant Henry Thompson. It is earnestly insisted by the appellant’s counsel, that the court was not authorized by any law of this State to appoint a receiver to take possession of the personal estate described in the complaint as the property of the defendant Thompson, under the circumstances shown in and by the record of this cause. The complaint alleged that Thompson had left the State, the summons issued for him in this case had been returned, apparently on the day of its issue, as to him “ not found,” he had not appeared and answered in this action, nor had any notice, reasonable or otherwise, been given him of the pendency of this action and of the appellee’s motion for
The appellant May has also assigned as error, that the appellee’s complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or to authorize the court to appoint a receiver. This error, we think, is well assigned. The complaint does not state, nor attempt to state, any cause of action against the appellant, May. As against the defendant Henry Thompson, the case made by the allegations of the complaint is not a case lor the appointment of a receiver. It was not alleged therein that the appellee Greenhill, or either of those persons for whom he sued, had any lien of any kind upon the property mentioned in the complaint. Conceding the truth of all the facts alleged in the complaint, precisely as they are stated, it seems to us that, without any resort to the equitable powers of the court, the law of this State afforded the appellee and those persons for whom he sued, a full, complete and ample remedy, by attachment against Henry Thompson, and process of garnishment against Edwin J. May.
For the reasons given, we are of the opinion that the appellee has mistaken his remedy, if he has any, 'and that the
The judgment is reversed, at the appellees’ costs, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to the court to vacate and set aside its order for the appointment of a receiver herein,, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion..