114 Misc. 106 | N.Y. App. Term. | 1921
The landlord has brought a summary . proceeding to recover possession of a house leased to the defendant after the expiration of the defendant’s term. At the trial the petition was dismissed on the ground that the landlord’s remedy by summary proceeding was suspended by chapter 942 of the Laws of 1920. That statute provides that in view of the existing public emergency no summary proceeding “ shall be maintainable to recover the possession of real property * * * occupied for dwelling purposes ’ ’ except in certain contingencies; and the only question in this case is whether the house leased by the tenant is “ occupied for dwelling purposes ” within the meaning of the statute.
No evidence was presented at the trial, but the tenant conceded, and the landlord has accepted the concession, that the premises which the landlord seeks to recover are “ a house in the City of New York occupied for dwelling purposes and for the purposes of this record, there are sixteen rooms in the house
It is quite evident that the words “ dwelling purposes ” are not capable of a fixed definition which will be always applicable regardless of the context in which they are used, and an examination of the cases in which these words have been construed shows that the courts have placed one construction on them when used in a statute defining burglary, and another construction "when used in a statute intended to restrict the granting of liquor licenses in residential districts; and they have placed one construction on them when used in a restrictive covenant in a deed and another construction on them when used in a warranty or condition in an insurance policy. This case itself furnishes a most striking example of the impossibility of finding a definition of the words that will satisfy all cases, for though the landlord asks us to reverse a finding that the house is “ occupied for dwelling purposes ” within the meaning of the statute, he has accepted a concession in which it is expressly stated that “ the house is occupied for dwelling purposes.” It is plain that if we give the words a broad signification or even the ordinary signification in which they were used by the parties at the trial, then we must hold that the trial judge correctly held that the landlord’s petition must be dismissed under the express provisions of the statute; and we can give these words a narrower signification only if a narrower construction will carry out the legislative intent. The statute under consideration is a remedial and not a penal statute, but it was enacted to meet an extraor
It is plain that the legislature did not intend its extraordinary remedies to apply to premises hired by the tenant for purposes of profit, even though that profit be made by the tenant in operating a hotel, a rooming house or a boarding house. The extraordinary laws do not prevent the lessee of such premises from securing from his guests all the compensation which he can induce or compel them to pay for housing, and it may well be argued that when the legislature used the words •“ occupied for dwelling purposes ” it intended an occupation by the tenant for such purposes, and that the statute should not be construed as including premises which are occupied by the tenant for the purpose of providing dwelling or shelter to others for the tenant’s profit.
For the purposes of this appeal, I have assumed that this is the correct construction of the statute, but even if so construed, it seems to me that its provisions are broad enough to protect the tenant in this case. Obviously the legislature did not intend to
Order should therefore he affirmed, with twentyffive dollars costs.
Guy and Wagner, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed, with twenty-five dollars costs.